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The main character of the construction projects is complexity where many 
human and non-human factors and variables play essential roles. So, when  change 
orders occur all projects performance strongly affected. A recent survey of 
professional engineers identified changes as the major cause of project failure and 
Gaza Strip is not exception where the main cause of delay, over budgeting, and 
productivity losing in Gaza Strip are due to change orders.        
 This research discusses the change orders and their impact on projects 
performance in the Gaza Strip using a combination of interviews and 15 case studies. 
These studies encompassed 6 educational building projects, one of which was 
rehabilitation, 4 health building projects, two of which were rehabilitation, and, 5 
residential building projects carried out in the Gaza Strip. These projects were 
investigated to collect the data required for in-depth study and analysis. The projects 
documented and analyzed were between 1996 and 2005. 
From  the case studies and interviews, factors influencing the number of 
change orders in the Gaza strip were determined and  then the impact of change 
orders on cost, time, and productivity for each factor was also determined for the 15 
case studies. The factors were ranked according to their occurrences and impact on 
projects performance to find the most important factors.  
A simulation model was built to model change orders occurrences and their 
impact on cost, time, and productivity for building projects in the Gaza Strip. 
Verification of the model was checked and was given 97% accuracy in forecasting 
increase in cost, 99% accuracy in forecasting decrease in cost, and 96% accuracy in 
forecasting time extension. The validity of the model was also checked firstly by 
interviews and then by examining a random case, where it gave  97% accuracy in 
forecasting increase in cost, and 98% in forecasting extension on time, which means 
that the simulation model can forecast the impact of change orders on project 
performance in the Gaza strip.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
Change affects every aspect of human endeavors, and construction is not an 
exception. A recent survey of professional engineers identified change as the major 
cause of project failure (Hallock, 2006). As a result of making some interviews in 
Gaza Strip, change orders play a significant role in construction because they have a 
great impact on cost, schedule, quality, safety, and productivity. So, they are one of 
the major causes of project failure. 
The concept of changes in Gaza is unclear, so project parties deal with their 
construction management problems as reactants without depending on any deep 
scientific concept. Because of that, this research intends to provide project parties in 
Gaza Strip with an effective change orders management tool. This tool is a simulation 
model which explains to contractors how change orders occur and how such orders 
impact performance. 
This research will contribute to the creation of a tool in forecasting the impact 
of change orders on projects' performance.  
  
1.1 Background  
 There are no in-depth studies conducted in the Gaza Strip to discuss change 
orders and their impact on performance. However, change orders may be found as 
minor factors in some studies, for example change orders take (relative importance 
index) RII equal 0.65 in their impact on time and cost over runs on construction 
projects in the Gaza Strip (Al-Najar, 2008). In affecting the performance of 
construction project the RII was equal 0.65 (Abo-Shaban, 2008).  
 
1.1.1 Change order definition 
A change order is an action that specifies and justifies a change of the scope of 




cost, or both (cited by Mokbel, 2003). It is also defined as a change is any 
modification to the contractual guidance provided to the contractor by the owner, 
owners agent or design engineer (Mokbel, 2003). 
 
1.1.2 Types of change orders 
Change orders have four main types. Those types are actual, constructive, 
cardinal, and conditional (Hunt, 2005). According to CSU (2000) the types of change 
orders are normal change orders, and emergency change orders. 
 
1.1.3 Major factors influencing the occurrences of changes 
 The group of major factors influencing the number of changes are as follows 
(Boot, 2005; Hallock, 2006): 
i. Design errors 
ii. Changes in market conditions 
iii. Scope and quantities of work 
iv. External conditions 
v. Differing site conditions  
vi. Suggestion to initiate better 
vii. Changes in design preference 
viii. Contract conditions  
ix. Actions by others 
x. final coordination  
 
1.1.4 Impact of change orders  
There are numerous effects brought about by changes and change order in 
construction. In this section, the researcher examines some of the effects commonly 
encountered. According to Arain and Pheng (2005), change orders have a potential 
effect on the cost, time, productivity, quality, health and safety, hiring new 
professionals, delay in payment, rework and demolition, tarnish a firms reputation, 
poor professional relations and disputes among professionals.  
 
1.1.5 Controls 




1. Owner  
The owner can cause damaging impact through failure to understand scope objectives 
and program for the project. Too many changes can cause disruption to the project 
coordination and construction sequencing (Atkins and Simpson, 2006).  
2. Contractor 
One of the most damaging impacts on a project is contractor installation of 
nonconforming work that the owner accepts to save remediation time or avoid forced 
correction efforts (Atkins and Simpson, 2006).  
3. Architect 
 The architect can cause disruption and damaging impact through excessive errors and 
omissions that can occur when construction documents are poorly prepared and 
coordinated (Atkins and Simpson, 2006).  
Therefore, the control must be in the design sage, construction stage, and 
design-construction interface stage (Arain and Pheng , 2005).  
 
1.1.6 Theoretical model for change orders 
Arain and Pheng (2006a) built a good model for change management system 
(CMS). The model consists of six fundamental stages linked to two main components, 
a knowledge-base and a controls selection shell for making more informed decisions 
for effective management of variation orders. The database was developed through 
the collection of data from source documents of past projects, questionnaire survey, 
literature review, and in-depth interview sessions with the professionals who were 
involved in the projects. The knowledge-base was developed through initial sieving 
and organization of data from the database. 
 
1.2 Research Outline 
This research comprises seven chapters. Chapter One is an introduction 
explaining the importance of this research study and its objectives. Chapter Two 
contains the change orders review of literature. Chapter Three highlights the survey 
work. It also defines the causes, effects, and the controls as they are used in the 
survey. Chapter Four illustrates the research methodology employed for dealing with 




pinpoints the results and findings of the model. Chapter Seven presents the study 
conclusions and recommendations.  
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
 A change order is a written order to the contractor, signed by the 
owner, and issued after the execution of the contract, authorizing a change in the work 
or an adjustment in the contract sum or time (Hallock, 2006). Changes in drawings 
and contract documents usually lead to change in the contract price and/or schedule. 
Changes also increase the possibility of contractual disputes. In general, changes 
present problems to all parties involved in the construction process. Changes are the 
major cause of project failure (Hallock, 2006). From some interviews which was done 
with some construction managers in Gaza Strip, change orders were the main cause of 
increasing in contract value and/or the extension of time.  
 
1.4 Aim  
The aim of the thesis is not only to determine the major factors causing 
changes and their impacts on performance, but also building a simulation model for 
predicting their impacts.  
 
1.5 Objectives  
The main objectives of the study are: 
1- Determining the major factors influencing change orders in the building 
projects in Gaza Strip.  
2- Determining the impacts of change orders on cost, schedule, and productivity.  
3- Building a simulation model to measure the impact of change orders on time, 
cost, and productivity for building projects in the Gaza Strip.  
 
1.6 Key Questions  
What are the major factors influencing the number of change orders? Is there a 
significant impact of those factors on performance? Is it possible to build a simulation 
model of change orders and their impact on performance? How can contractors, 





1.7 Methodology  
The methodology used in conducting this research includes the following: 
1- Literature review. 
2- Interviews. 
3- Case studies.  
4- Analysis. 
5- Building a simulation model.  
6- Conclusion, recommendations, and further studies.  
Following is a detailed description of the research methodology.  
 
1.7.1 Literature review 
Developing a better understanding of the research objectives, a comprehensive 
literature review was done to achieve the following: 
1- Determining the definition, types, and actions related to change orders. 
2- Identifying the major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders 
in the Gaza Strip. 
3- Identifying the impact of changes on time and the methods used to 
measure delay factors. 
4- Identifying the impact of changes on productivity and the methods 
employed to measure productivity losses during changes. 
5- Identifying the impact of changes on cost and the methods utilized to 
measure the cost variation. 
 
1.7.2 Interviews  
 An interview approach encompassing three main phases was carried out in the 
Gaza Strip aimed at collecting the required information for in-depth study and 
analysis.  
 
1.7.3 Case studies 
Case studies are the main tool in this research. Fifteen building projects were 
taken as case studies and the following tasks were conducted: 
1- Collecting the contract documents, monthly reports, weekly reports, daily 




2- Communicating with each project manager, owner, and contractor to collect 
the project history. 
3- Determining the major factors influencing the occurrences of each change.  
4- Determining the impact of each change on performance from projects 
documents and interviews. 
 
1.7.4 Analysis 
The data was analyzed as follows:  
1- Statistical analysis was used to analyze the data to rank the factors according 
to their importance and impacts.  
2- By calculating the frequency of % occurrences, the weight of each factor 
causing occurrences of changes was found and the factors were ranked 
according to their occurrences. Afterward, the mean of impact of each factor 
was calculated and the factors were re-ranked according to their impact.  
3- The probability distribution of the factors and their impact were calculated to 
build the simulation model using Arena (Cor, 1998). 
 
1.7.5 Model building 
The data collected through the case studies was used to build the simulation 
model. Then, the impact of changes on cost, schedule, and productivity would appear 
when users input the changes. A simple flow chart for building the model is shown in 
Figure 1.1. 
 
1.7.6 Conclusion, recommendations, and further studies  
Finally, the fulfillment of the objectives of this research was tested, and some 
recommendations were derived.  
The problems were discussed and consequently further studies were 
suggested.  
 
1.8 Scope and Limitations 
The study was limited to building construction projects (i.e. projects costing 
over 0.2 million dollars in the Gaza Strip executed by building contractors Grade 1 

























Literature Review  
Change orders take a middle rank in their impact on time and cost over runs 
on construction projects in Gaza strip (Al-Najar, 2008). Also they take a middle rank 
in affecting the performance of construction projects (Abo-Shaban, 2008).  
  
2.1 Change Order Definition  
Webster's dictionary defines change in the construction industry as 
transformation or modification, a variation or deviation, the substitution of one thing 
for another, and a replacement or substitution (Galloway, 2007).  
In construction, change order is defined as "an action that specifies and 
justifies a change to the scope of a construction contract that alters the original time of 
completion or the project total cost, or both" (Mokbel, 2003). 
A change is any modification to the contractual guidance provided to the 
contractor by the owner, owners agent, or design engineer (CII, 2000).  
Any event, which results in a modification of the original scope, execution 
time or cost of work (Lee, 2001).  
Change means movement, and movement means friction. Only in the 
frictionless vacuum of a nonexistent abstract world can movement or change 
occur without that abrasive friction of conflict (Hallock, 2006). 
A Change Order is a written instrument prepared by the Architect and signed 
by the Owner, Contractor and Architect (Libor et al, 2003). 
The impact of multiple changes is define as large, untimely, and numerous 
change orders have a bad effect on productivity (Galloway, 2007). According to CII 
(2000), the problems exacerbated when multiple changes are introduced into the 
project. 
 Change orders have four main types. Those types are actual, constructive, 




normal change orders, and emergency change orders. 
Actual change: An actual change arises in those circumstances where the 
owner directs a change to the scope of work (Hunt, 2005). 
Constructive change: A constructive change occurs when the owner, by his 
action and/or inaction, changes the scope of work, but does not recognize it as a 
change (Hunt, 2005). 
Cardinal change: A cardinal change has long been recognized in the federal 
sector of contracting (Hunt, 2005). Also, it is a change or series of changes that are 
beyond the scope of the contract (Libor et al, 2003; Guerrant, 1997).  
 
2.2 The Legal Aspects 
No one can deny that change orders have a great impact on the performance of 
projects; therefore, most contracts contain specific clauses that indicate who is 
authorized to take these decisions. In many construction contracts, the engineer has 
the authority to order or approve changes to the works as specified in the contract 
(International Labour Organization, 2006). On the other hand, change orders in some 
contracts are used when the Owner and Contractor agree on the price and the change 
in schedule (ECAT, 2003). 
The worst impacts of change orders are on cost, schedule, and productivity, 
where this impact comes from the parties which have the responsibility. These parties 
may cause damaging impact as follows:  
1 The owner can cause bad impact through failure to understand scope objectives 
and program for the project. The repeated numbers of changes can cause 
disruption to the project coordination and construction sequencing (Atkins and 
Simpson, 2006).  
2 Contractor installation of nonconforming work is one of the worst impacts on a 
project. The owner accepts to save remediation time or avoid forced correction 
efforts (Atkins and Simpson, 2006). 
3 The architect can cause disruption and bad impact through errors, omissions, and 
other factors in design errors group. That can occur when construction 






2.3 Major Factors Influencing the Occurrences of Change Orders 
 Factors causing change orders in many other countries were collected from 
many previous studies. Table 2.1 shows the major factors influencing the occurrences 
of change orders.  
 
Table 2.1: Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders 











 Inconsistencies.  
 Impossibilities.  
Change in design request.  
Design criteria changes.  
Inadequate design. 
 Change in design by consultant.  
Design complexity.  
Inadequate working drawing 
details. 
Inadequate shop drawing 
details.  
Consultants lack of required 
data. 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements. 
Change in specifications by 
consultant. 
Lack of contractors 
involvement in design. 
(County, 2005; Libor et al, 
2003; WSDOT, 2007; 
Hallock, 2006; Cor, 1998). 
(Libor et al, 2003; WSDOT, 
2007; Arain and Pheng, 2005; 







(Arain, 2005; Arain and 
Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 





Table 2.1: Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders (contd.) 
# Group Factors References 
2 Changes in 
market 
conditions 
Specified item became 
unavailable.  
New products became available, 
cheaper, more efficient. 






(Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi 
and Al-Marzoug, 2008). 
3 Scope and 
quantities of 
work 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work. 
Significant alteration of the 
work. 
Method of construction:  
 
Final measurements / 
calculations. 




Materials plan errors.  
 
 
Change of plans or scope by 
owner. 
Change in specifications by 
owner. 
Change in the owner's 
requirements (changes in 
scope).  
Owner, architect or contractor, 
contractor desire to improve his 
financial conditions. 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998; 
WSDOT, 2007). 
(Arain, 2005; Arain and 
Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain, 2005; Arain and 
Pheng, 2005). 
(Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi 
and Al-Marzoug, 2008). 
 
(Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi 





Table 2.1: Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders (contd.) 
# Group Factors References 
3 Scope and 
quantities of 
work 
Contractor financial difficulties. 
Additional or modified scope of 
work. 
Change of schedule by owner.  
Inadequate project objectives.  
Impediment in prompt decision 
making process. 
Obstinate nature of owner. 
Change in work sequence. 
(Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi 
and Al-Marzoug, 2008). 
 
(Libor et al, 2003). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 




Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions. 
uncovering unknown existing 
conditions.  
Strikes.  
Extreme weather condition. 
Material non- availability. 
Unforeseen site condition. 
Presence of field conditions not 















Differing site conditions. 
Safety considerations. 
Differing subsurface conditions. 
 
Differ from conditions 
represented in the bid 
documents. 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 






Suggestions to initiate faster. 








Table 2.1: Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders (contd.) 




Value engineering. (Al-Dubaisi, 2000), (Al-Jishi 
and Al-Marzoug, 2008; 
Mokbel, 2003). 
7 Changes in 
design 
preference 
Nonperformance of a team 
member.  
Delays in the project.  
Defective workmanship.  
Unavailability of skills. 
 
 
Unavailability of equipment. 
 
 
Poor procurement process.  




(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi 
and Al-Marzoug, 2008; Arain 
and Pheng, 2005). 
(Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi 
and Al-Marzoug, 2008; Arain 
and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 




Size of project. 
Magnitude of facility. 
Type of construction ( new  
renovation ). 
 Previous similar projects 
between owners and contractor. 
Type of contract. 
Owner project's budget.  
Consultants lack of judgment 
and experience. 
Lack of consultants knowledge 
of available materials. 











(Arain and Pheng, 2005).  
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005).  
 





Table 2.1: Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders (contd.) 
# Group Factors References 
8 Contract 
conditions 
Honest wrong beliefs of 
contractor. 
Equipment obstinate nature of 
consultant. 
Materially unbalanced Bid. 
Mathematically unbalanced Bid.  
Contractors desired 
profitability. 
Contractors obstinate nature. 
Lack of a specialized 
construction manager. 
Fast track construction. 
Contractors lack of judgment 
and experience. 
Lack of strategic. 
Contractors lack of required 
data. 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005).  
 




(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 












A prevalent practice on this 
project and/or district. 
Emergency.  
Building codes/inspector. 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998; Libor et 
al, 2001).  
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998; Libor 
and Lewis, 2003).  
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998; Libor 









Table 2.1: Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders (contd.) 
# Group Factors References 
9 Actions by 
others 
User needs. 
Review of the project by the 
proper governmental agency. 
Addition of new work or 
deletion of work.  
Acceleration. 
 
Suspension of work. 
 





(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Ohio Department of 
Transportation, 1998). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 




Mechanical and electrical 
provision. 
Lack of coordination: 
Technology changes.  
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005; Al-
Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi and 
Al-Marzoug, 2008). 
 
2.4 Impact of Change Orders 
Change orders have numerous effects on construction industry. In the following 
sections, some of these effects which are commonly encountered were examined.  
 
2.4.1 Impact of changes on cost 
Change orders have an impact on cost, whose direct changes can be easily 
calculated. However, items such as home-office overhead, increased labor costs, 
equipment and material costs, financing costs, and overhead, are not easily 
quantifiable (Abdul-Malak et al, 2002).  
The change in cost was defined as the difference between the cost at the end of 





Serag and Oloufa (2007) built a model to calculate the impact of changes on 
cost based on (Equation 2.2) and concluded that only 57% of the changes of the 
response variable increase the contract price.  
   
The increases in cost resulting from any major additions or alterations in the 
design which may eventually increase the project cost. In every construction project, a 
contingency sum is usually allocated to cater for possible changes in the project, while 
keeping the overall project cost intact (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
2.4.2 Impact of changes on time 
Completion schedule delay is a frequent result of variations in construction 
projects (Arain and Pheng, 2005). It can be defined as the difference between the time 
used to complete the whole project and the estimated time to complete the project 
where (Equation 2.3) shows that (Ibbs et al, 2003). 
 
Logistic delays may occur due to changes that require new materials and 
equipment. Arain and Pheng (2005) observed that logistic delays have significant 
effects on changes in construction projects. 
Frequent procurement delay may occur in the project due to changes that 
require new materials and specialized equipment (Arain and Pheng, 2005; Al-Dubaisi, 
2000; Al-Jishi and Al-Marzoug, 2008). 
CPM analysis is a useful method in identifying whether the time needed to 
finish an activity has affects on finishing time or not, attributing each part to the party 
responsible for it, and studying the overall impacts on the project schedule. There are 
three established delay analysis techniques (viz. the what-if technique, the but-for 
technique, and the time impact analysis (Abdul-Malak et al, 2002).  
 
2.4.3 Impact of change orders on labor productivity  




particular project and, when possible, performing differential analyses between 
normal and impacted periods of the work. Industry studies alone are of limited use 
(McEniry, 2007). Interruption, delays, and redirection of work during change orders 
have a negative impact on labor productivity (Arain and Pheng 2005; Al-Dubaisi, 
2000; Al-Jishi and Al-Marzoug, 2008). 
Cumulative impact on productivity is not just a theoretical concept but also a 
real occurrence on construction projects suffering numerous changes, the impact of 
which is difficult to recognize even if all the individual changes are recognized and 
priced (Ibbs, 2007). 
The first trial to measure the productivity losses during change orders was 
conducted by Leonard (1987), who established the relationship between change 
orders and the productivity loss illustrated in Figure2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between change orders and productivity loss (Leonard, 1987) 
 
Many industry professionals believe that changes implemented late in a 
project cause a greater loss of labor efficiency (Hanna, 1999). 
Hanna et al (2002) calculated the expected loss in labor productivity by using 





Measuring productivity losses in construction industry has different ways 
according to Abdul-Malak et al (2002), who have cited six methods. These methods 
are: the total cost method, the modified total cost method, the factor-based methods, 
the baseline method, the modified baseline method and interesting methodology to 
estimate disruption effects. These methods are all used to measure total productivity 
losses.  
 The above six methods are to measure the cumulative impact of change orders 
but to provide a quantitative method for both owners and contractors to determine if 
change has impacted a project. CII (2000) generated a linear regression equation to 
predict the magnitude of impact of change orders on labor productivity. The linear 
regression given by (Equation 2.5) is used to predict the magnitude of impact of 
change orders on labor productivity (% productivity loss). 
The definition of each of the independent factors listed in the above equation is given 
in (Table 2.2). 
A good distribution between changes and productivity (Figure 2.2 and 2.3) 
and a formula to determine productivity loss during changes was generated by Ibbs 
(2003), this formula is as follows:  
 
Where, 
PRODUnimpacted = Productivity for an un impacted project period. 
PRODImpacted = Productivity for an impacted project period. 
W-HRUnimpacted = Number of Work-Hours for an unimpacted project period. 
W-HRImpacted = Number of Work-Hours in an impacted project period. 
Ibbs et al, (2007) built an impact of changes model to deal with productivity 
loss due to change orders. Figure 2.4 shows that.  
The main factors of productivity loss during changes are: Intensity (Number of 
change orders - their frequency - ratio of change orders hours to contract hours), 
timing in relation, work type, type of impact, project phase, and on-site management 





2.4.4 Quality degradation 
The quality of work was usually poor because of frequent changes which 
contractors tended to compensate for the losses (CII, 1995; Ndihokubwayo and 
Haupt, 2007). 
 
Table 2.2: Equation 2.5 factors definition (CII, 2000) 
Factor  Definition  Limits 
Percentage change Percentage of change on project in terms of original 
budgeted work hours 
2.5% to 
90% 
PM% Time on 
project 








Did you track productivity for the project? 
(input[work hours] output[units installed]. The 
contractor could use one of the following: 
Track % complete by earned value. 
Track % complete by actual earned 
work-hours. 
Track % complete by actual installed quantities 
0 = NO 




Did overmanning occur on the project? 
[Estimated peak manpower 
Actual man power] < 0.77 
0 = NO 




The period of time between initiation of the change 
order and the owner's approval of the change order: 
1-7 days = 1, 8-14days = 2, 15-21 days = 3  
22-28 days = 4, >28 days    = 5 
1 to 5 
 
 
2.4.5 Health and safety 
The occurrence of change orders may affect health and safety conditions. This 
is because change in construction methods, materials and equipment may require 














Figure 2.4: Impact of changes model (Ibbs et al, 2007) 
 
2.4.6 Hiring new professionals 
A new specialized manpower may be needed to do the change orders 
especially in the complex technological projects (CII, 1995). 
 
2.4.7 Delay in payment  
Delay in payment occurred frequently due to changes in construction projects 
(CII, 1990). Changes may hinder the project progress, leading to delays in achieving 
the targeted milestones during construction (CII, 1995), which leads to delay in the 
payment to the contractors (Arain and Pheng, 2005).  
 
2.4.8 Rework 
Changes which are imposed when construction is underway or even completed 
usually lead to reworks (CII, 1990). Rework and demolition are potential effects of 
changes in construction, depending on the timing of the occurrence of the changes. 
These effects are to be expected due to changes during the construction phase (Arain 




2.4.9 Tarnish firms reputation  
Changes are referred to as a major source of construction claims and disputes. 
The claims and disputes may affect the firms reputation adversely, leading to 
insolvency in severe cases. Changes also increase the possibility of professional 
disputes. Conventionally, changes present problems to all the parties involved in the 
construction process (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
2.4.10 Poor professional relations  
Change orders may affect professional relations, leading to disputes which 
must be resolved firstly through negotiation; then they may be resolved by litigation 
(Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
2.4.11 Disputes among professionals  
Like poor professional relations, disputes among professionals are also 
potential effects of frequent changes in construction projects. Disputes over change 
orders and claims are inevitable and the change clauses are often the source of project 
disputes (Arain and Pheng, 2005; Al-Dubaisi, 2000). 
 
2.5 Controls 
controlling the occurrences of change orders and restraining their bad effect 
are highly recommended to analyze the controlling stage into three stages. These 
stages are design stage, construction stage, and design-construction interface stage. 
 
2.5.1 Design stage controls for change orders 
This stage consists of nine control tools which must be taken into 
consideration during design phase. These control tools are as follows: 
1- Review of contract documents  
Contract documents are the plans which the project works directly follow; so 
they must contain comprehensive and balanced change clauses to help improve 
coordination and communication (CII, 1994).  
 
2- Freezing design  




might be numerous . Therefore, closing the door for changes after the completion of 
the design freezes the design in a strong control method (CII, 1990).  
 
3- Value engineering at conceptual phase  
Value engineering is a great factor in saving cost, decreasing project time, 
initiating better quality, assisting clarifying project objectives, and reducing design 
discrepancies in design phase in construction projects (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
4- Involvement of professionals at initial stages of project 
Involvement of professionals in the design stage leads the design to be more 
compatible, especially, in highly technical buildings such as health buildings (Arain 
and Pheng, 2005). 
 
5- Owners involvement at planning and design phase  
The owner's involvement at the design phase would assist in discovering 
plans, scopes, specifications, and owner's requirements. This may result in avoiding 
change orders initiated by the owner (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
6- Contractor's involvement at planning and scheduling process  
Contractor with his wield experience has the ability to give his suggestion to 
initiate better (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
7- Thorough detailing of design  
Thorough detailing of design helps in identifying the errors and omissions in 
the design at an early stage (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
8- Clear and thorough project brief 
Clear and thorough project brief is a good tool in restraining change orders 
that identify the project objectives to all the participants, which leads to reducing the 
noncompliance with the owners requirements (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
9- Reducing contingency sum 
 The provision of a large contingency sum may lead to a number of change 
orders because the designer may not develop a comprehensive design (Arain and 
Pheng, 2005). 
 
2.5.2 Construction stage controls for change orders 




during construction phase. These control tools are follows: 
 
1- Clarity of change order procedures  
The change order procedures are an integral part of effective management of 
change orders. The procedures should be identified and made clear to all parties early 
in the project. This in its turn which will help in reducing the processing time and 
other mishandling issues (Arain and Pheng, 2005; Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi and Al-
Marzoug, 2008). 
 
2- Written approvals  
The owner should approve and write down any change in the work that 
involves a change in the original price before a change order can be executed (CII, 
1990). Any party signing on behalf of the owner must have a written authorization 
from the owner; otherwise it would be difficult to prove the right for compensation if 
there is no such authorization from the owner. In the busy environment of 
construction, many verbal agreements could be forgotten, which will leave the 
contractor without any legal proof to get compensation for the changes (Arain and 
Pheng, 2005; Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi and Al-Marzoug, 2008). 
 
3- Change order scope  
The professional teams , in order to recognize and plan appropriately to 
minimize the negative impact of the change, should have a well defined scope .The 
clarity of the original scope helps to distinguish between a change of scope and a 
change due to design development. Arain and Pheng (2005) pointed out that a 
common disagreement between parties in a project was about defining the change 
scope. Therefore, the effective definition of the scope of work is very important to 
identify and manage changes. 
 
4- Change logic and justification  
One of the principles of effective change management is change logic and 
justification for implementation, which should be classified as required or elective. 
Required changes were those which verified the original objectives of the project, 
while elective changes were additional features that enhanced the project. The 
acknowledgement of the logic and justification behind the proposed changes helps the 
professionals in promoting beneficial changes and eliminating detrimental changes 




5- Project manager from an independent firm to manage the project 
The involvement of a project manager from an independent firm would give a 
great help in eliminating changes that arise due to the lack of coordination among 
professionals. This practice may be useful in reducing design discrepancies through 
early reviews of the contract documents and drawings (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
6- Restricted pre-qualification system for awarding projects  
project bids should go through a restricted pre-qualification system for 
awarding projects which will act as a filter to select only the capable parties for any 
project. However, the lack of such system may permit incapable parties to win the 
bid, which may eventually lead to numerous problems in the later stages of a 
construction project (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
7- Owners involvement during construction phase  
The involvement of the owner during the construction stages would give a 
great help in identifying noncompliance with the requirements and in approving the 
changes promptly. Finally, the involvement of the owner during the construction 
stages may keep him aware of ongoing activities and help in decision making (Arain 
and Pheng, 2005). 
 
8- Avoidance of use of open tendering  
Contractors ,when competing in an open tendering, are usually encouraged to 
price very low in order to win the contract, especially in depression times when jobs 
are rare. This kind of system would give rise to the contractor trying to claim more to 
compensate for the low price. In order to eliminate the risks of unfair bids and 
changes that may arise due to the contractors bidding strategy, open tender should be 
prevented (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
9- Use of project scheduling/management techniques 
It is necessary to be flexible when dealing with change orders and have a 
flexible schedule to manage it. CPM, PERT are the most known scheduling 
techniques in the construction industry, but the schedule must have the ability to 
include impact of change orders in it in any time (Arain and Pheng, 2005) 
 
10- Comprehensive documentation of change order 




of change orders which give them the option to pursue a subsequent claim or to 
defend against it. One of the worst conditions that affect change order is the length of 
time that happened between the announcing of the proposed contract modification and 
the rejection or approving of it (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
The documentation of change orders and claims had assisted in tracking the 
effects of the change and claim events on time and cost. A documented source of 
knowledge about previous change orders would be helpful in making decisions 
concerning the appropriate handling of change orders (Arain and Pheng, 2005).  
 
2.5.3 Design-Construction interface stage controls for change orders 
This stage consists of nine control tools that must be taken care during the 
time between design and construction. These control tools are as follows: 
 
1- Prompt approval procedures  
 The length of time that elapses between a proposed contract modification is 
first announced until the matter is finally rejected or approved as a change order is 
one of the most aggravate conditions. However, if the period is long between 
recognition and implementation, the change will be more costly. Hence, instantaneous 
approval procedures would give a great help in reducing the bad effects of changes in 
the construction project. (Arain and Pheng, 2005; Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi and Al-
Marzoug, 2008). 
 
2- Ability to negotiate change  
One of the important factors for the effective control of change orders is the 
ability to negotiate changes. An effective negotiation can be greatly helpful for the 
professional team to minimize the negative impacts of the changes (Arain and Pheng, 
2005). Effective negotiation of change orders requires certain skills, i.e., the 
awareness of contract terms, equipment, technology, project details, labor rates, 
methods and communication skills (Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi and Al-Marzoug, 
2008). 
 
3- Valuation of indirect effects  
Consequential effects, which is vital to evaluate them through the 
acknowledgement of this possibility and the establishment the mechanism for them, 




important in the downstream phases of a complex project; therefore, in order to 
manage the change order effectively, professionals should evaluate the total overall 
effects a change may have on the downstream phases of a project (Arain and Pheng, 
2005; Al-Dubaisi, 2000; Al-Jishi and Al-Marzoug, 2008). 
 
4- Team effort to control change orders and coordination 
Good coordination between owner, consultant, and contractor is a great factor 
in controlling change orders impact (CII, 1994), as it assists to manage the change 
orders at the early stage. (Arain and Pheng, 2005; Al-Dubaisi, 2000).  
 
5- Utilize work breakdown structure 
A work breakdown structure (WBS) is an effective tool for identifying and 
defining work. If a change involves work which is not previously included in the 
WBS, it can be logically added to the WBS and its relationship with the other WBS 
elements can be easily checked (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
6- Control the potential for change orders arising through contractual 
clauses 
The selection of the appropriate contract form which includes the necessary 
and clear change clauses would be helpful in the management of change orders (Arain 
and Pheng, 2005). Benefits such as shifting risks and improved communication 
channels could result from a well done change clauses (CII, 1990). Obvious 
procedures written and presented in the contract and fair allocation of risks can help in 
resolving quarrels through negotiation rather than suing (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
7- Comprehensive site investigation  
Comprehensive site investigations during the design phase assist in 
discovering any uncovering site condition, as differing site conditions have a clear 
impact on time and cost in large building projects. Therefore, a comprehensive site 
investigation would help in reducing potential changes in a project (Arain and Pheng, 
2005). 
 
8- Use of collected and data compiled by owner, consultant and contractor  
The change orders should be documented to build a data base which can help 
in a further research study, that means, the institutions must share their documents 




and Pheng, 2005). 
 
9- Knowledge-base of previous similar projects  
Project strategies and philosophies should take advantage of learned lessons 
from past similar projects. Sometimes the same sectors of building have the same 
change orders, which is possible to be avoided if the parties of the project take the 
lesson from previous similar projects (Arain and Pheng, 2005). 
 
2.6 Change order management process reengineering  
There are some logical steps that must be followed to reach to good management 
of change orders. These steps are: 
1- Gathering historic change order data 
2- Gathering supplier feedback 
3- Sorting and preliminary analysis of data 
4- Statistical analysis of finding data 
5- System revisions formulation and report 
6- implementation planning, and implementation (Doran and Bridgers, 2002). 
 
2.7 Theoretical Model for Change Orders 
Chao-Ying (2005) successfully modeled the construction process data in 
Repcon, a research system developed in the University of British Columbia. However, 
due to the lack of good data analysis technology, its functionality of enhancing all 
management functions is limited.  
 Yitmen et al (2006) presented an expert system named QUICOPP, which 
quantifies the impact of change orders on project performance in terms of cost and 
time. The system analyzes the factors contributing to adverse effects of change orders 
and provides recommendations to all parties who are associated with a project in 
resolving claims regarding those changes at any stage of a project.  
The means by which latency disrupts construction is explored through a 
framework that finds connections among scope, process, and performance. This 
framework is converted into a working simulation model using System Dynamics to 
apply it to a real-world construction project (Lee and Pena-Mora, 2006). 
Motawa et al (2004) aimed to identify and forecast potential changes and 




of a proposed fuzzy model that attempts to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of a 
change event and predict the effect of change on project parameters using data that is 
realistic to obtain. Modeling construction change should consider the link between 
these main elements: project characteristics that lead to change, causes of change, the 
likelihood of change occurrence, and the change consequence. 
Arain (2005) developed knowledge-based decision support system (KBDSS) 
to manage change orders. It is important to understand that the KBDSS for the 
management of changes is not designed to make decisions for users, but rather it 
provides pertinent information in an efficient and easy-to-access format that allows 
users to make more informed decisions. The model consists of six fundamental stages 
linked to two main components, a knowledge-base and a controls selection shell for 
making more informed decisions for effective management of change orders. The 
database will be developed through collecting data from source documents of past 
projects, questionnaire survey, literature review and in-depth interview sessions with 
the professionals who were involved in the projects. The knowledge-base will be 
developed through initial sieving and organization of data from the database (Arain 
and Pheng, 2005). 
 Arain and Pheng (2006b) developed the previous system according to the 
flow chart depicted in Figure 2.5. 
Then, Arain and Pheng (2006a) developed Arain and Pheng (2006b) system to 
become a model consists of six fundamental stages linked to two main components, a 
knowledge-base and a controls selection shell for making more informed decisions for 










Chapter 3  
Methodology  
In order to realize the objectives of this study which are: determining major 
factors influencing the occurrences of change orders in the Gaza Strip; then 
determining their impacts on cost, schedule and productivity, and finally building a 
simulation model to model change orders occurrences and their impacts on building 
projects in the Gaza Strip. The methodology used in conducting this research consists 
of the following: 
1- Literature review. 
2- Case studies.  
3- Interviews. 
4- Analysis. 
5- Building a simulation model.  
a- Model verification. 
b- Model validation. 
6- Conclusion, recommendations, and further study.  
The flow chart of the research methodology is shown in (Figure3.1) and the 


































































3.1 Literature Review 
Developing a better understanding of the research objectives, a comprehensive 
literature review was conducted to achieve the following: 
1- Determining the definition, types, and actions related to change orders. 
2- Identifying major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders. 
3- Identifying the impact of changes on time and the methods to measure factors 
of delay. 
4- Identifying the impact of changes on productivity and the methods to measure 
productivity losses during changes. 
5- Identifying the impact of changes on cost and the methods to measure the 
variation of the cost. 
6- Collecting previous methods which was used in building simulation models.  
After relevant literature has been reviewed, the main factors causing change 
orders were collected as shown in Table 2.1. The techniques of measuring the impact 
then were chosen.  
 
3.2 Data Collection  
Information for the study was obtained from different sources such as 
documents from the education department, health department, completed residential 
projects, through personal interviews, and in-depth discussions with the professionals, 
consultants, and contractor involved in projects 
 Data were collected in a concurrent form from case studies and interviews. 
Following is a detailed description of how each method was used.  
 
3.2.1 Case studies 
Case studies approach used in this study encompassed 6 education building 
projects, one of which was rehabilitation. Case studies also encompassed 4 health 
building projects, two of which were rehabilitation. In addition, residential building 
projects carried out in the Gaza Strip were also investigated to collect the information 
required for in-depth study and analysis. The projects were documented and analyzed 
between 1996 and 2005. The purpose of case studies approach was to obtain data 
from the source documents of the completed projects. The source documents included 




quantities, schedules, and reports.  
Institutions like United Nations for Refugees and Works Agency (UNRWA), 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Palestinian Economic Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), Palestinian Housing Council, and 
Ministry of Public Works and Housing were chosen for the case studies. However, 
responses from them varied. The UNDP, for example, refused to give any document 
or information. UNRWA, on the other hand, said that they could provide data only 
from the memory of their engineers. As the Ministry of Public Works and Housing 
lost all its documents in the last war on Gaza, no cases were taken from them. 
Because PECDAR facilitated full access to all documents, so a lot of cases were taken 
from them. A clear system of documentation was used by Palestinian Economic 
Council, so it helped the researcher very much in studying change orders and their 
impact on building projects performance. As the Palestinian Housing Council also 
allowed full access to their full documents, all residential cases were taken from them. 
A good documentation system was used by Palestinian Housing Council, which 
greatly facilitated the researcher's collection of data concerning change orders and 
their impact. 
All case studies included in this current research are formal building projects 
with owners, contractors, consultants, and the contract types were unit-price contracts. 
The owner of all case studies was the Palestinian Authority. 
The following tasks were conducted: 
1- The data of the case studies were collected from full documents such as 
contract documents, monthly reports, weekly reports, daily logs, bill quantity, 
schedule, claim documents, price offers, memorandums, letters between 
consultant and contractor, letters between consultant and owner, and drawings. 
Obtaining data from different sources contributed to determining the accuracy 
of every change order and its impact on cost and time. 
2- From the case studies and interviews, the major factors influencing the 
occurrences of each change were determined.  
3- The impact of each change order on cost and time was determined from 
projects' documents and interviews. 
4- Other factors related to productivity were determined from the concurrent case 
studies and interviews.  






3.2.2 Interviews  
 An interview approach encompassing three main phases was carried out in this 
research in Gaza Strip aimed at collecting the required information for in-depth study 
and analysis. The interviews were conducted after the completion of the literature 
review and continued to the end of the research. The phases of the interview approach 
are as follows: 
 
3.2.2.1 Decision making interview phase  
 This phase of interviews started directly after literature review was finished 
with two construction managers experts to achieve the following:  
1- Making some use of their experiences, and discover other effective factors. 
2- Choosing the best method to measure the impact on performance from these 
methods which have been collected in literature review. 
3- Taking some idea about the number of case studies which may be taken in the 
research.  
 
3.2.2.2 Concurrent with case studies phase  
 This phase of interviews was done concurrently with case studies, The parties 
of each case study were involved in these interviews. These interviews aimed at the 
following:  
1 Collecting project documents (See Figure3.2.1) and determining every change 
which had happened and every cost and time that the contractor had claimed. 
2 Contacting the contractor and making an interview with him to discuss any 
unclear points, cost and time estimate, and the project's productivity curve. 
3 Contacting the consultant and discussing the project parameter with him.  
These interviews were conducted to evaluate the impact of changes on their projects' 
performance. 
 
3.2.2.3 Final phase  
This stage of interviews was done after building the simulation model, i.e. at 




interviewed to achieve the following:  
1- Knowing the consultants' opinions about the validity of the simulation model.  
2- Benefiting from their experience in writing the research conclusion and 
recommendations.  
 
3.2.3 Final data collection stage  
After finishing data collection, not only every factor causing change order was 
collected as seen in Table 3.1, but also impact on cost time, and productivity loss 
factors during change were determined.  
 












Formula Y1, Y2  X1, X2 .. N1, N2.. Factor 1 1 
    Factor 2 2 
    Factor 3 3 
    Factor N N 
 
3.4 Measuring Techniques 
 There were four stages of measuring techniques pertinent to this research. 
These stages are as follows: 
1- Occurrences of change order measuring technique. 
2- Cost impact measuring technique. 
3- Time impact measuring technique. 
4- Productivity impact measuring technique. 
 
3.4.1 Occurrences of change order measuring technique 
All change orders occurrences were taken from the documents of each case 
study and discussed with the parties to avoid any mistake.  
 
3.4.2 Cost impact measuring technique 
 In this research only the direct impact on cost was taken into consideration, 




orders cost. The approval between owner and contractor was taken as a direct impact 
on cost. 
 
3.4.3 Time impact measuring technique 
In this research only the delay in critical path was taken into consideration, 
The value of this impact was taken from the memorandums of negotiated change 
order time extension. The suitable approved extensions on time between owners and 
contractors were taken as the impact on time. 
 
3.4.4 Productivity impact measuring technique 
 The technique which was chosen to calculate the impact of change orders on 
productivity is CII (2000) method which provided a quantitative method for both 
owners and contractors to determine if change impacted a project, and to provide a 
model for determining the probable magnitude of that impact on labor efficiency, 
especially in labor-intensive fields. The CII (2000) developed a linear regression 
equation to predict the magnitude of impact of change orders on labor productivity. 
The research team found that only six factors out of all the influencing factors had the 
most significant impact. The linear regression equation to predict the magnitude of 
impact of change orders on labor productivity (% productivity loss) is as follows: 
 
The definition of each of the independent factors listed in the above equation 
is given in (Table 2.2). 
 
3.5 The Statistical Sample 
Three restrictions were imposed on the selection process of respondents:  
1- Restricted to projects (200000$ or more). 
2- Restricted to contractors (Class A and B). 
3- Restricted to building projects (education buildings, health buildings, and 
residential buildings). 






The data were analyzed by two ways, these ways are as follows: 
1- Statistical analysis 
2- Simulation model analysis  
 
3.6.1 Statistical analysis  
Statistical analysis was used to analyze the data to rank the factors according to 
their occurrences and impacts. 
Firstly sectors of buildings were analyzed separately to find the strength of change 
orders occurrences and then to find the mean of their impact on time, cost, and 
productivity. After that, all projects were analyzed together to find the strength of 
change orders occurrences and then to find the mean of their impact on time, cost, and 
productivity as shown in (Figure3.2). 
 
3.6.1.1 Sectorsanalysis  
At this stage, the data collected from the case studies and interviews were 
analyzed separately in order to study the occurrences of change orders and their 
impact on projects performance of health building, then on education building, and 
eventually on residential building.  
Initial analysis at this stage aimed to find the most effective factors that cause 
occurrences of change orders in each sector of buildings by calculating the probability 
of occurrences for each factor by taking all changes as the sample space, and then the 
probability of each factor determined as depicted in (Equation 3.1).  
. eq 3.1. 
After that the data was analyzed according to cost impact, time impact, and 
percentage of change on the project in terms of original budgeted work hours' impact 
to find out the factors having huge impact by calculating the mean of each factor and 






3.6.1.2 Combined analysis  
At this stage, all data that had been collected from the case studies and interviews 
were analyzed together to study the occurrences of change orders and their impacts on 
the building projects performance in the Gaza Strip. 
Initial analysis at this stage aimed to find the most effective factors that cause 
occurrences of change orders by calculating the probability of each factor occurrences 
as previously shown in (Section 3.4.1.1).  
After the data was analyzed according to cost impact by finding the mean of each 
factor's impact, factors was ranked to find out which factors had the hugest impact.  
 
3.6.2 Simulation model analysis  
Arena simulation model used to analyze the data where the probability 
distribution of each factor and its impact was calculated to build the Arena simulation 
model as the following:  
 
Firstly, data which was collected from the case studies and interviews was filled in 
(Table 4.20). That means not only every occurrences of change orders and each 
impact of cost and time due to this occurrences were recorded in Table 4.20, but also 




time the project manager spends on the project), and (Percent of change orders 
initiated by the owner) were collected.  
 
Secondly, the percentage change orders impact on cost was calculated was according 
to (Equation 3.2). 
  
The percentage change orders impact on time was calculated according to 
(Equation 3.3).  
 
The percent of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours 
was calculated from the agreed cost analysis that submitted during the negotiation, 
sometimes the percent of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours 
was calculated from the cost breakdown analysis of the contract or from the 
interviews at the case studies collection phase. 
 The percent of time the project manager spends on the project was calculated 
for each case from the consultant's daily logs and the probability distribution for the 
factor was generated. 
 The percent of change orders initiated by the owner was calculated from the 
change orders documents. 
The impact on productivity was generated by adding all previous factors in Arena 
program. 
 
Thirdly, the following procedure was followed to build the simulation model  
a) The time of project in the model was assumed by one day (model time).  
b) The occurrences of change orders were modeled as time per arrival between 
entities which mean everyone was considered as change orders  
c) To convert the occurrences of each factor to time the following question was 
asked. The question was supposed to be "What is time that resource needs to 
produce the occurrences of change orders?" The answer was "it is shorter than 
the time needed to produce the occurrences, T =  and more than the 
time needed to produce the occurrences + 1, T =  . So the 





d) In impact on cost and schedule the distribution was calculated directly by 
entering the value in input analyzer and finding out their distribution. 
e) Table 3.2 shows an example of the summary of distributions.  
 






Cost distribution function 
Schedule distribution 
function 
F1 0.3 NORM(Mean, Std Div) EXPO( Mean ) 
F2 0.49 TRIA( Min , Mode , Max ) WEIB( Beta , Alpha ) 
F3 0.9 UNIF( Min , Max ) Constant 
 
3.7 One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
Kolmogorove- Smirnov test was used to identify if data followed a normal 
distribution or not. This test is considered necessary in case of testing hypotheses as 
most parametric test stipulate data to be normally distributed. The test results, as 
shown in chapter 5, clarify that the significant level calculated is greater than 0.15 
(sig. Ok); this in turn denotes that the data follows normal distribution, and so a 
parametric test must be used. 
 
3.8 Building a Simulation Model  
At this stage, data collected by means of Interviews and case studies were used 
to build an Arena simulation model. Then, the impact of changes on cost, schedule, 
and productivity was revealed when the changes were input. The simulation model is 
shown in the flow chart in (Figure 6.1 and 6.2) 
 
3.9 Model Verification  
Two methods were used to check the model verification; the first was by 
reviewing the model step by step with the supervisor to insure that there was no error 
and the second way was by inserting the result of each case study on the model and 
comparing the results by calculating the mean of the error after that, by doing 




3.9.1 Bivariate correlations 
Bivariate correlations test was used to compare between simulation result with 
the project results. Bivariate Correlations procedure computes Pearson's correlation 
coefficient, Spearman's rho, and Kendall's tau-b with their significance levels. 
Correlations measure how variables or rank orders are related. Before calculating a 
correlation coefficient, screen data for outliers (which can cause misleading results) 
and evidence of a linear relationship. Pearson's correlation coefficient is a measure of 
linear association. Two variables can be perfectly related, but if the relationship is not 
linear, Pearson's correlation coefficient is not an appropriate statistic for measuring 
their association. 
 
3.9.2 Categorical regression  
Categorical regression was used to compare between simulation result with the 
project results. The use of Categorical Regression is most appropriate when the goal 
of analysis is to predict a dependent (response) variable from a set of independent 
(predictor) variables. As with all optimal scaling procedures, scale values are assigned 
to each category of every variable such that these values are optimal with respect to 
the regression. The solution of a categorical regression maximizes the squared 
correlation between the transformed response and the weighted combination of 
transformed predictors.  
 
6.10 Model Validation 
 Validation of the simulation model of change orders and their impact on cost, 
time, and productivity was done in two ways. The first was through two interviews 
with two expert construction managers. The second was by entering a new case on the 
model and comparing its results.  
 
3.11 Conclusion, Recommendations, and Further Studies  
Finally, the fulfillment of the objectives of this research was tested, and this 
led to listing some recommendations.  






Chapter 4  
Data Collection  
 
A combination of concurrent interviews and case studies were used to collect 
change orders occurred in 15 building projects and their impact on building projects 
performance. 
The case studies encompassed 6 education building projects, 4 health building 
projects, 5 residential building projects, which were carried out in the Gaza Strip to 
collect the information required for analysis. The projects which were documented 
and analyzed were only initiated between 1996 and 2005. 
 
4.1 Summary of Case Studies  
 Table 4.1 shows the main characteristics of each project taken as a case study 
where  
PC = Percentage of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours 
PM= Percentage of time the project manager spends on the project. 











Table 4.1: Characters of the case studies 
     Cost impact Time impact Productivity impact 










% Extension PC PM IO 
Case 1 Health New 540 days 1470821 59.2 27.7 19 39 95 56  
Case 2 Health New 215 days 281007 17.25 17.51 14 23.3 95 10.2 
Case 3 Health Rehabilitation 120 days 185885 7.9 0 21 13.7 95 2.3 
Case 4 Health Rehabilitation 90 days 629350 13.8 1.5 0 7.3 95 3.6 
Case 5 Education New 300 days 869278 10.8 2.8 10 5.6 40 32.8 
Case 6 Education New 300 days 869278 5.9 0 0 3.9 95 71.5 
Case 7 Education Rehabilitation 180 days 209950 26.1 0.3 90 24.3 95 13.7 
Case 8 Education New 300 days 716573 18.8 0.1 10 18.1 70 49.8 
Case 9 Education New 300 days 735280 17.8 2.5 12 18.4 85 24.9 
Case 10 Education New 300 days 716573 7.6 0 12 5.3 90 24.9 
Case 11 Residential New 365 days 706965 8.9 1.47 60 7.8 95 23.6 
Case 12 Residential New 365 days 477334 8.7 3.77 50 5.3 95 14.4 
Case 13 Residential New 240 days 276879 1.5 0 0 2.1 95 0 
Case 14 Residential New 240 days 587528 6 3.1 26 6.05 85 8 
Case 15 Residential New 240 days 564475 10.2 3.7 0 14.17 95 92 
 
 
4.2 Major Factors Causing Change Orders  
 While reviewing relevant literature, the researcher collected 98 factors causing 
change orders. However, after finishing the case studies, it was found out that only 35 
of them were effective in the Gaza Strip building industry. 
 After finishing interviews and case studies, another two effective factors in the 
Gaza Strip building industry were collected in addition to the above 35 factors. The 
new two factors were Israeli closure and suggestions to initiate more quality. The 
effective factors that were collected are illustrated in (Table 4.2). 
 























1 1 1 Design errors 
2  2 Omissions 
3  4 Inconsistencies 
4  5 Impossibilities 
5  6 Change in design request 
6  8 Inadequate design 
7  Design errors 15 Noncompliance of design with owners requirements 
8 
2 Changes in 
market 
conditions 18 
Specified item became unavailable 
9 3 21 Significant changes in the quantities of work 
10  27 Plan errors 
11  29 Change of plans or scope by owner 





 32 Owner desire to improve his financial conditions 
14 4 39 Uncovering disclosed existing conditions 
15  41 Strikes 
16  42 Extreme weather condition 
17  43 Material non- availability 
18  
External 
conditions 44 Israeli closure 
 
 























19 5 47 Differing site conditions 
20  48 Safety considerations 
21  
Differing Site 
Conditions 49 Differing subsurface conditions 
22 6 52 Suggestions to initiate more economical construction 
23  53 Suggestions to initiate more quality 
24  
Suggestion to 
initiate better 54 Value engineering  
25 
7 Changes in 
design 
preference 56  Delays in the project 
26 8 69 Consultants lack of judgment and experience 
27  71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant 
28  
Contract 
conditions 80 Contractors lack of judgment and experience 
29  83 Utility companies 
30  85  Local governments 
31 9 87 Prevalent practice on this project and/or district. 




Review of the project by the proper governmental 
agency 
34  95 Change in economic conditions 
35  
Actions by 
others 96 Socio-cultural factors 







equipment 100 Technology changes 
 
4.3 Health Sector 
4 health building projects were taken as case studies as follows :  
1- The first one was a community health center in Deir El-Balah, but because the 
 
 
occurrence of El-Aqsa Intifada the community center changed to a hospital. 
The owner of this project was the Ministry of Health and the contract type of 
this project was a unit price contract. The strategy of the contractor in this 
project was a partnering strategy. The delay in the project was 19 causable 
days with finishing date on 14/02/2001. The contract value was 1470821$, but 
the contract close up cost was 1972933.5$.  
2- The second was a health clinic in Al-Zaitoon in Gaza. The owner of this 
project was the Ministry of Health. The contract type of this project was a unit 
price and the delay of this project was 14 causable days. The contract value 
was 281007.06 $, but the contract close up cost was 278571.7 $. The 
relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner wasn't good. 
3- The third was a community health center in Deir El-Balah and it consisted of 
adding a new storey and some rehabilitation. The owner of this project was the 
Ministry of Health and the contract type of this project was a unit price. The 
delay of this project was 52 days, but only 21 days were causable. The main 
reason for the delay was a not enough of contractor crews to perform. The 
contract value was 185885.99 $ and the relationship between the contractor, 
consultant, and owner wasn't a good one and there were some disputes among 
them. 
4- The fourth was adding a storey and additional new building C in Nasser 
hospital - Khan Younis and doing some rehabilitation. The owner of this 
project was the Ministry of Health and the contract type of this project was a 
unit price. The delay of this project was 6 non-causable days. The main reason 
for the delay was the intensity of change orders. The contract value was 
629350 $ and the relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner 
was a good one.  
Table 4.1 summarized the impact on projects performance and the details of these 
health projects was shown in Table 4.3. for more detail review Annex (1 and 2).  
In this section all change orders which happened in 4 health projects were 
collected. After that the impact of each change order in cost, time, and percentage of 
change on the project in terms of original budgeted work hours were counted. Table 
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% PC(1) impact per 
each occurrence 
1 1 5 
0.15, 0.13, 0.4, 0.57, 
0.06 No Impact 
0.6, 0.05, 0.22, 0.11, 
0.01 
1 2 1 -0.16 No Impact No Impact 
1 4 2 0.1, 0.08 No Impact 0.04, 0.15 
1 5 1 1.37 No Impact 0.26 
1 6 2 2.89, -3.43 No Impact 0.24, 0.04 
1 8 16 
1.47, 0.02, 0.01, 0.21, 
0.05, 0.05, 0.04, 0.5, 
0.31, 0.15, 0.07, 3.1, 
0.3, 0.1, 0.18, 0.13 
No Impact 5.44,0.02, 0.01, 0.08, 
0.49, 3.46, 0, 0.03, 
0.03, 0.84, 0.05, 0.05, 
0.03, 0, 0.3, 0.1 
1 15 5 
0.04, 0.34, 1.19, 1.89, 
4.84 


































% PC(1) impact per 
each occurrence 
3 21 32 
2.25, 0.53, 0.9, 0.94, 
0.32, 0.44, 0.06, 0.28, 
-0.09, 0.68, 0.37, 0.58, 
0.63, 0.17,0.13, 0.55, 
0.31, 0.24, 0.2, 0.16, 
0.06, 0.05, 0.06, 0.05, 
0.05, 0.53, 0.05, 0.03, 
-0.13, -0.08, -0.06, -
0.41, 
No Impact 
3.56, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
12.73, 0.17, 0.25, 0.03, 
0.21, 0.07, 0.04, 0.11, 
1.87, 0.1, 0.08, 
0.21,0.23, 0.19, 0.04, 
0.03, 0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 
0.01, 0.01, 0.05, 0.01, 
0.01 
3 27 1 0.1 1.3 0.5 
3 29 2 11.54 0.93, -5.56 17.1 
3 32 19 
-2.72, -0.03, -0.55, -
3.1, 
-0.63, -0.08, -1.37, 
-0.73, -0.94, -0.47, 
-1.05, -0.52, -5.06, -
0.1, 
-0.26, -0.1, -0.04, -
0.08, 
-0.08 No Impact 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.81, 5.66, 
0.98, 2.65, 0.55 
4 43 2 0.41, 1.13 0, 5.83 0.28, 0 
4 44 1 0 11.67 0 
5 47 1 3.08 No Impact 2.29 
5 48 6 
0.06, 0.4, 003, 0.1, 
0.38, 1.02 
No Impact 0.16, 0.07, 0.05, 0.01, 
0, 0.01 


































% PC(1) impact per 
each occurrence 
6 53 6 
0.06, 1.62, 1.9, 0.15, 
0.29, 0.27 
No Impact 
0, 0, 0, 0.03, 0.06, 0.01 
6 54 1 4.82 0.37 7.14 
7 56 1 2.72 No Impact 0 
8 69 1 0 1.48 0 
8 71 1 0.18 No Impact 0.04 
8 80 1 0.09 No Impact 0 
9 85 1  0.01 0 
9 87 3 1.25, 9.52, 0.11 No Impact 0.03, 1.89, 0.13 
9 90 2 0.65, 0.22 No Impact 0.48, 0.04 
9 91 1 0.04 4.63 0.17 
9 96 1 0.38 No Impact 0.7 
10 98 1 0.01 No Impact 0.04 
10 100 2 0.17, 0.13 No Impact 0.48, 0.12 
 (1)Percentage of Change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours  
 
4.4 Education Sector 
 In this research 6 education building projects, one of which was rehabilitation, 
were taken as case studies.  
1- The first project was Al-Shejaa'ea Elementary School for Males. The project 
was a new construction school in Gaza city. The owner of this project was 
Ministry of Education. The contract type of this project was a unit price. The 
delay of this project was 13 days, only 10 of which were causable. The main 
reason for the delay was the plan error but the cause of the non-causable delay 
was the productivity loss. The contract value was 869278 $ and the 
relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner wasn't a good one 
 
 
2- The second projects was a new construction for Sheikh Radwan School in the 
City of Gaza. The project owner was the Ministry of Education. The contract 
type of this project was a unit price and there was no delay on this project. The 
contract value was 869278 $ and the relationship between the contractor, 
consultant, and owner fluctuated between good and bad.  
3- The third project was comprised adding a new classroom with rehabilitation in 
Al-Karmel Secondary School in the City of Gaza. The owner of this project 
was the Ministry of Education. The project contract type was a unit price. The 
delay of this project was 87 days, but the causable delay was 90 days. The 
main reason for the delay was differing site conditions and Israeli closures. 
The contract value was $209950 and the relationship between the contractor, 
consultant, and owner was a good one 
4- The fourth project was a new construction for Khalid Bin Al Waleed School in 
Al-Nusirat Camp. The owner of this project was the Ministry of Education and 
the contract type was a unit price. The delay on this project was 7 days with 10 
days of causable delay and the main reason for the delay was Israeli closures. 
The contract value was $ 716573 and the relationship between the contractor, 
consultant, and owner wasn't a good one. 
5- The fifth project was a new construction of Nusairat Elementary Girl School 
in Al-Nusairat camp. The owner of this project was the Ministry of Education. 
This project contract type was a unit price and the delay of this project was 13 
days with 12 days causable delay. The main reason for the delay was Israeli 
closure and the extreme whether condition. The contract value was $856439 
and the relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner was rather 
a good one.  
6- The sixth project was a new construction of Al-Qezan School in Khan Younis. 
The owner of this project was the Ministry of Education and contract type was 
a unit price. The delay on this project was 19 days with 12 days causable 
delay. The main reason for the delay was Israeli closures and the extreme 
weather conditions and the non-causable delay was because the contractor did 
not use enough labor. The contract value was $735280.5 and the relationship 
between the contractor, consultant, and owner was a rather good one 
Table 4.1 summarized the impact on projects performance and the details of these 
health projects was shown in Table 4.4. for more detail review Annex (1 and 2)  
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735280 No Data 
 
In this section, all change orders taking place in 6 education building projects 
were compiled. After that the impact of each change order in cost, time, and 
percentage of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours were 
counted. Table 4.5 illustrates those change orders and their impact.  
 





























% PC(1) impact per each 
occurrence 
1 1 7 
0.06, 0.01, 0.02, 0.06, 
0.06, 0.02, 0.13 
No Impact 0.02, 0.04, 0.11, 0.02, 
0.01, 0.01, 0.01 
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% PC(1) impact per each 
occurrence 
1 4 2 0.29, 0.02 No Impact 0.32, 0.08 
1 5 1 0.08 No Impact 0.02 
1 8 34 
0.35, 0.16, 0.02, 0.04, 
0.06, 0.46, 0.25, 0.24, 
-0.04, 0.07, 0.36, 0.07, 
0.11, 0.4, 0.7, 0.13, 
0.37, 0.45, 0.1, 0.06, 
0.01, 0.02, 0.69, 0.15, 
0.38, 0.02, 0.04, 0.35, 
0.16, 0.34, 0.06, 0.46, 
0.25, 0.3 
No Impact 0.41, 0.12, 0.01, 0.01, 
0.03, 0.29, 0.04, 0.4, 0, 
0.01, 0.27, 0.02, 0.02, 
0.08, 0.07, 0.05, 0.21, 
0.29, 0.15, 0.11, 0.01, 
0.01, 0.26, 0.06, 0.32, 
0.01, 0.01, 0.26, 0.12, 
0.25, 0.01, 0.34, 0.09, 
0.23 
2 18 1 0.63 No Impact 0.06 
3 21 9 
0.63, 0.71, -1.34, 0.96, 
0.25, 0.49, 0.03, 0.09, 
0.95 
No Impact 
0.06, 0.84, 0, 1.69, 0.34, 
1.19, 0.05, 0.08, 0.71 
3 27 1 0.02 3.33 0.07 
3 31 2 0.14, 0.14 No Impact 0.05, 0.05 
3 32 1 -0.17 No Impact No Impact 
4 39 3 0.4, 1.21, 0.31 No Impact 0.29, 1.35, 0.23 
4 42 2 No Impact 1.33, 1.33 No Impact 
4 43 1 0.05 No Impact No Impact 




5 47 5 
13.02, 6.65, 0.1, 0.81, 
0.69 25, 0,0,0,0 
14.46, 6.1, 0.05, 0.6, 
0.64 
5 48 6 
0.02, 0.14, 0.19, 5.84, 
0.13, 0.31 


































% PC(1) impact per each 
occurrence 
5 49 7 
0.74, 0.59, 1.12, 1.77, 
-0.36, 6.1, 1.55 
No Impact 0.14, 0.06, 0.42, 0.33, 0, 
5.61, 0.58 
6 52 3 -0.81, -0.09, -0.28 No Impact No Impact 
6 53 30 
1.14, 0.24, 1.79, 0.08, 
1.14, 0.24, 2.68, 3.62, 
0.48, 0.81, 0.6, 0.06, 
5.62, 1.56, 0.2, 0.05, 
0.07, 0.02, 2.36, 0.21, 
0.1, 0.01, 0.28, 0.05, 
1.96, 0.05, 0.07, 2.28, 
2.42, 0.32 
No Impact 
0.05, 0.01, 1, 0.01, 0.05, 
0.01, 2.46, 2.69, 036, 
2.2, 0.76, 6.1, 1.8, 0.22, 
0.02, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.01, 
2.98, 0.08, 0.04, 0.01, 
0.16, 0.02, 0.01, 0.04, 
3.28, 0.13 
7 56 1 No Impact -1 No Impact 
9 87 3 0.78, 0.14, 0.62 No Impact 0.73, 0.06, 058 
9 90 7 
0.12, 0.06, 0.02, 012, 
0.01, 0.11, 0.065 
No Impact 0.03, 0.22, 0.01, 0.16, 
0.01, 0.1, 0.01 
9 96 4 0.1, 0.04, 0.03, 0.03 No Impact 0.05, 0.04, 0.01, 0.01 
10 98 1 0.12 No Impact 0.05 
(1)Percentage of Change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours  
 
4.5 Residential Sector 
 In this research 5 residential building projects were taken as case studies, two 
of which in Rafah city and three in the City of Gaza. The details of these projects are 
as follows. 
1- The first project was a new housing building for the engineering institute in 
Rafah City. The owner of this project was the Ministry of Public Works and 
Housing. The contract type of this project was a unit price. The delay of this 
project was 53 days with 60 days causable delay. The main reason for the 
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delay was the Israeli closures. The contract value was $706965.49 and the 
relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner was a good one 
2- The second project was a new housing building for the Palestinian control and 
investigation board in Gaza City. The owner of this project was the Ministry 
of Public Works and Housing. The contract type of this project was a unit 
price. The delay of this project was 50 causable delays and the main reason for 
the delay was Israeli closures and differing subsurface conditions. The 
contract value was 477334 $ and the relationship between the contractor, 
consultant, and owner was a good one.  
3- The third project was a new housing building in Rafah city. The owner of this 
project was the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The contract type of 
this project was a unit price. The contract value was 276879.5 $ and the 
relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner was a good one 
4- The fourth project was a new housing building for the Palestinian Control and 
Investigation Board in Gaza City. The owner of this project was the Ministry 
of Public Works and Housing. The projects' contract type was a unit price. The 
project's delay was 37 days, but the causable delay was only 26 days. The 
main reason for the delay was Israeli closures and differing subsurface 
conditions. The contract value was 587528 $ and the relationship between the 
contractor, consultant, and owner was a bad one as the contractor strategy was 
claimer. 
5- The fifth project was a new housing building for Personnel Department of the 
Palestinian Authority (Diwan Almothafeen) in Gaza City. The owner of this 
project was the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The project's contract 
type was a unit price. The delay of this project was 22 days and it was non-
causable delay. The reason for the delay was that the contractor company was 
a novice one in the field without any experience. The contract value was 
564475 $ and the relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner 
was a bad one. 
Table 4.1 summarized the impact on projects performance and the details of these 
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In this section all change orders taking place in 5 residential projects were 
collected. Then, the impact of each change order in cost, time, and percentage of 
change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours were counted. Table 4.7 
shows those change orders and their impact.  
 





























% PC(1) impact per each 
occurrence 
1 1 2 0.02, 0.2 No Impact 0.01, 0.22 
1 4 3 0.05, 0, 0.03 No Impact 0.1, 0, 0.02 


































% PC(1) impact per each 
occurrence 
1 8 21 
0.08, 0.07, 0.3, 0.06, 
0.18, 0.2, 0.06, 0.51, 
0.02, 0.22, 0.09, 0.09, 
1.42, 0.19, 0.19, 0.03, 
0.21, 0.06, 0.1, 0.11, 0.16 
No Impact 0.04, 0.09, 0.3, 0.03, 0.1, 
0.21, 0.06, 0.22, 0.01, 0.09, 
0.01, 0.03, 1.31, 0.06, 0.08, 
0.04, 0.02, 0.14, 0.25, 0.02, 
0.26 
3 21 4 0.34, 0.02, 0.03, 0.06 No Impact 0.37, 0.04, 0.03, 0.01 
3 27 1 3.63 No Impact 3.36 
3 29 1 3.6 No Impact 3.36 
3 32 3 -0.49, -0.34, -0.09 No Impact No Impact 
4 41 1 1.400 No Impact 2.100 
4 44 4 No Impact 
16.1, 6.7, 
3.5, 3.5 No Impact 
5 48 12 
0.1, 1.42, 0.45, 0.46, 
0.02, 0.09, 0.11, 0.37, 




0.25, 1.31, 0.17, 0.43, 0.03, 
0.06, 0.04, 0.28, 0.01, 0.05, 
0.03, 0.21 
5 49 2 0.98, 1.26 2.78, 1.25 0.4, 0.93 
6 52 1 -0.57 No Impact No Impact 
6 53 8 
0.6, 0.5, 0.73, 0.07, 0.06, 
0.35, 0.02, 0.04 
No Impact 0.75, 0.46, 0.67, 0.05, 0.05, 
0.14, 0, 0.06 
6 54 3 -3.77, -3.06, -3.19 No Impact No Impact 
8 71 1 3.12 No Impact 1.6 
9 83 1 0.02 No Impact No Impact 
9 90 21 
0.03, 0.3, 0.07, 0.53, 017, 
0.21, 0.26, 0.01, 0.05, 
0.02, 0.06, 0.04, 0.01, 
0.05, 0.02, 0.02, -0.53, 
0.16, 0.11, 0.08, 0.06 
No Impact 0.01, 0.22, 0.03, 0.01, 0.19, 
0.4, 0.42, 0.01, 0.05, 0.02, 
0.05, 0.04, 0.01, 0.05, 0.02, 
0.02, 0, 0.15, 0.08, 0.06, 
0.05 
9 91 1 No Impact 0.28 No Impact 
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% PC(1) impact per each 
occurrence 
9 95 7 
0.38, 1.53, 0.48, 6.89, 
1.3, 0.13, 0.6 
No Impact 0.08, 1.99, 0.85, 11.25, 
1.17, 0.11, 0.52 
9 96 1 0.22 No Impact No Impact 
10 
10
0 3 0.17, 0.15, 0.09 
No Impact 
0.084, 0.12, 0.032 
(1)Percentage of Change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours  
 
4.6 Summary of All Data 
In this section all change orders which happened in 15 building projects were 
collected. After that the impact of each change order in cost, time, and (PC) 
percentage of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours were 
counted. Table 4.8 shows those change orders and their impact.  
 





























% PC(1) impact per 
each occurrence 
1 1 14 
0.02, 0.2, 0.15, 0.13, 0.4, 
0.57, 0.06, 0.06, 0.01, 
0.02, 0.06, 0.06, 0.02, 
0.13 No Impact 
0.01, 0.22, 0.02, 0.04, 
0.11, 0.02, 0.01, 0.01, 
0.01, 0.6, 0.05, 0.22, 
0.11, 0.01 
1 2 1 -0.16 No Impact No Impact 
1 4 7 
0.05, 0, 0.03, 0.1, 0.08, 
0.29, 0.02 
No Impact 0.1, 0, 0.02, 0.32, 
0.08, 0.04, 0.15 
1 5 3 0.09, 1.37, 0.08 No Impact 0, 0.26, 0.02 


































% PC(1) impact per 
each occurrence 
1 8 71 
0.08, 0.07, 0.3, 0.06, 
0.18, 0.2, 0.06, 0.51, 
0.02, 0.22, 0.09, 0.09, 
1.42, 0.19, 0.19, 0.03, 
0.21, 0.06, 0.1, 0.11 
,0.16, 1.47, 0.02, 0.01, 
0.21, 0.05, 0.05, 0.04, 
0.5, 0.31, 0.15, 0.07, 3.1, 
0.3, 0.1, 0.18, 0.13, 0.35, 
0.16, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 
0.46, 0.25, 0.24, -0.04, 
0.07, 0.36, 0.07, 0.11, 
0.4, 0.7, 0.13, 0.37, 0.45, 
0.1, 0.06, 0.01, 0.02, 
0.69, 0.15, 0.38, 0.02, 
0.04, 0.35, 0.16, 0.34, 
0.06, 0.46, 0.25, 0.3 
No Impact 0.04, 0.09, 0.3, 0.03, 
0.1, 0.21, 0.06, 0.22, 
0.01, 0.09, 0.01, 0.03, 
1.31, 0.06, 0.08, 0.04, 
0.02, 0.14, 0.25, 0.02, 
0.26, 0.41, 0.12, 0.01, 
0.01, 0.03, 0.29, 0.04, 
0.4, 0, 0.01, 0.27, 
0.02, 0.02, 0.08, 0.07, 
0.05, 0.21, 0.29, 0.15, 
0.11, 0.01, 0.01, 0.26, 
0.06, 0.32, 0.01, 0.01, 
0.26, 0.12, 0.25, 0.01, 
0.34, 0.09, 0.23, 
5.44,0.02, 0.01, 0.08, 
0.49, 3.46, 0, 0.03, 
0.03, 0.84, 0.05, 0.05, 
0.03, 0, 0.3, 0.1 
1 15 5 
0.04, 0.34, 1.19, 1.89, 
4.84 
No Impact 0.08, 0.24, 4.19, 0.95, 
0.07 
2 18 1 0.63 No Impact 0.06 
3 21 45 
0.34, 0.02, 0.03, 0.06, 
2.25, 0.53, 0.9, 0.94, 
0.32, 0.44, 0.06, 0.28, 
0.09, 0.68, 0.37, 0.58, 
0.63, 0.17, 0.13, 0.55, 
0.31, 0.24, 0.2, 0.16, 
0.06, 0.05, 0.06, 0.05,  
No Impact 0.37, 0.04, 0.03, 0.01, 
0.06, 0.84, 0, 1.69, 
0.34, 1.19, 0.05, 0.08, 
0.71, 3.56, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0, 0, 0, 12.73, 0.17, 
0.25, 0.03, 0.21, 0.07, 
0.04, 0.11, 1.87, 0.1,  
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% PC(1) impact per 
each occurrence 
3 21 45 
0.05, 0.53, 0.05, 0.03, 
-0.13, -0.08, -0.06, 0.95, 
-0.41, 0.63, 0.71, -1.34, 
0.96, 0.25, 0.49, 0.03, 
0.09, 
No Impact 
0.08, 0.21, 0.23, 0.19, 
0.04, 0.03, 0.02, 0.02, 
0.02, 0.01, 0.01, 0.05, 
0.01, 0.01 
3 27 3 3.63, 0.1, 0.02 0,1.3, 3.33 3.36, 0.5, 0.07 
3 29 3 3.6, 11.54 
0, 0.93, 
-5.56 3.36, 17.1 
3 31 2 0.14, 0.14 0 0.05, 0.05 
3 32 23 
-0.49, -0.34, -0.09, -2.72, 
-0.03, -0.55, -3.1, -0.63, 
-0.08, -1.37, -0.73, -0.1, 
-0.94, -0.47, -1.05, -0.1, 
-0.52, -5.06, -0.26, 
- 0.04, -0.08, -0.08, -0.17 
No Impact 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0.81, 5.66, 0.98, 2.65, 
0.55 
4 39 3 0.4, 1.21, 0.31 No Impact 0.29, 1.35, 0.23 
4 41 1 1.4 No Impact 2.100 
4 42 2 No Impact 1.33, 1.33 No Impact 
4 43 3 0.41, 1.13, 0.05 0,0, 5.83 0, 0, 0.28 





11.67 No Impact 
5 47 6 




14.46, 6.1, 0.05, 0.6, 
0.64, 2.29 
5 48 24 
0.1, 1.42, 0.45, 0.46, 
0.02, 0.09, 0.11, 0.37,  
0,0,0,0,0,0
,0,0,0,0,0, 
0.25, 1.31, 0.17, 0.43, 
0.03, 0.06, 0.04, 0.28,  
 
 





























% PC(1) impact per 
each occurrence 
5 48 24 
0.014, 0.12, 0.07, 0.25, 
0.06, 0.4, 003, 0.1, 0.38, 
1.02, 0.02, 0.14, 0.19, 




0.01, 0.05, 0.03, 0.21, 
0.01, 0.17, 0.15, 5.41, 
0.05, 0.36, 0.16, 0.07, 
0.05, 0.01, 0, 0.01 
5 49 11 
0.98, 1.26, 0.74, 0.59, 
1.12, 1.77, -0.36, 6.1, 




0.4, 0.93, 0.14, 0.06, 
0.42, 0.33, 0, 5.61, 
0.58, 0.16, 0.04 
6 52 4 -0.57, -0.81, -0.09, -0.28 No Impact No Impact
6 53 44 
0.6, 0.5, 0.73, 0.07, 0.06, 
0.35, 0.02, 0.04, 1.14, 
0.24, 1.79, 0.08, 1.14, 
0.24, 2.68, 3.62, 0.48, 
0.81, 0.6, 0.06, 5.62, 
1.56, 0.2, 0.05, 0.07, 
0.02, 2.36, 0.21, 0.1, 
0.01, 0.28, 0.05, 1.96, 
0.05, 0.07, 2.28, 2.42, 
0.32, 0.06, 1.62, 1.9, 
0.15, 0.29, 0.27 No Impact 
0.75, 0.46, 0.67, 0.05, 
0.05, 0.14, 0, 0.06, 
0.05, 0.01, 1, 0.01, 
0.05, 0.01, 2.46, 2.69, 
036, 2.2, 0.76, 6.8, 
0.22, 0.02, 0.01, 2.98, 
0.08, 0.04, 0.01, 0.16, 
0.02, 0.01, 0.04, 3.28, 
0.13, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0, 0.03, 0.06, 0.01 
6 54 4 -3.77, -3.06, -3.19, 4.82 0,0,0, 0.37 0, 0, 0, 7.14 
7 56 2 2.72, 0 0, -1 No Impact
8 69 1 No Impact 1.48 No Impact 
8 71 2 3.12, 0.18 No Impact 1.6, 0.04 
8 80 1 0.09 No Impact No Impact 
9 83 1 0.02 No Impact No Impact 
9 85 1 No Impact 0.01 No Impact 
9 87 6 
1.25, 9.52, 0.11, 0.78, 
0.14, 0.62 

































% PC(1) impact per 
each occurrence 
9 90 30 
0.03, 0.3, 0.07, 0.53, 017, 
0.21, 0.26, 0.01, 0.05, 
0.02, 0.06, 0.04, 0.01, 
0.05, 0.02, 0.02, 0.53, 
0.16, 0.11, 0.08, 0.06, 
0.12, 0.06, 0.02, 012, 
0.01, 0.11, 0.65, 0.65, 
0.22 
No Impact 0.01, 0.22, 0.03, 0.01, 
0.19, 0.4, 0.42, 0.01, 
0.05, 0.02, 0.05, 0.04, 
0.01, 0.05, 0.02, 0.02, 
0, 0.15, 0.08, 0.06, 
0.05, 0.03, 0.22, 0.01, 
0.16, 0.01, 0.1, 0.01, 
0.48, 0.04 
9 91 2 0, 0.04 0.28, 4.63 0, 0.17 
9 95 7 
0.38, 1.53, 0.48, 6.89, 
1.3, 0.13, 0.6 
No Impact 0.08, 1.99, 0.85, 
11.25, 1.17, 0.11, 
0.52 
9 96 6 
0.22, 0.1, 0.04, 0.03, 
0.03, 0.38 
No Impact 0, 0.05, 0.04, 0.01, 
0.01, 0.7 




0.17, 0.15, 0.09, 0.17, 
0.13 
No Impact 0.084, 0.12, 0.032, 
0.48, 0.12 












Chapter 5  
Analysis and Results  
This chapter describes the results obtained from 15 case studies. The Input 
Analyzer in Arena packages was used to analyze the occurrences of change orders 
and their impact on cost, time, and productivity to rank the occurrences and the 
impact of change orders on building projects in the Gaza Strip in health, education, 
and residential sectors, cited in Al  helou (2006). 
 
5.1 Change Orders Analysis  
In this section the groups of change orders are ranked according to their 
importance for the health, education, and residential building projects, and then for all 
projects.  
 
5.1.1 Health sector  
The most important group producing 44.9 % of change orders in health sector 
was scope and quantities of work as shown in Table 5.1, followed by the design errors 
with 27.1 %, and other groups came as secondary groups producing only 28 % of 
change orders. 
Changes in market conditions in the health sector did not have any effect on 
the construction industry. Figure 5.1 shows the major groups influencing the 
occurrences of change orders in the health sector. 
 
5.1.2 Education sector  
The most important groups producing 32% of change orders in education 
sector was design errors as shown in Table 5.2, followed by the suggestion to initiate 






















1 3 Scope and quantities of work 53 44.9 1 
2 1 Design errors 32 27.1 2 
3 5 Differing site conditions 8 6.77 3 
4 9 Actions by others 8 6.77 3 
5 6 Suggestion to initiate better 7 5.93 5 
6 4 External conditions 3 2.54 6 
7 8 Contract conditions 3 2.54 6 
8 10 
Final coordination without in 
contract equipment 3 2.54 6 
9 7 Changes in design preference 1 0.85 9 
10 2 Changes in market conditions 0 0 10 
  
 
Fig 5.1: Major groups influencing the occurrences of change orders in the Gaza Strip. 
 
Differing site conditions with 13%, scope and quantities of work with 10% , 
actions by others with 10%, and external conditions with 7% were a minor groups 
(Figure 5.2).  
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Changes in market conditions, changes in design preference, final 
coordination without contract equipment came as secondary groups by producing only 
2.22% of change orders. 
Contract conditions does not have any effect on the education sector in the 
construction industry. Figure 5.2 shows the groups influencing the occurrences of 
change orders in the Gaza Strip in the education sector.  
 




















1 1 Design errors 44 32 1 
2 6 Suggestion to initiate better 33 24 2 
3 5 Differing site conditions 18 13 3 
4 3 Scope and quantities of work 14 10 4 
5 9 Actions by others 14 10 4 
6 4 External conditions 10 7 6 
7 2 Changes in market conditions 1 0.74 8 
8 7 Changes in design preference 1 0.74 8 
9 10 
Final coordination without in contract 
equipment 1 0.74 8 
10 8 Contract conditions 0 0 10 
 
5.1.3 Residential buildings  
 The most important group which produces 30.39% of change orders in 
residential sector was actions by others as shown in Table 5.3, followed by the design 
errors with 26.47%. Differing site conditions, suggestion to initiate better, and scope 
and quantities of work came in the middle by causing 33.31% of change orders in the 
residential sector in the Gaza Strip. Other groups came as secondary group by 




Fig 5.2: Major groups influencing the occurrences of change orders in Gaza Strip.  
 
 Changes in market conditions and changes in design preference 
did not have any effect on the residential sector in the Gaza Strip's 
construction industry. Figure 5.3 below shows the groups influencing 
the occurrences of change orders in Gaza strip for residential sector.  
  















4 9 Actions by others 31 30.39 1 
2 1 Design errors 27 26.47 2 
3 5 Differing site conditions 14 13.73 3 
5 6 Suggestion to initiate better 12 11.76 4 
1 3 Scope and quantities of work 9 8.82 5 
6 4 External conditions 5 4.90 6 
8 10 
final coordination without in 
contract equipment 3 2.94 7 
7 8 Contract conditions 1 0.98 8 
10 2 Changes in market conditions 0 0.00 9 




Fig 5.3: Major groups influencing the occurrences of change orders in Gaza Strip. 
 
5.1.4 All sectors 
The most important group which produced 28.7% of change orders in building 
projects was design errors as shown in Table 5.3, followed by scope and quantities of 
work with 21.3%, actions by others with 14.9, Suggestion to initiate better with 
14.6%, Differing site conditions with 11.5%, and External conditions with 5.06%. 
 Final coordination without in contract equipment, Contract conditions, 
Changes in Design Preference, and Changes in market conditions did not have any 
significant effect. Figure 5.4 shows the major groups influencing the occurrences of 
change orders in the Gaza Strip.  
 
5.2 Factors Influencing Change Orders and their Impact for the 
Health Sector  
At this stage the data which were collected from case studies and interviews from 
the health sector were analyzed collectively to study the reality of change orders and 
their impact on performance, This data also contained the analysis of occurrences and 






















1 1 Design errors 102 28.8 1 
2 3 Scope and quantities of work 75 21.2 2 
3 9 Actions by others 53 14.97 3 
4 6 Suggestion to initiate better 52 14.68 4 
5 5 Differing site conditions 40 11.3 5 
6 4 External conditions 18 5.1 6 
7 10 
Final coordination without in 
contract equipment 7 1.98 7 
8 8 Contract conditions 4 1.13 8 
9 7 Changes in design preference 2 0.56 9 
10 2 Changes in market conditions 1 0.28 10 
 
 
Fig 5.4: Major groups influencing the occurrences of change orders in 
Gaza Strip. 
 
5.2.1 Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders  
 There were only 29 effective factors causing change orders in the health sector 
in the Gaza Strip. The factors varied among themselves in their strength, where 
significant changes in the quantities of work were the most effective factor as it 
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caused 26.65% of the number of change orders. This factor reflected itself strongly in 
the rehabilitation projects. 
 Owner desire to improve his financial conditions was a major factor causing 
15.83% of the change orders in this sector. This factor began to appear directly after 
the increase in estimated budget, resulting from the occurrences of change orders. 
 Inadequate design was the third effective factor as it resulted in 13.33% of the 
change orders in the health sector. Really, this factor had an awful impact on the Gaza 
Strip construction industry as it appeared approximately in all projects. Therefore, it 
must be resolved. 
Safety considerations with 5%, suggestions to initiate more quality with 5%, 
design errors with 4.17%, noncompliance of design with owners requirements with 
4.17%, and prevalent practice on this project and/or district with 2.5% have a middle 
effect on causing change orders in health sector. Other factors in Table 5.5 were 
considered as a minor factors 
    





























Significant changes in the 




Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions 19 3 15.83 
2 
1 8 Inadequate design 16 3 13.33 3 
5 48 Safety considerations 6 2 5.00 4 
6 53 
Suggestions to initiate more 
quality 6 3 5.00 
4 
1 1 Design errors 5 2 4.17 6 
1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 5 3 4.17 
6 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this 
































1 4 Inconsistencies 2 1 1.67 9 
1 6 Change in design request 2 1 1.67 9 
9 90 User needs 2 2 1.67 9 
10 100 Technology changes 2 2 1.67 9 
4 43 Material non- availability 2 2 1.67 9 
5 49 
Differing subsurface 
conditions. 1 1 1.67 
9 
3 29 
Change of plans or scope by 
owner 1 1 1.67 
9 
1 2 Omissions 1 1 0.83 16 
1 5 Impossibilities. 1 1 0.83 16 
3 27 Plan errors 1 1 0.83 16 
4 44 Israeli closure 1 1 0.83 16 
5 47 Differing site conditions 1 1 0.83 16 
6 54 Value engineering 1 1 0.83 16 
7 56 Delays in the project 1 1 0.83 16 
8 69 
Consultants lack of judgment 




Honest wrong beliefs of 




Contractors lack of judgment 
and experience 1 1 0.83 
 
16 
9 85 Local governments 1 1 0.83 16 
9 91 
Review of the project by the 
proper governmental agency 1 1 0.83 
 
16 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 1 1 0.83 16 
10 98 
Mechanical and electrical 





5.2.2 Impact of change orders on cost 
 From the 29 previous factors causing change orders in health sector only 26 
factors had an impact on cost, as only three factors reduced the cost while 23 factors 
increased it. 
 Change of plans or scope by owner has the greatest impact on cost causing 
5.77 % increase in cost with maximum of 11.5%. So one time occurrence of this 
factor may cause a fatal failure in the project budget. Matters would much more fatal 
if it happened more than once as is did in one case study. Legally speaking, this factor 
causes a cardinal change but in the Gaza strip all parties deal with it as a natural 
change order and that may be due to a misunderstanding of the concept of change 
orders.   
 Value engineering in the Gaza Strip health sector appears one time but with a 
big impact on cost as it caused 4.82% increase in contract value. This change was a 
sudden, self-imposing one. So the parties concerned took their time in studying it. The 
owner paid for it out of the contract provisional sum and the contractor used a new 
crews to execute it so it was fully under control. 
 A prevalent practice on this project and/or district appeared three times in two 
projects with a mean of 3.63%, but its maximum appearance was 9.52%, which 
means it was one of the factors which has a significant impacts on the Gaza Strip 
health sector.  
Differing site conditions and delays in the projects had a great impact on cost, 
where they increased the contract value by 3.08% and 2.72%. The former can be 
controlled by site inspectation, while the delays in the projects leaded to direct 
acceleration in the health projects.  
Other factors had unessential impact but their great problem was their 
intensity, which may have led to project failure. 
Omissions, change in design request, and owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions had decreasing impact on cost but without an effective mean. The 
first two factors took place according to the specialty of the projects so there were not 
any side effects but owner's desire to improve his financial conditions resulted in the 




































Change of plans or scope by 
owner 0 11.5 5.77 8.2 
 
1 
6 54 Value engineering 4.82 4.82 4.82 0 2 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this 
project and/or district. 0.11 9.52 3.63 5.1 
3 
5 47 Differing site conditions 3.08 3.08 3.08 0 4 
7 56 Delays in the project 2.72 2.72 2.72 0 5 
1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 0.04 4.84 1.66 1.9 
 
6 
1 5 Impossibilities 1.37 1.37 1.37 0 7 
4 43 Material non- availability 0.41 1.13 0.77 0.5 8 
6 53 
Suggestions to initiate more 
quality 0.06 1.9 0.715 0.8 
9 
9 90 User needs 0.22 0.65 0.435 0.3 10 
1 8 Inadequate design 0.01 3.1 0.42 0.8 11 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 0.38 0.38 0.38 0 12 
5 48 Safety considerations 0.03 1.02 0.332 0.4 13 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work -0.41 2.25 0.31 0.5 
 
14 
1 1 Design errors 0.06 0.57 0.26 0.2 15 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions. 0.10 0.41 0.255 0.2 16 
8 71 
Honest wrong beliefs of 
consultant 0.18 0.18 0.18 0 
 
17 
10 100 Technology changes 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.0 18 
3 27 Plan errors 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 19 
1 4 Inconsistencies 0.08 0.1 0.09 0.0 20 
8 80 
Contractors lack of judgment and 





































Review of the project by the 
proper governmental agency 0.04 0.04 0.04 0 
22 
10 98 
Mechanical and electrical 
provision 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
 
23 
1 2 Omissions -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 0 24 
1 6 Change in design request -3.43 2.89 -0.27 4.5 25 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 




5.2.3 Impact of change orders on time  
 From the 29 factors causing change orders in the Gaza Strip health sector only 
8 factors caused an extension in the contract schedule. The most effective factor was 
the Israelis closures with a mean of 11.7 % of impact on time for every occurrence. 
Thus, problems from this factor must be resolved effectively. 
 Review of the project by the proper governmental agency had a mean of 
4.63% impact on time. Due to the importance of the health sector, many techniques 
should be used to end this delay. Material unavailability caused 2.92% impact on 
time.  
Consultants lack of judgment and experience caused 1.48% extension of time 
despite the importance of the health sector. 
Plan errors, value engineering, change of plans or scope by owner, and local 
governments also led to time extension but without real effective impact on time and 







































4 44 Israeli closure 11.67 11.7 11.67 0 1 
9 91 
Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency 4.63 4.63 4.63 0 
 
2 
4 43 Material non- availability. 0 5.83 2.92 4.1 3 
8 69 
Consultants lack of judgment and 
experience. 1.48 1.48 1.48 0 
 
4 
3 27 Plan errors 1.3 1.3 1.3 0 5 
6 54 Value engineering  0.37 0.37 0.37 0 6 
3 29 Change of plans or scope by owner 0 0.93 0.31 0.5 7 
9 85  Local governments 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 8 
 
5.2.4 Impact of health sector change orders on productivity 
 There were 23 factors that had an impact on the percentage of change on 
project in terms of original budgeted work hours, which means direct impact on 
productivity where all factors in one project were constant so the variable was only 
the percentage of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours. 
 Change of plans or scope by owner and value engineering were the most 
effective factors which led to productivity losses. Differing site conditions and 
noncompliance of design with owners requirements came in the second level in 
causing productivity losses and the other factors came as minor factors. On the other 
hand, the intensity of the factors had the greatest impact and it may have led to 
productivity fatigue. 
  





























3 29 Change of plans or scope by owner 0 17.1 8.55 12 1 
6 54 Value engineering 7.14 7.14 7.14 0 2 
 
 





























5 47 Differing site conditions 2.29 2.29 2.29 0 3 
1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 0.07 4.19 1.11 1.8 
 
4 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 0.7 0.7 0.7 0 5 
1 8 Inadequate design 0 5.44 0.683 1.5 6 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this project 




Significant changes in the quantities 




Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions. 0 5.66 0.561 1.4 
 
9 
3 27 Plan errors 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 10 
10 100 Technology changes 0.12 0.48 0.3 0.3 11 
1 5 Impossibilities. 0.26 0.26 0.26 0 12 
9 90 User needs 0.04 0.48 0.26 0.3 13 
1 1 Design errors 0.01 0.6 0.198 0.2 14 
9 91 
Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency 0.17 0.17 0.17 0 
 
15 
1 6 Change in design request 0.04 0.24 0.14 0.1 16 
4 43 Material non- availability 0 0.28 0.14 0.2 17 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 0.04 0.16 0.1 0.1 18 
1 4 Inconsistencies 0.04 0.15 0.095 0.1 19 
5 48 Safety considerations 0 0.16 0.05 0.1 20 
8 71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant 0.04 0.04 0.04 0 21 
10 98 Mechanical and electrical provision 0.04 0.04 0.04 0 22 





5.3 Factors Influencing Change Orders and their Impact for the 
Education Sector  
The data which were collected from case studies and interviews were analyzed 
collectively to study the reality of change orders and their impact on performance. 
Following are the results of such an analysis.  
 
5.3.1 Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders  
Twenty three factors hit the education building projects to cause change orders 
in the Gaza Strip. The most effective factors in this sector were inadequate design 
which accounted for 25.19% of the change orders' occurrence, then suggestions to 
initiate more quality with 22.22%. These two factors had a dangerous intensity and 
were evident in approximately all the education projects. 
Significant changes in the quantities of work, design errors, differing 
subsurface conditions, user needs, safety considerations, differing site conditions, 
Israeli closures, and socio-cultural factors caused numerous change orders in the 
education sector are they caused 36.3% of the change orders. 
Other factors in Table 5.9 came as secondary ones they accounted for only 
17.02% of change orders in this sector.  
 




























1 8  Inadequate design 34 5 25.19 1 
6 53 
Suggestions to initiate more 
quality 30 6 22.22 2 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 9 2 6.67 3 
1 1 Design errors 7 4 5.19 5 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 7 3 5.19 5 
































5 48 Safety considerations 6 5 4.44 7 
5 47 Differing site conditions 5 2 3.70 8 
4 44 Israeli closure 4 4 2.96 9 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 4 3 2.96 9 
4 39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 3 1 2.22 11 
6 52 
Suggestions to initiate more 
economical construction 3 1 2.22 11 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this 
project and/or district 3 2 2.22 11 
1 4 Inconsistencies 2 2 1.48 14 
3 31 
Change in the owner's 
requirements  2 2 1.48 14 
4 42 Extreme whether condition 2 2 1.48 14 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions 2 1 1.48 14 
1 5 Impossibilities 1 1 0.74 18 
2 18 
Specified item became 




3 27 Plan errors 1 1 0.74 18 
4 43 Material non- availability 1 1 0.74 18 
7 56 Delays in the project 1 1 0.74 18 
10 98 
Mechanical and electrical 









5.3.2 Impact of change orders on cost 
Of the 23 previous factors which caused change orders in the Gaza Strip in the 
education sector, only 20 factors had an impact on cost. Only two of those factors 
decreased the cost while 18 of them increased it. 
Differing site conditions had the greatest impact on cost and accounted for 
4.25 % of cost increase with maximum of 13% . The cause of this change in education 
sectors can be attributed to weak site visit.  
 Differing subsurface conditions was the second effective factor as it accounted 
for 1.75% increase in contract value, but sometimes it may have resulted in 6.1% cost 
increase. 
 Safety considerations played an important role in the education sector where 
the health of our children is the most important consideration.. The mean of this factor 
was 1.1% but the maximum was 5.84%, so sometimes it had big impact. 
 Suggestions to initiate more quality played a big role in increasing contracts 
value accounting for 1.1% of cost increase, but the average of its concurrency was 5 
times in every project where the mean of its occurrence was 5.5 in every contract 
value in the Gaza Strip education sector.  
 Uncovering disclosed existing conditions, specified item became unavailable, 
a prevalent practice on this project and/or district, significant changes in the quantities 
of work, inadequate design, change in the owner's requirements, mechanical and 
electrical provision, impossibilities, user needs, design errors, material unavailability, 
socio-cultural factors, and plan errors came as a secondary factors. 
 Suggestions to initiate more economical construction and owner desire to 
improve his financial conditions were used in education projects in large numbers in 
trying to control cost increase.  
 





























5 47 Differing site conditions 0.1 13 4.25 5.6  1 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 0.36 6.1 1.75 2  2 


































Suggestions to initiate more 
quality 0.01 5.62 1.02 1.3  4 
4 39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 0.31 1.21 0.64 0.5  5 
2 18 
Specified item became 
unavailable 0.63 0.63 0.63 0  6 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this 
project and/or district 0.14 0.78 0.513 0.3  7 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work -1.34 0.96 0.308 0.  8 
1 8  Inadequate design 0.01 0.7 0.231 0.2  9 
1 4 Inconsistencies 0.02 0.29 0.155 0.2  10 
3 31 
Change in the owner's 
requirements  0.14 0.14 0.14 0  11 
10 98 
Mechanical and electrical 
provision 0.12 0.12 0.12 0  12 
1 5 Impossibilities 0.08 0.08 0.08 0  13 
9 90 User needs 0.01 0.12 0.072 0.1  14 
1 1 Design errors 0.01 0.13 0.051 0.0  15 
4 43 Material non- availability 0.05 0.05 0.05 0  16 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 0.03 0.1 0.05 0.0  16 
3 27 Plan errors 0.02 0.02 0.02 0  18 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions -0.17 -0.04 -0.105 0.1  19 
6 52 
Suggestions to initiate more 






5.3.3 Impact of change orders on time  
 Israeli closure was the most effective factor causing delay in education 
projects as it accounted for 8.42% in average extension time followed by differing site 
conditions which caused 5% and plan errors which caused 3.33% of time increase. 
Last came extreme weather conditions which resulted in 1.33% delay. The remaining 
factors did not play any role in delay in education projects. 
 





























4 44 Israeli closure 2.67 25 8.42 11.1  1 
5 47 Differing site conditions 0 25 5 11.2  2 
3 27 Plan errors 3.33 3.33 3.33 0  3 
4 42 Extreme whether condition 1.33 1.33 1.33 0  4 
 
5.3.4 Impact of change orders on productivity 
 Seventeen factors had direct impact on productivity. Productivity can be 
calculated by taking the percentage of change on project in terms of original budgeted 
work hours as the main variable so differing site conditions, safety considerations, and 
differing subsurface conditions were the main factors which caused productivity loss. 
  Suggestions to initiate more quality, uncovering disclosed existing conditions, 
significant changes in the quantities of work, a prevalent practice on this project 
and/or district, inconsistencies, had a middle impact on education sectors the other 
factor did not have an essential role.  
 






























5 47 Differing site conditions 0.05 14.5 4.37 6.2 1 
5 48 Safety considerations 0.01 5.41 1.03 2.2 2 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 0 5.61 1.02 2.0 3 
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Suggestions to initiate more 
quality 0 6.1 0.817 1.4 4 
4 39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 0.23 1.35 0.623 0.6 5 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 0 1.69 0.551 0.6 6 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this 
project and/or district 0.06 0.73 0.457 0.4 7 
1 4 Inconsistencies 0.08 0.32 0.2 0.2 8 
1 8 Inadequate design 0.01 0.41 0.138 0.1 9 
9 90 User needs 0.01 0.22 0.077 0.1 10 
3 27 Plan errors 0.07 0.07 0.07 0 11 
2 18 
Specified item became 
unavailable 0.6 0.06 0.06 0 12 
3 31 
Change in the owner's 
requirements 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 13 
10 98 
Mechanical and electrical 
provision 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 13 
1 1 Design errors 0.01 0.11 0.031 0.0 15 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 0.01 0.05 0.026 0.0 16 
1 5 Impossibilities 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 17 
 
5.4 Factors Influencing Change Orders and their Impact for the 
Residential Sector  
In the following sections, the data collected from the case studies and interviews 
in the residential sector will be analyzed so as to reveal the reality of change orders 
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and their impact on performance. These sections will also entail the occurrence 
analysis and the impact of those occurrences on the performance analysis. 
 
5.4.1 Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders  
Twenty two effective factors caused change orders in Gaza Strip residential 
sector where inadequate design and user needs played an essential role resulting in 
20.59% occurrences of change orders per each factor. This means that about 50% of 
the change orders in residential sector caused by the two previous factors. 
 Change orders factors vary among themselves in their strength where 
significant changes in the quantities of work was the most effective factor resulting in 
26.65% of the number of change orders in health sector. These factors reflected 
themselves strongly in a big number of health rehabilitation projects. 
 Safety considerations with 11.76%, suggestions to initiate more quality with 
7.84%, and change in economic conditions with 6.86%, came second in causing 
change orders in the Gaza Strip residential sector.  
 Significant changes in the quantities of work, Israeli closure, inconsistencies, 
owner desire to improve his financial conditions, value engineering, technology 
changes, design errors, and differing subsurface conditions came as secondary factors 
accounting for 22.98% of the total change orders.  
Factors such as impossibilities, plan errors, socio-cultural factors, strikes, 
suggestions to initiate more economical construction, honest wrong beliefs of 
consultant, utility companies, review of the project by the proper governmental 
agency, and change of plans or scope by owner each occurred only one time in all 
cases, so despite their occurrence in the Gaza Strip residential sector, they did not 
have any importance in change orders. 
 





























1 8 Inadequate Design 21 4 20.59 1 
9 90 User needs 21 4 20.59 1 
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5 48 Safety considerations 12 5 11.76 3 
6 53 Suggestions to initiate more quality 8 4 7.84 4 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 7 2 6.86 5 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities 
of work 4 1 3.92 6 
4 44 Israeli closure 4 3 3.92 6 
1 4 Inconsistencies 3 2 2.94 8 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions 3 1 2.94 8 
6 54 Value engineering 3 3 2.94 8 
10 100 Technology changes 3 1 2.94 8 
1 1 Design errors 2 2 1.96 12 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 2 2 1.96 12 
1 5 Impossibilities 1 1 0.98 14 
3 27 Plan errors 1 1 0.98 15 
3 29 Change of plans or scope by owner 1 1 0.98 15 
4 41 Strikes 1 1 0.98 15 
6 52 
Suggestions to initiate more 
economical construction 1 1 0.98 15 
8 71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant 1 1 0.98039 15 
9 83 Utility companies 1 1 0.98 15 
9 91 
Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency 1 1 0.98 15 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 1 1 0.98 15 
 
5.4.2 Impact of change orders on cost 
 Plans error resulted in 3.63 of contract value increase, change of plans or 
scope by owner resulted in 3.6 of increase in contract value, and honest wrong beliefs 
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of consultant resulted in 3.12 of increase in contract value> this last factor, as it can be 
noticed, was the most effective factor having an enormous impact on cost. The good 
thing is that every factor of those illustrated above occurred only one time in this 
sector. Nonetheless, their impact on cost needs to be controlled. 
  Change in economic conditions, strikes, and differing subsurface conditions 
came second in increasing contract value. 
 The secondary factors which have cost impact in this sector were suggestions 
to initiate more quality, safety considerations, socio-cultural factors, inadequate 
design, technology changes, utility companies, design errors, impossibilities, user 
needs, inconsistencies, and significant changes in the quantities of work. 
 Owner desire to improve his financial conditions and suggestions to initiate 
more economical construction were used to reduce contract value but they did not 
have a big impact. 
 Value engineering occurred three times in three different projects causing 
decreasing in contract value by 3.34%, so it must be encouraged. 
  





























3 27 Plan errors 3.63 3.63 3.63 0 1 
3 29 
Change of plans or scope by 
owner 3.60 3.6 3.6 0 2 
8 71 
Honest wrong beliefs of 
consultant 3.12 3.12 3.12 0 3 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 0.13 6.89 1.62 2.2 4 
4 41 Strikes 1.40 1.4 1.400  5 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 0.98 1.26 1.12 0.2 6 
6 53 
Suggestions to initiate more 
quality 0.02 0.73 0.296 0.3 7 
5 48 Safety considerations 0.02 1.42 0.289 0.4 8 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 0.22 0.22 0.22 0 9 

































10 100 Technology changes 0.09 0.17 0.137 0.0 11 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 0.02 0.34 0.113 0.2 12 
1 1 Design errors 0.02 0.2 0.11 0.1 13 
1 5 Impossibilities 0.09 0.09 0.09 0 14 
9 90 User needs -0.5 0.53 0.082 0.2 15 
1 4 Inconsistencies 0.00 0.05 0.027 0.0 16 
9 83 Utility companies 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 17 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions -0.49 -0.09 -0.307 0.2 18 
6 52 
Suggestions to initiate more 
economical construction -0.57 -0.57 -0.57  19 
6 54 Value engineering -3.1 -3.8 -3.34 0.4 20 
 
5.4.3 Impact of change orders on time  
 Israeli closure was the most effective factor causing delay in education 
projects resulting in 7.45% in average extension time followed by differing subsurface 
conditions which accounted for 2.01%, followed by safety consideration resulting in 
0.348% increase in time. Last came review of the project by proper governmental 
agency which accounted for 1.33% delay. Other factors did not play any role in 
causing delay in the education projects. 
  






























4 44 Israeli closure 3.5 16.1 7.45 6 1 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 1.25 2.78 2.01 1.1 2 
5 48 Safety considerations 0 3.9 0.35 1.1 3 
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Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency 0.28 0.28 0.28 0 4 
 
5.4.4 Impact of change orders on productivity 
Fourteen factors had direct impact on productivity when taking the percentage 
of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours as the main variable 
together with plan errors, change in economic conditions, change in economic 
conditions, strikes, honest wrong beliefs of consultant. 
Differing subsurface conditions, suggestions to initiate more quality, safety 
considerations, inadequate design, design errors, significant changes in the quantities 
of work, user needs, inconsistencies, and technology changes had a moderate impact 
on education sector whereas the other factor did not have an essential role.  
 































3 27 Plan errors 3.36 3.36 3.36 0 1 
3 29 Change of plans or scope by owner 3.36 3.36 3.36 0 1 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 0.08 11.3 2.28 4.0 3 
4 41 Strikes 2.1 2.1 2.10 0 4 
8 71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant 1.6 1.6 1.6 0 5 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 0.4 0.93 0.67 0.4 6 
6 53 Suggestions to initiate more quality 0.05 0.75 0.27 0.3 7 
5 48 Safety considerations 0.01 1.31 0.24 0.4 8 
1 8 Inadequate Design 0.01 1.31 0.16 0.3 9 




































Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 0.01 0.37 0.11 0.2 11 
9 90 User needs 0 0.42 0.09 0.1 12 
10 100 Technology changes 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.1 13 
1 4 Inconsistencies 0.02 0.1 0.04 0.1 14 
 
5.5 Factors Influencing Change Orders and their Impact for the 
Gaza Strip Building Industry  
In the section that follow, the data collected from case studies and interviews 
people involved in building projects in the Gaza Strip will be analyzed to study the 
reality of change orders and their impact on performance. The sections will also 
include the occurrence analysis and impact of each effective factor on performance 
analysis. 
 
5.5.1 Major factors influencing the occurrences of change orders  
There were 37 factors causing change orders in the Gaza Strip. Those factors 
varied in their strength where inadequate design was the most effective factor causing 
19.72% of change orders occurrences in 80% of building projects in the Gaza Strip. 
 Significant changes in the quantities of work was the second factor in causing 
change orders by causing 12.68% of change orders occurrences in 40% of building 
projects in the Gaza Strip. This factor appears strongly intensity in rehabilitation 
projects. 
  Suggestions to initiate more quality resulted in 12.68% of change orders in 
the Gaza Strip in 86% of projects. The occurrence of this factor is due to the fact that 
there is no specific quality system in the Gaza Strip institutes. 
 User needs resulted in 8.45% of the occurrences of change orders and it 
reflected itself strongly in the residential sector. 
 Safety considerations resulted in 6.76% of change order occurrences and in 
80% of the Gaza Strip projects this factor appears strongly in building projects in the 
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Gaza Strip because there was no significant legal conditions for enforcing safety in 
construction projects. 
 Owner desire to improve his financial conditions caused 6.48% of change 
order occurrences in the Gaza Strip. This Factor appeared strongly after increasing the 
contract value during numbers of change orders and resulted in their reduction. 
 Design errors, differing subsurface conditions, Israeli closures, inconsistencies, 
change in economic conditions, differing site conditions, a prevalent practice on this 
project and/or district, socio-cultural factors, noncompliance of design with owners 
requirements, and technology changes got middle ranking.  
 Table 5.17 shows every factor causing any change order in fifteen building 
projects and its rank in the Gaza strip.  
  



































1 1 8  Inadequate design 70 12 19.72 1 
2 3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities 
of work 45 6 12.68 
2 
3 6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 44 13 12.39 3 
4 9 90 User needs 30 10 8.45 4 
5 5 48 Safety considerations 24 12 6.76 5 
6 3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions 23 5 6.48 
6 
7 1 1 Design errors 14 8 3.94 7 
8 5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 11 6 3.10 8 
9 4 44 Israeli closure 9 8 2.54 9 
10 1 4 Inconsistencies 7 5 1.97 10 
11 9 95 Change in economic conditions 7 2 1.97 10 
12 5 47 Differing site conditions 6 3 1.69 12 
13 9 87 
A prevalent practice on this project 
and/or district 6 4 1.69 
12 
14 9 96 Socio-cultural factors 6 5 1.69 14 
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15 1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 5 3 1.41 
15 
16 10 100 Technology changes 5 3 1.41 15 
17 6 52 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
economical construction 4 2 1.13 
17 
18 6 54 Value engineering 4 4 1.13 17 
19 1 5 Impossibilities 3 3 0.85 19 
20 3 27 Plan errors 3 3 0.85 19 
21 4 39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 3 1 0.85 
19 
22 4 43 Material non- availability 3 3 0.85 19 
23 1 6 Change in design request 2 2 0.56 23 
24 3 29 Change of plans or scope by owner 2 2 0.56 24 
25 3 31 Change in the owner's requirements  2 2 0.56 24 
26 4 42 Extreme whether condition 2 2 0.56 24 
27 7 56  Delays in the Project 2 2 0.56 24 
28 8 71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant 2 2 0.56 24 
29 9 91 
Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency 2 2 0.56 
24 
30 10 98 Mechanical and electrical provision 2 2 0.56 24 
31 1 2 Omissions 1 1 0.28 31 
32 2 18 Specified item became unavailable 1 1 0.28 31 
33 4 41 Strikes 1 1 0.28 31 
34 8 69 
Consultants lack of judgment and 
experience 1 1 0.28 
31 
35 8 80 
Contractors lack of judgment and 
experience 1 1 0.28 
31 
36 9 83 Utility companies 1 1 0.28 31 
37 9 85  Local governments 1 1 0.28 31 
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5.5.2 Impact of change orders on cost 
 Although change of plans or scope by owner is considered as a cardinal 
change, it is dealt with in the Gaza Strip as a constructive change. Therefore, it is sure 
that it had the greatest impact on cost and consequently increased the contract value 
by 7.55% in average. 
 Value engineering was the second factor as it increased the contract value by 
4.82% . However, this is a fully controlled factor because the owner paid for it from 
the provisional sum or maybe he paid for it out of the contact money. On other 
occasion this same factor decreased the cost by -3.34%.   
Differing site conditions had a bad impact on cost as it increased the contract 
value by 4.06%. The main reason for its occurrences was poor site visit. 
 Although change in design request increased the cost by 2.89% or decreased 
it by -3.43% it could be hardly controlled. 
Delays in the project caused 2.72% increase in contract value. This cost went 
up as a result f the overtime work which contractors may have resorted to while trying 
to meet the project's deadline. 
 A prevalent practice on this project and/or district appeared strongly in health 
sector because the inexperience of the designers is a prevalent practice in this sector. 
 Noncompliance of design with owners requirements, change in economic 
conditions, strikes, plan errors, suggestions to initiate more quality, uncovering 
disclosed existing conditions, specified item became unavailable, material non- 
availability, and impossibilities had a moderate impact on cost as shown in Table 
5.18.  
 Owner desire to improve his financial conditions and suggestions to initiate 
more economical construction were used to reduce contract value but they did not 
have a significant impact. 
 





































1 3 29 
Change of plans or scope 
by owner 3.6 11.5 7.55 5.6 1 
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2 6 54 Value engineering 4.82 4.82 4.82 0 2 
3 5 47 Differing site conditions 0.36 13 4.06 5.0 3 
4 1 6 Change in design request 2.89 2.89 2.89 0 4 
5 7 56  Delays in the Project 0 2.72 2.72 1.4 5 
6 9 87 
A prevalent practice on 
this project and/or district 0.11 9.52 2.07 3.7 6 
7 1 15 
Noncompliance of design 
with owners requirements 0.04 4.84 1.66 1.9 7 
8 8 71 
Honest wrong beliefs of 
consultant 0.18 3.12 1.65 2.1 8 
9 9 95 
Change in economic 
conditions 0.13 1.53 1.62 2.4 9 
10 5 49 
Differing subsurface 
conditions 0.1 6.1 1.5 1.7 10 
11 4 41 Strikes 1.4 1.4 1.4 0 11 
12 3 27 Plan errors 0.02 3.63 1.25 2.1 12 
13 6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate 
more Quality 0.01 5.62 0.85 1.2 13 
14 4 39 
Uncovering disclosed 
existing conditions 0.31 1.21 0.64 0.5 14 
15 2 18 
Specified item became 
unavailable 0.63 0.63 0.63 0 15 
16 4 43 Material non- availability 0.05 1.13 0.53 0.6 16 
17 1 5 Impossibilities 0.08 0.14 0.51 0.7 17 
18 5 48 Safety considerations 0.014 5.84 0.50 1.2 18 
19 3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 0.02 2.25 0.39 0.4 19 
20 1 8  Inadequate design 0.01 3.1 0.28 0.5 20 
21 10 100 Technology changes 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.0 21 
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22 3 31 
Change in the owner's 
requirements  0.14 0.14 0.14 0 22 
23 1 1 Design errors 0.01 0.57 0.14 0.2 23 
24 9 96 Socio-cultural factors 0.03 0.38 0.13 0.1 24 
25 9 90 User needs -0.53 0.65 0.12 0.2 25 
26 8 80 
Contractors lack of 
judgment and experience 0.09 0.09 0.09 0 26 
27 1 4 Inconsistencies 0 0.29 0.08 0.1 27 
28 10 98 
Mechanical and electrical 
provision 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.1 28 
29 9 83 
Utility companies 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0 
29.
5 
30 9 91 
Review of the project by 
the proper governmental 
agency 0 0.04 0.02 0.0 
29.
5 
31 1 2 Omissions -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 0 31 
32 3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work -1.34 -0.06 -0.35 0.5 32 
33 6 52 
Suggestions to Initiate 
more economical 
construction -0.09 -0.81 -0.44 0.3 33 
34 3 32 
Owner desire to improve 
his financial conditions -0.03 -5.06 -0.79 1.2 34 
35 6 54 Value engineering -3.77 -3.06 -3.34 0.4 35 
36 1 6 Change in design request -3.43 -3.43 -3.43 0 36 
   Total (+) 
15.16 87.46 38.47 
  
   Total (-) 
-9.35 -12.58 -8.51 
  




5.5.3 Impact of change orders on time  
 Israeli closure imposed on the Palestinian territories was the most effective 
factor causing delay in education projects as it caused 8.35% in average time 
extension, followed by differing subsurface conditions which caused 5%, dovetailed 
by review of the project by the proper governmental agency which resulted in 2.46% 
increase in time, followed finally by material un availability which caused 1.94% 
delay. 
 Other factors were secondary ones they may have resulted in one or two days' 
delay as shown in Table 5.19.  
  

































1 4 44 Israeli closure  2.67 25 8.35 7.8 1 
2 5 47 Differing site conditions 0 25 5 11 2 
3 9 91 
Review of the project by the 
proper governmental agency 0.28 4.63 2.46 3.1 3 
4 4 43 Material unavailability 0 5.83 1.94 3.4 4 
5 3 27 Plan errors 0.39 3.33 1.54 1.7 5 
6 8 69 
Consultants lack of judgment 
and experience 1.48 1.48 1.48  0 6 
7 4 42 Extreme whether condition 1.33 1.33 1.33 0 7 
8 3 29 
Change of plans or scope by 
owner 0 0.93 0.47 0.7 8 
9 5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 0 2.78 0.40 0.9 9 
10 6 54 Value engineering 0.37 0.37 0.37 0 10 
11 5 48 Safety considerations 0 3.9 0.17 0.8 11 
 
5.5.4 Impact of change orders on productivity 
Twenty eight factors had a direct impact on productivity which is calculated 
by taking the percentage of change on project in terms of original budgeted work 
hours as the main variable so change of plans or scope by owner have the greatest 
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impact then a prevalent practice on this project and/or district, after that value 
engineering and so as shown in Table 5.20. 
As seen in literature review, there were other factors playing important role in 
causing productivity loss as shown in (Equation 2.5).  
 


































1 3 29 
Change of plans or scope by 
owner 0 17.1 10.2 9.7 1 
2 9 87 
A prevalent practice on this 
project and/or district 0.03 1.89 10.1 23 2 
3 6 54 Value engineering 7.14 7.14 7.14 0 3 
4 5 47 Differing site conditions 0.67 14.5 4.02 5.6 4 
5 9 95 Change in economic conditions 0.08 11.3 2.28 4.0 5 
6 4 41 Strikes 2.1 2.1 2.10 0 6 
7 3 27 Plan errors 0.12 3.36 1.31 1.8 7 
8 1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 0.07 4.19 1.11 1.8 8 
9 5 48 Safety considerations 0 5.41 0.87 1.7 9 
10 8 71 
Honest wrong beliefs of 
consultant 0.04 1.6 0.82 1.1 10 
11 5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 0 5.61 0.79 1.6 11 
12 3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 0 12.7 0.65 2.1 12 
13 4 39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 0.23 1.35 0.62 0.6 13 
14 6 53 
Suggestions to initiate more 
quality 0 6.1 0.61 1.2 14 
15 3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions 0 5.66 0.46 1.3 15 
16 1 8  Inadequate design 0 5.44 0.27 0.8 16 
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17 1 6 Change in design request 0.24 0.24 0.24 0 17 
18 10 100 Technology changes 0.03 0.48 0.17 0.2 18 
19 9 96 Socio-cultural factors 0 0.7 0.14 0.3 19 
20 1 1 Design errors 0.01 0.6 0.10 0.2 20 
21 1 4 Inconsistencies 0 0.32 0.10 0.1 21 
22 9 90 User needs 0 0.48 0.1 0.1 22 
23 1 5 Impossibilities 0 0.26 0.1 0.1 23 
24 4 43 Material non- availability 0 0.28 0.1 0.2 23 
25 9 91 
Review of the project by the 
proper governmental agency 0 0.17 0.09 0.1 25 
26 2 18 
Specified item became 
unavailable 0.06 0.06 0.06 0 26 
27 3 31 
Change in the owner's 
requirements  0.05 0.05 0.05 0 27 
28 10 98 
Mechanical and electrical 












Chapter 6  
Building Simulation Model  
This chapter outlines the simulation model of change orders and their impact 
on cost, schedule, and productivity. The environment of the simulation was Arena-
version 5.00.02 (cited in Al  helou, 2006). 
 
6.1 Model Objectives 
 Two simulation models were built to simulate change orders' factors and their 
impact on building projects performance. 
The first model was built to analyze the factors of change orders and their impact 
on building projects' performance. 
The second model was built to help a project parties in predicting the impact of 
change orders on project performance. 
 
6.2 Simulation by Arena 
Al-helou (2006) cited that Arena has an object oriented environment to define 
system logic and physical components. The power afforded by Arena extends its 
ability to be integrated with other technologies, such as databases, drawing, modeling 
products, or spreadsheets. Moreover, it has such familiar interface that is compatible 
with Microsoft software packages. 
Arena's product family consists of Arena Basic Edition, Arena Standard 
Edition, Arena Contact Center Edition, Arena Packaging Edition, Arena Professional 
Edition, and OptQuest for Arena which is used for the optimization process. The 
simulation model of change orders and their impact on building projects performance 
in Gaza Strip was built using Arena Basic Edition, version (5.00.02).  
The "flowchart" is the general mechanism of simulation by Arena. The word 
"flowchart" has two main concepts behind; "flow" and "chart". Beginning with 
"chart", it is the main frame of the model that is built according to the logical aspects. 
 
 
"Chart" consists of graphical objects called "modules", which are the objects of both 
chart and data, that define the process to be simulated. All information required to 
simulate a process is stored in the "modules". The second concept, "flow", represents 
the moving objects through a "chart". Such objects which are called "entities" are the 
items that are being served, produced, or otherwise acted on by a process. Arena 
software adopts the "production lines" strategy, which could be represented by static 
"workshops", and moving "products". The projection of such concept on the 
construction environment makes the entire project represented as objects "entities", 
that pass through the chart's modules to be performed, cited in Al  helou (2006). 
 
6.3 Input and Output Data 
 The input of the simulation model of change orders and their impact was the 
number of change orders occurred by factors in the actual project, while the output 
were 
1- Impact on cost and time for each factor  
2- Total impact on cost, time, and productivity on the project (Figure 6.1).  
 
 
6.4 Model Flow Chart 
Flow chart in Figures 6.2a and 6.2b was the first basic step in building the 
simulation model of the change orders and their impact on performance as follows: 
1- As shown in Figure 6.2a, the flow chart starts with generating 171 entities to 
use them in the sub-models as seen latter.  
2- 10 entities enter the change orders' group factors sub-model and the rest goes 
to the productivity loss sub-model. 























6.2b), it directly separates into a number of batches equal in number to the 
number of factors in the sub-model and each batch contains 100 entities.  
4- The batch which enters into the factor is stopped to allow only an equal 
number of entities to the number of change orders to enter.  
5- After that the batch is separated into three batches. 
6- The first batch is separated into a number equals to [100 x (entities in the 
batch)] and they are used to calculate the impact of the factor on time by 
choosing the impact from the time impact probability distribution (Table 6.4), 
then the value is sent to time block, see Figure 6.2a. 
7- The time block collects all impacts on time coming from each factor. Then the 
result is directed to "output time impact" block.  
8- The second batch is separated into a number equals to [100 x (entities in the 
batch)] and they are used to calculate the impact of the factor on percentage of 
change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours by choosing the 
impact from the percentage of change on project in terms of original budgeted 
work hours impact probability distribution (Table 6.5), then the value is sent to 
PC block, see Figure 6.2a. 
9- The PC block collects all impacts on PC coming from each factor. Then the 
result is then directed to "sum coming PC" block, see Figure 6.2a.  
10- The third batch is separated into a number equals to [100 x (entities in the 
batch)] and they are used to calculate the impact of the factor on cost by 
choosing the impact from the cost impact probability distribution, see Table 
6.3. 
11- Impact on cost is checked if its positive or negative, the positive impact goes 
to "+cost" block while the negative impact goes to "- cost" block, see Figure 
6.2a.  
12- The "+ cost" block collects all positive impact on cost coming from each 
factor. Then the value is directed to "output cost impact" block.  
13- The "- cost" block collects all negative impact on cost coming from each 
factor. The value is then directed to "output cost impact" block. 
14- The remaining entities are used to calculate other factors of productivity loss 
as shown in Figure 6.2a as follows: 
a- 37 entities are used to form the constant shown in Equation 2.5. After that 
they go to "sum all productivity factors" block as a positive number. 
 
 
b- 8 entities go to "Calculate 0.08 PM" block, then the value is calculated 
from probability distribution. After that the value goes to "sum all 
productivity factors" block as a negative number. 
c- 100 entities (represent 100%) go to "Calculate 0.17 %Owner CO" block, 
then the value is calculated from probability distribution and goes to "sum 
all productivity factors" block as a negative number. 
d-  9 entities go to " Calculate 0.09 Productivity" block, then they go to "sum 
all productivity factors" block as a negative number. 
e- 5 entities go to " Calculate 0.05 Overmanning" block, then they go to "sum 
all productivity factors" block as a negative number. 
f- 2 entities go to " Calculate 0.02PT" block, then they go to "sum all 
productivity factors" block as a positive number. 
g- 12% of the entities which reach to the "sum coming PC" block go to "sum 
all productivity factors" block as a positive number. 
h- "Sum all productivity factors" block adds all coming values together, then 
it sends the result to " output productivity loss" block as seen in Figure 6.2. 
15- At the end, the "Impact on Performance" block previews the impact of change 
orders on cost, time, and productivity: 
a- The "Output Time" block previews the impact on time. 
b- The "Output Cost" block previews the impact on cost. 
c- The "Output productivity loss" block previews the impact on labor 
productivity.  
 
6.5 Arena Modules  
The simulation model was built by using the modules that are located at the 
"basic process panel". Modules such graphical objects that define the process, and 
containing all of the required information. Modules have two main types; "flowchart" 
modules and "data" modules. The "basic process panel" consists of eight flowchart 
modules and six data modules (Figure 6.3). In the side panel, each of the "flowchart" 
modules has a specific figure such as: rectangular, diagonal, etc., while "data" 
modules were acted with small tables. To build a flowchart in the Arena's 
environment, the required "flowchart" module has to be dragged and dropped via 
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Figure 6.2b: Flow chart of change orders and impact model 
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from their both ends with one connection at least, except the Create and Dispose 
modules. Table 6.1 clarifies the flowchart modules.  
A Data module is simply a table that can be fed with different data features. 
The Data module's table could be opened by double clicking its icon at the "basic 
process panel" (cited in Al  helou, 2006). 
 
Figure 6.3: Arena software window 
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Table 6.1: Arena flowchart modules (cited in Al  Helou, 2006). 
Module Figure  Brief Description 
Create   
Create
0       
The starting point for entities in a model. 
Process  
Process
     0  
The main processing method in the simulation 
process including resources delay type 






0      
     0  
This module allows for decision making process 





It is used for assigning new values to any of 






0      
     0  
This module can be used to either copy an 
incoming entity into multiple entities or to split a 




     0  
Intended as the grouping mechanism for the 









0       
The ending point for entities in a model (The 
termination of the simulation process). 
 
6.6 Data Preparation 
 Before laying out the simulation model, four questions have to be asked. The 
questions are:  
1- how can we produce the change orders per each factor in the model? 
2- what is the impact on cost probability distributions per each factor? 
3- what is the impact on time probability distributions per each factor? 
4- what is the impact on percentage of change on project in terms of original 
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budgeted work hours probability distributions per each factor? 
 
6.6.1 Change orders generation 
 
To answer the first question, entities in the queuing line of the factor have to 
be passed with equal number to the number of change orders occurring in actual 
project due to the respective factor (Table 4.21). So, the Process module with (seize, 
delay, release) action is activated, that means, a resource with certain service time 
serves a number of entities in queuing line to produce the occurring number of change 
orders. The question then is supposed to be "What is the time that the resource needs 
to produce the number of change orders?" The answer is summarized in the 
following: 
1- The project life time is simulated by one day in the model. 
2- The resource must serve the entities in the queuing line to produce a number 
of entities equal to the number of change orders. 
3- To produce only one entity, the service time has to be one day. But to produce 
two entities, the service time has to be 0.5 day which means that the resource 
releases 1 entity per 0.5 day.  
4- To produce any occurrence, then the service time has to be  day.  
5- But to make sure that the last entity in service goes out, the time of service has 
to be less than the time in the previous point. 
6- To make sure the entities are not more than the number of change orders 
produced, the time of service has to be less than the time needed to produce 
the occurrences +1, so the service time has to be less than  day.  
7- Therefore, the general average needed service time is given in Equation 6.1. 
  
 Table 6.2 shows the occurrences of change orders and the service time needed 







Table 6.2: The number of change orders and their service times 










1 Design errors 14 0.069 
2 Omissions 1 0.750 
4 Inconsistencies 7 0.134 
5 Impossibilities 3 0.292 
6 Change in design request 1 0.750 
6 Change in design request 1 0.750 
8  Inadequate design 70 0.014 
15 Noncompliance of design with owners requirements 5 0.183 
18 Specified item became unavailable 1 0.750 
21 Significant changes in the quantities of work 39 0.025 
21 Significant changes in the quantities of work 6 0.155 
27 Plan errors 3 0.292 
29 Change of plans or scope by owner 2 0.417 
31 Change in the owner's requirements  2 0.417 
32 Owner desire to improve his financial conditions 23 0.043 
39 Uncovering disclosed existing conditions 3 0.292 
41 Strikes 1 0.750 
42 Extreme whether condition 2 0.417 
43 Material non- availability 3 0.292 
44 Israeli closure 9 0.106 
47 Differing site conditions 6 0.155 
48 Safety considerations 24 0.041 
49 Differing subsurface conditions 11 0.087 
52 Suggestions to Initiate more economical construction 4 0.225 
53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 44 0.022 
54 Value engineering (+ cost) 1 0.750 
54 Value engineering (- cost) 3 0.292 




Table 6.2: The number of change orders and their service times (contd.) 










69 Consultants lack of judgment and experience 1 0.750 
71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant 2 0.417 
80 Contractors lack of judgment and experience 1 0.750 
83 Utility companies 1 0.750 
85  Local governments 1 0.750 
87 A prevalent practice on this project and/or district 6 0.155 
90 User needs 30 0.033 
91 Review of the project by the proper governmental agency 2 0.417 
95 Change in economic conditions 7 0.134 
96 Socio-cultural factors 6 0.155 
98 Mechanical and electrical provision 2 0.417 
100 Technology changes 5 0.183 
 
6.6.2 Impact of change orders on cost  
To answer the second question, "% Cost impact per each occurrence", Table 
4.9 was inserted to the Input Analyzer program of Arena to fit the optimum 
probability distribution for each factor. Every change occurred due to any factor is 
separated into 100 entities where every entity represents 1%. The cost probability 
distribution was entered into a Decide module to let a ratio from the entities passes 
according to the probability distribution (Figure 6.14). The ratio equals the actual 
impact. The fitted probability distributions for change orders factors are shown in 
Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3: Impact of change orders on cost 
#F Factor  




1 Design errors GAMM(0.143, 0.943) 0.016 
2 Omissions 0.16  




Table 6.3: Impact of change orders on cost (contd.) 
#F Factor  




5 Impossibilities 1.5 * BETA(0.435, 0.695) 0.092 
6 Change in design request 2.89 - 
6 Change in design request 3.43 - 
8  Inadequate design LOGN(0.267, 0.446) 0.002 
15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 5 * BETA(0.476, 0.505) 0.091 
18 Specified item became unavailable 0.63 - 
21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 2.48 * BETA(0.751, 3.65) 0.003 
21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work LOGN(0.393, 0.651) 0.040 
27 Plan errors WEIB(0.596, 0.48) 0.114 
29 Change of plans or scope by owner 3 + 9 * BETA(0.484, 0.466) 0.082 
31 Change in the owner's requirements  0.14 0.000 
32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions WEIB(0.635, 0.732) 0.015 
39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 
0.22 + 1.08 * 
BETA(0.0499, 0.0783) 0.068 
41 Strikes 1.38 0.000 
42 Extreme whether condition 0 0.000 
43 Material non- availability 1.24 * BETA(0.584, 0.75) 0.089 
44 Israeli closure 0 0.000 
47 Differing site conditions GAMM(6.31, 0.644) 0.026 
48 Safety considerations WEIB(0.342, 0.668) 0.003 
49 Differing subsurface conditions LOGN(1.41, 1.23) 0.026 
52 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
economical construction UNIF(0.01, 0.89) 0.050 
53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality WEIB(0.659, 0.698) 0.003 





Table 6.3: Impact of change orders on cost 
#F Factor  




54 Value engineering ERLA(0.131, 25) 0.201 
56  Delays in the Project EXPO(1.36) 0.297 
69 
Consultants lack of judgment and 
experience 0 0.000 
71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant 3.42 * BETA(0.479, 0.537) 0.100 
80 
Contractors lack of judgment and 
experience 0.09 - 
83 Utility companies 0.2 - 
85  Local governments 0 - 
87 
A prevalent practice on this project 
and/or district 10 * BETA(0.0447, 0.171) 0.031 
90 User needs LOGN(0.17, 0.32) 0.005 
91 
Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency WEIB(0.0117, 0.563) 0.242 
95 Change in economic conditions LOGN(1.56, 2.65) 0.022 
96 Socio-cultural factors EXPO(0.133) 0.031 
98 Mechanical and electrical provision BETA(0.602, 0.726473) 0.179 
100 Technology changes TRIA(0.08, 0.17, 0.18) 0.067 
 
6.6.3 Impact of change orders on time 
To answer the third question, "% Time impact per each occurrence", Table 4.9 
was inserted to the Input Analyzer program of Arena to fit the optimum probability 
distribution for each factor. Every change occurred due to any factor is separated into 
100 entities where every entity represents 1%. The time probability distribution was 
entered into a Decide module to let a ratio from the entities passes according to the 
probability distribution. The ratio equals the actual impact. The fitted probability 








Table 6.4: Impact of change orders on time 
#F Factor 
Expression of impact 
on time (%) 
Square 
Error 
27 Plan errors EXPO(1.54) 0.118 
29 Change of plans or scope by owner EXPO(0.465) 0.297 
42 Extreme whether condition 1.33 0.000 
43 Material non- availability WEIB(1.6, 0.851) 0.166 
44 Israeli closure TRIA(2, 4.3, 25) 0.128 
47 Differing site conditions GAMM(7.88, 0.635) 0.375 
48 Safety considerations ERLA(0.174, 1) 0.003 
49 
Differing subsurface conditions 3 * BETA(0.0307, 
0.198) 0.019 
54 Value engineering 0.37 0 
69 Consultants lack of judgment and experience 1.48 0 
91 
Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency 
5 * BETA(0.476, 
0.505) 0.091 
 
6.6.4 Impact of change orders on PC 
To answer the fourth question, "% PC impact per each occurrence", Table 4.9 
was inserted to the Input Analyzer program of Arena to fit the optimum probability 
distribution for each factor. Every change occurred due to any factor is separated into 
100 entities where every entity represents 1%. The PC probability distribution was 
entered into a Decide module to let a ratio from the entities passes according to the 
probability distribution. The ratio equals the actual impact. The fitted probability 
distributions for change orders factors are shown in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5: Impact of change orders on the percentage of change  
#F Factor  
Expression of  impact 
on PC (%) 
Square 
Error 
1 Design errors LOGN(0.101, 0.233) 0.007 
4 Inconsistencies EXPO(0.101) 0.024 
5 Impossibilities ERLA(0.0933, 1) 0.213 
6 Change in design request 0.24 0.000 
8  Inadequate design EXPO(0.278) 0.002 
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Table 6.5: Impact of change orders on the percentage of change (contd.) 
#F Factor  
Expression of  impact 




Noncompliance of design with owners 
requirements GAMM(2.02, 0.547) 0.043 
18 Specified item became unavailable 0.06 - 
21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work WEIB(0.254, 0.525) 0.001 
27 Plan errors 
3.69 * BETA(0.414, 
0.672) 0.082 
29 Change of plans or scope by owner 
3 + 15 * BETA(0.354, 
0.415) 0.054 
31 Change in the owner's requirements  0.05 - 
32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions ERLA(0.463, 1) 0.008 
39 Uncovering disclosed existing conditions NORM(0.26, 0.03) 0.000 
41 Strikes 2.1 - 
43 Material non- availability ERLA(0.0933, 1) 0.206 
47 Differing site conditions LOGN(0.879, 1.52) 0.034 
48 Safety considerations WEIB(0.202, 0.596) 0.002 
49 Differing subsurface conditions LOGN(0.837, 1.83) 0.027 
53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality WEIB(0.291, 0.573) 0.008 
54 Value engineering 7.14 - 
71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant LOGN(1.39, 7.47) 0.250 
87 
A prevalent practice on this project and/or 
district EXPO(0.57) 0.045 
90 User needs LOGN(0.13, 0.29) 0.006 
91 
Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency ERLA(0.085, 1) 0.297 
95 Change in economic conditions 12 * BETA(0.363, 1.04) 0.050 
96 Socio-cultural factors WEIB(0.0886, 0.71) 0.051 
98 Mechanical and electrical provision TRIA(0.03, 0.039, 0.06) 0.232 
100 Technology changes LOGN(0.165, 0.176) 0.063 
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6.7 Model Layout  
The developed model consists of 4 main parts as the following: 
1- Entities generation part consists of a Create module, 10 Separate modules, and a 
process module, see Figure 6.4. 
2- 10 sub-models of change orders' groups part. These sub-models are: design errors, 
change in market conditions, scope and quantities of work, external conditions, 
different site conditions, suggestion to initiate better, changes in design 
performance, contract conditions, actions by others, and final coordination, see 
Figure 6.8. 
3- Productivity loss sub-model part which is modeled according to Equation 2.5, see 
Figure 6.15. 
4- Impact of change orders on project performance part, see Figure 6.18.  
The model consists of 690 modules from 12 kinds of flow chart modules. Table 6.6 
shows the details of the 690 modules.  
 

















































Entities generation part 1 1 - - 10 - - - - - 12 
10 sub-models of change 
orders' groups part 
- 40 - 120 160 - 160 - 170 - 650 
Productivity loss sub-model 
part 
- - 2 2 6 1 2 1 - 1 15 
Impact of change orders on 
project performance part 
- - - - - - 4 5 - 4 13 
Total 1 41 2 122 176 1 166 6 170 5 690 
 
6.7.1 Entities generation 
 The simulation model of change orders and their impacts (Figure 6.4) starts 
with generating and distributing entities as shown in Figure 6.5 according to the 
following systematic steps: 
1- The simulation model starts with generating one entity. A Create module with 




Figure 6.4: Entities generation part 
 
module is constant with value equals to 5 seconds where we need a negligible 
time compared with the project life, so the entity shall be generated in the first 




Figure 6.5: Create module data entry window  
 
maximum arrival equals one. The previous module means that only one entity 
will be generated in a time equivalent to the start time of the model. 
2- After generating the entity, it enters into a Separate 
module called "G10". G10 module separates the entity into two (Figure 6.6), 
one goes to sub-model called " G10 final coordination without in contract 
equipment" in change orders groups part and the second entity goes to other 
Separate module called "G9". The same action is repeated in a series of 
Separate modules till reaching to G1 module. G1 module sends one entity to 
"G1 design errors" sub-model and send the second to a "process" module 
before reached to productivity loss sub-model.  
 




3- There is no delay actions in productivity loss sub-model, 
so Process module (Figure 6.7) delays the entity (1 hour) to guarantee that it 
will not dispose before starting the simulation model see Figure 6.5 . 
  
 
Figure 6.7: Process module data entry window 
 
6.7.2 Change orders' groups part 
This part consists of 10 sub-models (Figure 6.8). As seen in section 6.7.1 a 
series of Separates modules feed each sub-model with one entity. To be aware of what 
happens in change orders groups sub-models, "G10 final coordination without in 
contract equipment" sub-model was taken as an example as follows:  
1- "G10 final coordination without in contract equipment" sub-model consists of 
two factors sub-models , the first one is "Factor 98 - Mechanical and electrical 
provision" sub-model and the second is "Factor 100 - Technology changes" 
sub-model. Factor 100 is taken here as an example see Figure 6.9 and Table 
4.1. 
2- Once the entity enters "G10 final coordination without in contract equipment", 
a series of Separate modules send 100 entities (represent 100%) to each factor  
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Figure 6.8: Change orders' groups sub-models 
 
in the group. These 100 entities enter into a queuing line of a Process module. 
The resource in the Process module serves the entities in the queuing line to 
produce an equal number of entities to the number of change orders in the 
actual project due to this factor.  




 Figure 6.9: Representative Factor sub model (G10 sub-model) 
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(Section 6.7.1), enters Group 10 sub-model, it goes to Separate module 
(Figure 6.10) to separate it into an entity and a batch of 100 entities. The batch 
goes to "F100" queuing line and the entity goes to another Separate module 
with the same function to feed "F98". 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Separate module which is used to feed factors by entities 
 
4- "F100 Technology changes" Process module (Figure 6.11) serves 100 entities 
in the queuing line to let only for an equal number of entities equal to the 
actual change orders enters. So, a resource with action "Seize Delay Release" 
serves entities in the queuing line with [delay type: constant, Unit: day, and 
Value: 0.183 (Table 6.2)].  
5- Entities which pass "F100 Technology changes" Process module go to a 
Record module (Figure 6.12) with ( Type: count and value = 1). The Record 
module stores the value in a counter with name (a number of change) and all 
other factors store their values with the same name so the total number of 
change orders of the project appears in the final results sheet.  
6- After that the entities which pass the Recored module enter into a series of 
Separate modules to produce three batches. each batch equal to [(entities pass 
the Record module) x 100] (Figure 6.10). 
7- The first batch enters "F100 cost" Decide module (Figure 6.13). The module 
produces change orders impact on cost due to this factor. The impact on cost 
due to this factor is given by probability distributuion in Table 6.3.  
8- After (the number of entities which equals to the value of impact on cost)  
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Figure 6.11: Module which used to produce change orders 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Record module  
 
leaves the Decide module, it enters into a Record modul to count it, then it 
goes to a Route module. 
9- The Route module (Figure 6.14) sends entities to a Station called cost in 
"impact of changes on project performance" part.  
10- The second batch enters "F100 schedule" Decide module (Figure 6.9). This 
module produces the impact of change orders on time. The impact on time is 




Figure 6.13: Decide module  
 
entities which equals to the value of impact on time) leaves the Decide 
module, they enter a Record module to count them, then they go to a Route 
module. The Route module sends entities to a Station module called "Time" in 
impact on performance part. 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Route module 
 
11- The third batch enters "F100 productivity" Decide module (Figure 6.9). This 
module produces the impact of change orders on percentage of change on 
project in terms of original budgeted work hours. The impact on "Percentage 
of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours" is given by the 
probability distributuion seen in Table 6.5. After the number of entities which 
equal to the value of impact on percentage of change on project in terms of 
original budgeted work hours leave the Decide module, they enter a Record 
module to count them, then they go to a Route module. The Route module 
sends entities to a Station module called "Percent Change" in impact on 
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productivity sub-model.  
 
6.7.3 Productivity loss sub-model 
This part consists of 15 modules (Figure 6.15). As seen in section 6.7.1 the last 
Separate module in the entities generation part feeds a Process module with one 
entity. The Process module delays the entity to guarantee that the entity will not be 
disposed before starting the simulation model. 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Impact on productivity sub-model  
 
The impact on productivity sub-model starts once the entity comes from the 
entities generation part according to the following systematic steps.  




2- When the entity reaches to productivity loss sub-model, it goes to a Separate 
module to produce another entity and a batch of 37 entities. The entity goes to 
(0.02 processing time) Separate module and the batch goes to "negative 
productivity" Record module forming the constant in the previous equation. 
3- The entity which reaches to "0.02 processing time" separates into an entity and 
a batch of 2. The entity goes to a Separate module with name (P3) and the 
batch goes to "negative productivity" Record module. 
4- The entity which reaches to "P3" module separates into two entities. One of 
them goes to "0.17 %Owner Intiated CO" Decide module and the another goes 
to Separate module with name "0.09 Productivity". 
5- "%OwnerIntiatedCO" Decide module generates percentage of change orders 
initiated by the owner and sends it to positive productivity Record module. 
6- "0.09 Productivity" Separate module separates the entity into an entity and a 
batch of 9 entities. The entity goes to "0.05 Overmanning" Separate module 
and the batch goes to "positive productivity" Record module.  
7- "0.05 Overmanning" Separate module separates the entity into an entity and a 
batch of 5. The entity goes to "P6" Separate module and the batch goes to 
positive productivity Record module. 
8- "P6" Separate module separates the entity into an entity and a batch of 8. The 
entity goes to Dispose module and the batch goes to "0.08 PM% Time On 
Project" Decide module. 
9- "0.08 PM% Time On Project" Decide module calculates the value of 
percentage of time the project manager spends on the project and sends it to 
"Positive productivity" Record module. 
10- Percentage of change on project in terms of original budgeted work hours 
which is collected from 37 change orders factors in the "Change Orders' 
Groups" sub-model is sent by a Route module to a Station module (Figure 
6.15). After that, Batch module (Figure 6.16) allows only the 12% of entities 





Figure 6.16 Batch module  
 
11- An Assign module (Figure 6.17) with name Assign1 marks the entities which 
pass from "Positive productivity" Record module by variable 1 with value = 
+1. After that, entities go to total impact on productivity Record module, see 
Figure 6.19.  
 
 
Figure 6.17 Assign module  
 
12- An Assign module with name Assign2 marks entities which pass from 
"negative productivity" Record module by variable 1 with value = -1. After 
that entities go to total impact on productivity Record module, see Figure 6.19.  
 
6.7.4 Impact of change orders on project performance part 
This part consists of 13 modules (Figure 6.18) and it shows the result of the 
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simulation model of change orders and their impact on performance. 
The first part consists of Station module connected by Dispose module (Figure 
6.18). The Station module collects all unneeded entities in the model and sends them 
to the Dispose module. 
The second part consists of a Record module called Total Impact on 
productivity (Figure 6.19). The Record module receives entities coming from Assign1 
and Assign2 modules and adds them together, see Section 6.7.3 Points 11 and 12.  
The third part consists of a Station module called Cost (Figure 6.18). The 
Station module receives entities coming from Route module, see Section 4.7.2 Point 
9, and sends them to a Record module called "Total Positive impact on cost". The 
same thing happens with negative cost (Figure 6.18) and impact on time (Figure 
6.18).After running the model, the total impact on cost, time, and productivity will 
also be generated (Figure 6.20). 
  
 




Figure 6.19: Variable counter module  
 
6.8 Using Model  
 To demonstrate how project parties can use the model, the following 
systematic steps have be followed: 
1- Collect change orders in the respective project, then determine the causing 
factors from Table 4.1 For each change. For example, suppose there are ten 
changes in the project and change (1) is caused by [G1(Design Errors), 
F1(Design errors)]. Changes (2, 3, 4) are caused by [G3(Scope and quantities 
of work), F21(positive significant changes in the quantities of work)]. Changes 
(5, 6) are caused by [G3 (Scope and quantities of work), F21(Negative 
significant changes in the quantities of work)]. Changes (7, 8, 9, 10) are 
caused by [G9 (Actions by others), F90 (users need)]. The respective service 
times should be calculated according to Equation 6.1 as demonstrated in step 
2. Table 6.7 summarizes the changes and respective occurrences  
2- In the previous example F1 occurred once so the service time = 
. 
3- F21positive happened three times, so the service time = . 
4- F21negative happened twice, so the service time = . 
5- F90 happened four times, so the service time = . 
6- The summary of the previous are (G1 F1, T= 0.75), (G3 F21positive, T= 
0.292), (G3 F21negative, T= 0.417), and (G9 F90, T= 0.225) see Table 6.8.  
7- To operate the model, the following procedure are followed: 




Figure 6.20: Model result  
 
a- Double click on "G1Design Errors" (Figure 6.21)  
b- Double click on "F1 Dr " block and put the value of T in the delay value 
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box (Figure 6.22), then chose ok. 
c- Click the right mouse button and chose "close sub-model". 
d- Redo (a, b, c, and d) with all factors.  
e- Press F5 button then wait until finishing the program then chose yes. 
f- The result will be appeared.  
 
 
Figure 6.21: Double click on "G1Design Errors" 
 











G1 1 Design errors 1 0.75 
G3 21 Positive significant changes in the 
quantities of work 
3  
G3 21 Negative significant changes in the 
quantities of work) 
2  





Figure 6.22: Double click on "F1 Dr " block and put the value of T 
 
6.9 Model Verification 
 Two methods were used to verify the model. The first was by reviewing the 
model step by step with the supervisor to insure that there was no error in the logic 
and the second was by inserting the result of each case study on the model and 
comparing the results. 
 Thirty two replications were used to analyze the data where these replications 
were the smallest number of replications which gave the highest maximum of total 
impact on performance and the lowest minimum of total impact on performance. 
To satisfy the verification of increase the cost, decrease in cost and extension 
in the time, the mean error, the bivariate correlations, and categorical regression were 
calculated.  
Table 6.8 outlines the actual increase in the projects' cost due to change orders and the 
simulation results. The mean error between the actual increase in cost and the 
simulated increase is 2.98%, which means the average accuracy of the simulation 
model in predicting increase in cost was 97.02%. As a result, it can be confidently 
said that the simulation represents significantly the actual cost increase.  
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Bivariate correlations factor for the actual increase in cost and the simulated 
increase (Table 6.9) was 0.889 and it is satisfactory at á = 0.000 which means that the 
test is satisfactory at level of confidence approaching to 100%, that means there is a 
good relationship between the actual and the simulation results.  
 
Table 6.8: Actual increase and simulated increase in cost 









in cost (%) Min Max Mean 
Average 
Error 
1 H1 28 34.78 23 45 31.4 3.34 
2 H2 28 16.9 9 24 13.8 3.09 
3 H3 6 9.01 1 11 4.48 4.53 
4 H4 56 13.8 10 31 21 7.2 
5 R1 31 9 4 14 9.63 0.63 
6 R2 21 8.71 2 17 9.7 0.99 
7 R3 2 1.49 0 6 2.31 0.82 
8 R4 31 5.96 6 20 13.9 7.94 
9 R5 16 10.72 5 15 9.72 1 
10 S1 21 12.38 8 26 16.8 4.42 
11 S2 16 5.86 1 16 5.93 0.07 
12 S3 9 26.41 12 28 21.2 5.21 
13 S4 29 18.77 5 27 17.1 1.64 
14 S5 36 17.79 6 31 21.5 3.71 
15 S6 15 7.71 3 18 7.87 0.16 
 
Table 6.9: Bivariate correlations for actual and simulated increase in cost  
  Actual Simulation 
Actual Pearson Correlation 1 0.889* 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 
  N 15 15 
Simulation Pearson Correlation 0.889* 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000   
  N 15 15 




Categorical regression between the actual increase in cost - dependent variable 
- and the simulated increase  predictors - was done. After That ANOVA test was 
done. The á value of the ANOVA test was 0.000 which means that the test is 
satisfactory at a level of confidence approaching to 100%. Categorical regression is 
satisfactory at á = 0.000 which means that the test is satisfactory at a level of 
confidence approaching to 100%. which lead to said there are a real relationship 
between the actual result and the simulation result. Table 6.10, 6.11, 6.12 illustrate the 
results of the Categorical regression.  
Table 6.10: ANOVA test for actual increase and simulated increase in cost  
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 14.908 1 14.908 2113.039 0.000 
Residual 0.092 13 0.007     
Total 15.000 14       
Dependent variable: actual 
Predictors: simulation 
 
Table 6.11: Coefficients of categorical regression for actual increase and simulated 
increase in cost  
Standardized Coefficients 
 Beta Std. Error df F Sig. 
Simulation 0.997 0.022 1 2113.039 .000 
Dependent variable: actual 
 
 
Table 6.12: Correlations and tolerance of categorical regression for actual increase 
and simulated increase in cost  
  Correlations Importance Tolerance 
  
Zero-





Simulation 0.997 0.997 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Dependent variable: actual 
 
Table 6.13 outlines the decrease in projects' cost due to change orders and the 
simulation results. The average error between the actual decrease in cost and that of 
the simulation was 1.114%. This means that the average accuracy of the simulation 
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model in the prediction of cost decrease was 98.886%. Therefore, it can be truly said 
that the simulation model represents the actual cost decrease. 
 
Table 6.13: Actual decrease and simulated decrease on cost  








Actual decrease in 
project cost Min Max Mean 
Average 
error 
1 H1 28 3.265 0 4 1.47 1.8 
2 H2 28 17.2 3 21 11.3 5.86 
3 H3 6 0 0 0 0 0 
4 H4 56 1.6 2 13 6.6 5 
5 R1 31 1.47 0 6 2.75 1.28 
6 R2 21 3.77 1 10 3.43 0.34 
7 R3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
8 R4 31 3.06 0 7 2.88 0.18 
9 R5 16 3.19 0 7 2.63 0.56 
10 S1 21 0 0 0 0 0 
11 S2 16 0 0 0 0 0 
12 S3 9 0 0.00 0 0 0 
13 S4 29 0.2 0 6 1.6 1.4 
14 S5 36 2.51 0 6 2.22 0.29 
15 S6 15 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Bivariate correlations factor for the actual decrease in cost and the simulated 
decrease (Table 6.14) was 0.879 and it is satisfactory at á = 0.000 which means that 
the test is satisfactory at level of confidence approaching to 100%, that means there is 
a good relationship between the actual and the simulation results.  
Categorical regression between the actual decrease in cost - dependent 
variable - and the simulated decrease  predictors - was done. After That ANOVA test 
was done. The á value of the ANOVA test was 0.000 which means that the test is 
satisfactory at a level of confidence approaching to 100%. Categorical regression is 
satisfactory at á = 0.000 which means that the test is satisfactory at a level of 
confidence approaching to 100%. which lead to said there are a real relationship 
between the actual result and the simulation result. Table 6.15, 6.16, and 6.17 
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illustrate the results of the Categorical regression.  
 
Table 6.14: Bivariate correlations for actual decrease and simulated decrease in cost 
  Actual Simulation 
Actual Pearson Correlation 1 .879(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 
  N 15 15 
Simulation Pearson Correlation .879(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000   
  N 15 15 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6.15: ANOVA test for actual decrease and simulated decrease in cost  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 14.999 2 7.500 148342.619 0.000 
Residual 0.001 12 0.000   
Total 15.000 14    
Dependent variable: actual 
Predictors: simulation 
 
Table 6.16: Coefficients of categorical regression for actual decrease and simulated 
decrease in cost  
Standardized Coefficients 
  Beta Std. Error df F Sig. 
Simulation 1.000 0.002 2 296685.238 0.000 
Dependent variable: actual 
 
Table 6.17: Correlations and tolerance of categorical regression for actual decrease 









Simulation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Dependent variable: actual 
 
Table 6.18 outlines the increase in the projects' dime due to change orders and 
the simulation results. The Average error between the actual increase in time and the 
simulated increase was 4.25%. This means that the average accuracy of the simulation 
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model in predicting the time impact was 95.75%. This mean that the simulation 
represents significantly the actual time increase.  
  
Table 6.18: Actual increase and simulated increasing in time  














time Max Mean error 
1 H1 28 8.7 3 14 8.5 0.2 
2 H2 28 0 0 0 0 0 
3 H3 6 17.5 7 22 12.4 5.1 
4 H4 56 6 2 10 5.5 0.5 
5 R1 31 16.4 6 20 12.6 3.8 
6 R2 21 9.7 6 22 13.3 3.6 
7 R3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
8 R4 31 8.1 13 29 21.8 13.7 
9 R5 16 0 0 2 0.5 0.5 
10 S1 21 3.3 3.2 0 7 3.7 
11 S2 16 0 0 3 0.2 0.2 
12 S3 9 50.00 24 40 31.1 18.9 
13 S4 29 3.3 5 27 13.2 9.9 
14 S5 36 15.8 10 27 17.8 2 
15 S6 15 10 5 20 11.7 1.7 
 
Bivariate correlations factor for the actual increase in time and the simulated 
increase (Table 6.19) was 0.837 and is satisfactory at á = 0.000 which means that the 
test is satisfactory at a level of confidence approaching to 100%, that means there is a 
good relationship between the actual and the simulation results.  
Categorical regression between the actual increase in time - dependent 
variable - and the simulated increase  predictors - was done. After That ANOVA test 
was done. The á value of the ANOVA test was 0.000 which means that the test is 
satisfactory at a level of confidence approaching to 100%. Categorical regression is 
satisfactory at á = 0.000 which means that the test is satisfactory at a level of 
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confidence approaching to 100%. which lead to said there are a real relationship 
between the actual result and the simulation result. Table 6.20, 6.21, and 6.22 
illustrate the results of the Categorical regression. 
 
Table 6.19: Bivariate correlations for actual increase and simulated increase in time 
  Actual Simulation 
Actual Pearson Correlation 1 .837(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 
  N 15 15 
Simulation Pearson Correlation .837(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
  N 15 15 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6.20: ANOVA test for actual increase and simulated increase in time  
 Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 14.946 2 7.473 1658.479 0.000 
Residual 0.054 12 0.005   
Total 15.000 14    
Dependent variable: actual 
Predictors: simulation 
 
Table 6.21: Coefficients of categorical regression for actual increase and simulated 
increase in time  
Standardized Coefficients 
 Beta Std. Error df F Sig. 
Simulation 0.998 0.017 2 3316.957 0.000 
Dependent variable: actual 
 
Table 6.22: Correlations and tolerance of categorical regression for actual increase 









Simulation .998 .998 .998 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Dependent variable: actual 
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6.10 Model Validation 
 Validation of simulation model of change orders and their impact on cost, 
time, and productivity was validated also in two ways. The first was through two 
interviews with Palestinian Economic Council projects' managers and the Palestinian 
Housing Council projects' managers, who expressed their approval of the model. The 
second was by entering a new case on the model and comparing its results. The case 
was Khan-Yonis School. Table 6.23 depicts the actual change orders and their actual 
impact. Table 6.24 compares between the actual and the simulation change orders.  
 










1 1 1 Design Errors 1 0.02 0 
2 1 8 Inadequate Design 3 1.22 0 
3 4 42 Extreme whether condition 1  1.33 
4 4 44 Israel Closer 1  2.66 
5 5 47 Differing Site Conditions 1 6.8 10 
6 5 48 Safety considerations 1 0.31 0 
7 5 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 4 5.07 0 
8 9 87 
A prevalent practice on this 
project and/or district 1 0.78 0 
9 9 96 Socio-cultural factors 1 0.02 0 
 
Table 6.24: Comparison between actual and simulated impact of change orders for 
Khan-Younis school 
Simulation Impact 
on cost (%) 






















































V1 14 13.99 4 25 11 2.69 13.99 8 28 16.3 2.31 
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As shown in Table 6.25, the accuracy in predicting cost is 97.31% and the 
accuracy in predicting time is 97.69%, after entering a new case study into the 
simulation model. This accuracy means that the simulation model is a significantly 
valid to be used in the Gaza Strip. 
6.11 Model Data Analysis 
 After building Arena simulation model, all change orders on 15 projects were 
tested. Table 6.25 illustrates the result of the simulated impact of change orders on 
cost, time, and productivity where Table 5.18 and 5.19 illustrate the actual .  
Table 6.25: Simulated projects results 























































1 1 1 Design errors 0.00 0.40 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 1 2 Omissions 0.00 -0.1 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 1 4 Inconsistencies 0.00 0.60 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 1 5 Impossibilities 0.00 0.40 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 1 6 
Change in design 
request 0.00 0.47 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 1 6 
Change in design 
request 0.00 -0.5 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 1 8 Inadequate design 0.73 1.93 1.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 1 15 
Noncompliance of 
design with owners 
requirements 0.40 1.40 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 2 18 
Specified item became 
unavailable 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 3 21 
Significant changes in 





Table 6.26: Simulated projects results (contd.) 























































 3 21 
Significant changes in 
the quantities of work 0.00 -0.4 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 3 27 Plan errors 0.07 0.53 0.28 0.07 0.67 0.31 
11 3 29 
Change of plans or 
scope by owner 0.33 1.40 0.98 0.00 0.33 0.08 
12 3 31 
Change in the owner's 
requirements 0.00 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 3 32 
Owner desire to 
improve his financial 
conditions -0.47 
-
1.53 -1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 4 39 
Uncovering disclosed 
existing conditions 0.00 0.40 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 4 41 Strikes 0.00 0.27 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 4 42 
Extreme whether 
condition 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.15 
17 4 43 
Material 
Unavailability 0.00 0.33 0.11 0.00 0.73 0.35 
18 4 44 Israeli closure 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.87 7.93 6.44 
19 5 47 
Differing site 
conditions 1.07 2.33 1.65 1.33 2.73 1.87 
20 5 48 Safety considerations 0.27 1.07 0.71 0.00 0.60 0.25 
21 5 49 
Differing subsurface 
conditions 0.53 1.80 1.07 0.07 0.67 0.40 
22 6 52 









Table 6.26: Simulated projects results (contd.) 























































23 6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate 
more Quality 1.80 3.33 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 6 54 Value engineering 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.20 0.04 
24 6 54 Value engineering -0.3 -1.0 -0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25 7 56 Delays in the Project 0.00 0.47 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26 8 69 
Consultants lack of 
judgment and 
experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.09 
27 8 71 
Honest wrong beliefs 
of consultant 0.00 0.40 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
28 8 80 
Contractors lack of 
judgment and 
experience 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
29 9 83 Utility companies 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
30 9 85 Local governments 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31 9 87 
A prevalent practice 
on this project and/or 
district 0.47 1.73 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
32 9 90 User needs 0.07 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
33 9 91 
Review of the project 
by the proper 
governmental agency 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.53 0.28 
34 9 95 
Change in economic 
conditions 0.27 1.20 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 





electrical provision 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 6.26: Simulated projects results (contd.) 























































37 10 100 Technology changes 0.00 0.27 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
38 
Total Simulation impact on (-) 
cost 1 3 1.9    
39 
Total Simulation impact on (+) 
cost 8 12 9.75    
40 Total Simulation impact on time 12 16 14.1    
41 
Total Simulation impact on 
productivity 9.00 17.0 13.0    
 
Simulation analysis show that the total impact of change orders increased the 
cost on minimum by 8%, average by 9.75%, and maximum by 12%. Total impact of 
change orders also decreased the cost on minimum by 1%, mean by 1.9%, and 
maximum by 3%.The total impact of change orders increased the time on minimum 
by 12%, mean by 14.1%, and maximum 16%. The total simulation impact of change 
orders decrease the productivity on minimum by 9%, mean by 13%, and maximum by 
17% 
 major factors causing change orders in the Gaza Strip were as follows:  
   
1- Inadequate design caused 19.72% of change orders. It is recommended to involve 
owners and contractors during the design phase. Consequently any change orders 
taking place during the construction phase must provide feedback to be taken into 
consideration in the future.  
2- Significant changes in the quantities of work caused 12.68% of change orders. 
Using experts in preparing bill quantity and reviewing by others will restrain this 
factor. 
3- Suggestions to initiate more quality cased 12.39% of change orders. determining   
quality level and after that freezing the design against the quality is a good way to 
restrain this factor. 
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4- User needs caused 8.45% of change orders. The best way to restrain it is through 
feedback. 
5- Safety considerations caused 6.76% of change orders. The best way to restrain it 
is through feedback.  
6- Owner desire to improve his financial conditions caused 6.87% of change 
orders. The best way to restrain it is through preparing the feasibility study and 
studying the financial status during the design phase.  
7- Design errors caused 3.94% of change orders. The best way to restrain it is 
through using expert designers in preparing the design and then the design must be 
reviewed by other experts. 
8- Differing subsurface conditions caused 3.1% of change orders. The best way to 
restrain it is through doing the soil tests before preparing design. 
9- Israeli closures  cause 2.54% of change orders. Although most documents stated 
that the contractors should do their  procurement work in the beginning, owners still 
need to compensate contractors by time so a strategy mustbe set up so that no damage 
can be inflicted on the contractors as a result of the Israeli closures.  
10- Inconsistencies caused 1.97% of change orders. The best way to restrain it is by 
using expert designers to prepare the design and then the design must be reviewed by 
an expert team. 
11- Change in economic conditions caused 1.97% of change orders. The best way to 
restrain it is through conducting an in-depth feasibility study.  
 
12- Differing site conditions caused 1.69% of change orders. The best way to 
restrain it is by doing an in-depth site investigation. 
 13- A prevalent practice on this project and/or district caused 1.69% of change 
orders. The best way to restrain it is by using a form of bill quantity upgraded after 
every project from feedback. 
14- Socio-cultural factors caused 1.69% of change orders. The best way to restrain it 
is by feedback 
15- Noncompliance of design with owners requirements caused 1.41% of change 
orders. The best way to restrain it is through involving the owner in design  
16- Technology changes caused 1.41% of change orders. The best way to restrain it 





Conclusion and Recommendation 
7.1 Conclusion  
Change affects every aspect of human endeavors, and construction is not an 
exception. A recent survey of professional engineers identified change as the major 
cause of project failure, so a combination of concurrent interviews and case studies 
were used to collect change orders occurred in 15 building projects and their impact 
on building projects' performance in Gaza Strip. 
As a result of this research, a good tool for showing the factors causing change 
orders and forecasting their impact on the Gaza Strip building projects have been 
made available. This tool is a simulation model of change orders and their impact on 
building projects' performance. The 37 available factors in Gaza Strip (Table 4.2) 
were modeled in Arena environmental to allow the users to input change orders, then 
the impact on cost, time, and productivity will appear. The model gave 97.02% 
accuracy in forecasting the increase in cost, 98.9% accuracy in forecasting decrease in 
cost, and 95.75% in forecasting time extension. 
There were 37 effective factors causing change orders in the Gaza Strip 
building projects. Those factors caused 355 occurrences of change orders in only 15 
projects. These projects encompassed 6 education building projects, 4 health building 
projects, 5 residential building projects, which were carried out in the Gaza Strip to 
collect the information required for analysis. The projects which were documented 
and analyzed were only initiated between 1996 and 2005. 
In Gaza Strip, change orders played a significant role in construction because 
they had a great impact on cost, schedule, and productivity. The simulation analysis 
showed the following: 
1-  The Total impact of change orders increased the cost on minimum by 8%, 
average by 9.75%, and maximum by 12%.  
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2- The total impact of change orders decreased the cost on minimum by 1%, 
mean by 1.9%, and maximum by 3%. 
3- The total impact of change orders increased the time on minimum by 12%, 
mean by 14.1%, and maximum 16%. 
4- The total impact of change orders decrease the productivity on minimum 
by 9%, mean by 13%, and maximum by 17%. 
The concept of changes in Gaza was unclear, so contractors managed their 
construction change orders problems without depending on any deep scientific 
concept. Because of that, this research intended to provide contractors in Gaza Strip 
with an effective change orders management tool. This tool is a simulation model 
which explains to contractors how change orders occur and how such orders impact 
performance. This research added a tool for forecasting the impact of change orders 
on cost, schedule, and productivity in the Gaza Strip.  
 
7.1.1 Health sector 
There were 29 effective factors causing change orders in the health sector in the 
Gaza Strip. Those factors caused 118 occurrences of change orders in only 4 projects. 
The increase in actual cost was: the minimum 9.1%, the maximum 34.78%, 
and the mean 18.6%. The increase in simulation cost was: the minimum 10.75%, the 
maximum 27.75%, and the average 17.67%.  
The decrease in the actual cost during change orders was: the minimum 0%, 
the maximum 17.2%, and the average 5.52%. The decrease in simulation cost was: 
the minimum 1.25%, the maximum 9.5%, and the average 4.84%. 
The increase in actual time was: the minimum 0%, the maximum 17.5%, and 
the average 8.05%. The increase in simulation time was: the minimum 3%, the 
maximum 11.5%, and the average 6.6%.  
 The loss in productivity in actual was not measured because there were not 
any recordings, so (CII,2000) method was programmed in the simulation model and 
the result of the simulation productivity loss during change orders was: the minimum 






7.1.2 Education sector 
There were 23 effective factors causing change orders in the educational 
sector in the Gaza Strip. Those factors caused 135 occurrences of change orders in 
only 6 projects. 
The increase in the actual cost was: the minimum 5.86%, the maximum 
26.41%, and the mean 14.82%. The increase in simulation cost was: the minimum 
5.8%, the maximum 24.3%, and the average 15.06%.  
The decrease in the actual cost during change orders was: the minimum 0%, 
the maximum by 2.51%, and the mean 0.45%. The decrease in simulation cost were: 
the minimum 0%, the maximum 2%, and the average 0.63%. 
The increase in actual time was: the minimum 0%, the maximum 50%, and the 
mean 13.7%. The increase in simulation time was: the minimum 7.8%, the  maximum 
19.5%, and the average 13.5%.  
 The loss in productivity in actual time was not measured because there was 
not any document recording the information about the productivity loss so (CII,2000) 
method was program in the simulation model and the result of the simulation 
productivity loss during change orders was: the minimum 7.5%, the maximum 17.5%, 
and the average 13.8 %.  
 
7.1.3 Residential sector 
There were 22 effective factors causing change orders in the residential sector 
in the Gaza Strip. Those factors caused 102 occurrences of change orders in only 5 
projects. 
The increase in actual cost was:  the minimum 1.49%, the maximum 10.72%, 
the mean 7.18%. The increase in simulation cost was: The minimum 3.4%, the 
maximum 14.4%, and the average 9.05%.  
The decrease in the actual cost during change orders was: the minimum 0%, 
the maximum 3.77% and the mean 2.3%. The decrease in simulation cost was: the 
minimum 0.2%, the maximum 6%, and the average 2.34%. 
The increase in actual time was: The minimum 0%, the maximum 16.4%, and 
the mean 6.9%. The increase in simulation time was: the minimum 5%, the maximum 
14.6%, and the average 9.6%.  
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 The loss in productivity in actual was not measured because there was not any 
document recording the information about the productivity loss so (CII,2000) method 
was program in the simulation model and the result of the simulation productivity loss 
during change orders was: the minimum 7.4%, the maximum 17.6 %, and the average 
13.4 %. 
  
7.2 Problems Encountered  
The following problems were faced during this research: 
1- All construction projects came to a halt due to the Israeli closure imposed on 
the Gaza Strip on 14/6/2007. 
2- A lot of organizations considered their documents as confidential so they did 
not permit access to them. 
3- There are no records concerning the companies' productivity 
4- Israeli airstrikes against all Palestinian ministries led to the loss of most 
construction projects documents . 
 
7.3 Recommendation  
 Initially, change orders require more concern regarding managing. Change 
orders simulation model represents a powerful planning tool that have to be 
considered, so it is recommended for institutions to have their own model  
 There were 37 factors causing change orders in Gaza strip causing great 
impact on cost, time, and productivity so the best way to manage the change orders is 
by restraining the occurrences of them. Section     those factors need to manage. 
Section 6.11 showed the major factors causing change orders and the way which helps 
project parties in controlling with their occurrences.  
 
7.4 Further study  
 It is recommended three different researches be conducted in the future so that 
each research focuses on each sector separately to satisfy the specialty of each sector 
so that these developed researches contribute to improvement in construction projects' 
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Case 1  
 Project name community helthcenterin Deir El-Balah 
 project # EHRB G2H23. R3. DB.  
 ϰϔθΘδϤϟϞϣΎϜϟΎΑϪϠϳϮΤΗέήϘϓϪ΋ΎϨΑ˯ΎϨΛ΃ϰμϗϷ΍ΔοΎϔΘϧ·ΖΛΪΣ 
 Duration 18 month 
Schedule start date 25/07/1999 
Schedule finish date 25/01/2001 
 start date 15/08/1999 
 finish date 14/02/2001 
 Contract Value 1470821 $ 
 final value 1972933.5 $ 
 Owner Ministry of health  
 Consultant Palestinian Economic Council 
 contractor Salama Co.  




























1 13/07/1999 ˯ςΑ κϴΧ΍ήΗέ΍Ϊλ΍  91  500 25   425 
2 
08/08/ 
1999 ιΎΨϟ΍ϊϗϮϤϟ΍ϭωέΎθϟ΍ήϴϐΗ ωϭήθϤϠϟ 27  1500 7   1245 
3   ήϔΤϟ΍ΓΩΎϳίˬϡΩήϟ΍ 49  7530     474.5 
4   ϒόπϠϟ˯ΎϤϟ΍ϥ΍ΰΧϢΠΣΓΩΎϳί 96 5550     1748 
5   ϞϤϋΐϗ΍ήϣϦϴϴόΗήϣ΃ 8  21600     13608 
6   ΔϓΎο·ϧΪϨΑκϗΎB40 8  300     36 
7   ΔϓΎο·κϗΎϧΪϨΑB7/96,9 8  157     20 
8   έ΍άϧ·ϖϳήΣΔϓΎο·κϗΎϧΪϨΑB6/11,12 8  3000     189 
9 05/09/1999 ΓΩΎϳίήϴΧ΄ΗξϳϮόΘϟϡ΍ϭΪϟ΍ΕΎϋΎγΩΪϋΓΩΎϳΰΑήϣ΃ 56  40000     0 
10 11/09/1999 Ϫϣ΍ΪΨΘγ΍ϢΛϪϨϋΓΩϮόϟ΍ϭϲγΪϗήΠΣήϣ΃ 69 0 8 38 0 
11 11/10/1999 ϪΘϧί΍ϮϣΩΎϤΘϋ΍ΪόΑϲγΪϗήΠΣϡ΍ΪΨΘγ΍ήϣ΃ 87 140000     4725 
12 25/09/1999 ΔϨϴόϟ΍ΩΎϤΘϋ΍ΪόΑήΠΤϟ΍ωϮϧήϴϴϐΗήϣ΃ 32 -40000     0 
13 20/09/1999 ϝ΍ΔϴϋϮϧήϴϴϐΗήϣ΃Water stop 53  800     0 
14 25/09/1999 ΪϘόϟ΍ϦϣΩϮΟ΃ΔϨϴϋΪϳέϮΗέ΍ήλ·ΎϬϴϠϋϑήθϤϟ΍ 80 1200     0 
15 24/10/1999 ϖϠόϤϟ΍ϒϘδϟ΍ϊϣΏ΍ϮΑϷ΍ξόΑΕΎϋΎϔΗέ΍νέΎόΗ 5  20100     633 
16 12/02/2000 ήϣ΃ϝΎϔϗ·ήϤΣ΃ΪϴϣήϘΑΪόμϤϟ΍ΔΤΘϓ 87  1600     302.4 
17 23/02/2000 ΕΎϴϠϤόϟ΍ΡΎϨΟΔϴλϮμΧΪϳΪΤΗ 15 600     196.8 
18 05/10/2000 ϔΤϟ΍ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ήΔϴλΎμΘϣϻ΍ϱέΎΠϣΔϜΒθΑ 54 70830 2 20 17849 
19 05/10/2000 ϝϮλϭϞϴϬδΘϟωέΎθϟ΍ϒλέϰϔθΘδϤϟϝϮΤΗ 29  169700 5 50 42764 
20 06/10/2000 ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ϴϣ΍ήϴγϚΓέΎμϘϟϥ΍έΪΟ 32  -8010     2018 
21 26/04/2000 ϒϴϴϜΘϟ΍ϱέΎΠϣϲϓήϴϴϐΘΑήϣ΃ 98. 150     94.5 
22   ΎϋάϴϔϨΗϛβΒϠϓϞϳΪΒΗϭϢϴϜΤΗϭέ΍ϮϧϸϟβζϋΎΠϟ 71 2656 0 70 83.6 
23 15/07/2000 ήϣ΃ΏΎΑνϮΣ˯Ύϐϟ·ΔϠδϐϣϞλΎϓ 90 9534     1201 
24 09/08/2000 ϞΑ΍ϮϛΔϴτϏ΃ΐϴϛήΗ 48  800     400 
25 15/08/2000 ΝέΪϠϟρϼΑϝΪΑϡΎΧέϭΖϴϧ΍ήΟϡ΍ΪΨΘγ΍ 43  5995     700 
26 15/08/2000 ϥΎϨγ΃ΓΩΎϴϋϡϭΰϟήϴϴϐΗήϣ΃ 100  2429.5     1200 
27 16/12/2000 ˯Ύϐϟ·ϊσΎϗSF6ήόδΑϪΑϝϭΎϘϤϟ΍ΔΤϣΎδϣϭ 85        0 
28 10/02/2001 ΔϴϓΎο·ϝΎϤϋ΃ήϣ΍ϭ΃ 15 5050     600 
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Case 2  
 Project name Zitoon Health Clinic     
 project # GZH/11     
 Θϟ΍ΎϬΒϗΎόΗϭΕ΍ήϴϐΘϟ΍ΩΪϋΐΒδΑήϴΧ΄     
 Duration 215     
 
Schedule start 
date 15/10/1996     
 
Schedule finish 
date 23/06/1997     
 start date 23/10/1996     
 finish date 15/07/1997     
 Contract Value 281007.06     
 final value 278571.7     
 Owner Ministry of health      
 Consultant Palestinian Economic Council     
 contractor Al Rafe'a Contracting company     
        























 1 05/06/1997 ΕΎϔλέϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ ΖϠϔγϹ΍ΘϧΎΑϙϮϟή  53 536.5 8.5 4538.1 
 2 21/06/1997 
ΔϓήϏϦϴτΒΗ ΔόηϷ΍ϦϣϻΪΑιΎλήϟΎΑ
ΓέΎμϘϟ΍ 15 34 115 3350 
 3 30/06/1997 ΐθΧΕΎϔϠοϞϤϋ ϩΎϴϤϟ΍ΕΎϧϮϠΒτϟ 8 2 70 140 
 4 07/05/1997 ΓΩΎϴόϟ΍ϞΧΪϤϟήϤΣ΃ΪϴϣήϗΐϴϛήΗ 87 50.33 70 3523.1 
 5 30/06/1997 ΔϔϠοϡϮϴϧϮϤϟ΃ΛϞϴϠϛϞΧΪϤϠϟΖΑΎ 8 1 140 140 
 6 05/03/1997 ήΘΒϛϮϠϴϫϡ΍ΪΨΘγ΍ϭϒϘδϠϟϝϮϴϣΔϧΎγήΧΐλ 53 716.5 7.5 5373.7 
     ˯Ύϐϟ·ΖϳήϜϨϛϡϮϔϟ΍ΪϨΑ 32 -670 13 -8710 
 7 30/06/1997 ΪϳέϮΗΝέΪϟ΍ϞΧΪϣΏΎΒϟϚΘγϼΑΡϮϟΐϴϛήΗϭ 8 2 50 100 
 8   ϙΎΒηϡϮϴϧϮϤϟ΃ϝΎΒϘΘγϻ΍ϑήϐϟΏΎΤγ 8 4 350 1400 
 9   ΢τδϟ΍ϒϘγβϴγ΄Η 8     866 
 10   ΝέΪϠϟΪϳΪΣΏΎΑ 8     400 
 11   Ήέ΍Ϯτϟ΍ΝϭήΧΕΎΒϤϟΐϴϛήΗ 8 2 100 200 
 12   ϰϨΒϤϟ΍ϞΧ΍ΩϡΩέ 21 1624 3.9 6334.8 
 13   ΔϧΎγήΧΓΩΎϳίΓΪϤϋϷ΍βϴγ΄Θϟ΍ΓΩΎϳΰϟϒϘδϟ΍ϭ 6     8116.5 
 14   Ύδϟ΍ϥ΍έΪΠϟ΍ΔϧΎγήΧϲϓκϘϧΓΪϧ 6 -55.12 175 -9647 
 15   ˯Ύϐϟ·ΕΎϧΎγήΧϲϓΔϓΎψϨϟ΍ 32 -22.35 79 -1766 
 16   ˯Ύϐϟ·Ν΍ήϜϠϟΓΪγ 32 9 -25 -225 
 17   ΔϓΎο·ΏΎΘϋ΃ϚϴΑΎΒθϟ΍ϭΏ΍ϮΑϼϟΔϴϧΎγήΧ 8 34.34 250 8585.8 
 18   ˯Ύϐϟ·ςϴΤϤϟ΍έϮδϟ΍Ϧϣ˯΍ΰΟ΍ 32 -240 16 -3840 
 19   ˯ΎϨΒϟ΍ΔϴϤϛϲϓΓΩΎϳίϲϠΧ΍Ϊϟ΍ 21 249.4 9.9 2469.1 
 20   ΓέΎμϘϟ΍ΕΎϴϤϛϲϓΓΩΎϳί 21 507 5 2535 
 21   ˯Ύϐϟ·ϡΎΧήϟ΍ϭρϼΒϟ΍ϲϓξϴϔΨΗϭΩϮϨΑ 32     -2041 
 22   ˯Ύϐϟ·ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ϭϲΟέΎΨϟ΍Ζϳΰϟ΍ϥΎϫΩ 32 -471.7 3.9 -2632 
     ϞϳήϛήΑϮδΑϲϠΧ΍ΩΖϳίΕΎϧΎϫΩ         
 23   Ώ΍ϮΑ΃ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ΔϔϠϜΗϞϗ΃ϯήΧ΄ΑϚϴΑΎΒηϭ 32     -1307 
 24   ˯Ύϐϟ·ϲΒϧΎΠϟ΍ϰθϤϤϟ΍ΪϨΑ 32 -280 10.5 -2940 
 25   ΔΤμϟ΍ΔϜΒηϢϴϤμΗΓΩΎϋ΍ 1     411.7 
 26   ϑΎόγϻ΍Ν΍ήϛΐϴτθΗϝΎϤϋ΍ϲϓήϴϓϮΗ 32     -1450 
 27   ˯Ύϐϟ·ςϘϓΕΎδϴγ΄Θϟ΍ϰϠϋ˯ΎϘΑϻ΍ϭϒϴϴϜΘϟ΍ΪϨΑ 32     -14220 
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Case3       
Project name 
community helthcenterin Deir El-
Balah      
    ϲοέϻ΍Ϟϴϫ΄ΗΓΩΎϋ΍ϭϝϭ΍έϭΩ˯Ύθϧ΍      
project # IDB/WB/074/75-GAZA      
       
Duration 120      
Schedule start 
date 27/01/2003      
Schedule finish 
date 27/05/2003      
start date 30/01/2003      
finish date 22/07/2003      
Contract 
Value 185885.99      
final value        
Owner Ministry of health       
Consultant Palestinian Economic Council      




ίΎΠϧϼϟΔΑϮϠτϤϟ΍      






























1 28/04/2003 ωϮϧήϴϐΗήϣ΃ ϡΪΨΘδϤϟ΍ρϼΒϟ΍ 43     2100 7 
2 27/04/2003 ϝΎϤϋ΍ήϴΧ΄Η ΍ίΎϐϟ΍ήΑΎόϤϟ΍ϕϼϏ΍ΐΒδΑΕ  44       14 
3 03/04/2003 
ΓΰϛήϤϟ΍ΔϳΎϨόϟ΍ϞΧ΍ΩήϴϐλΦΒτϣϖϴϠΨΗ
ΔΟΎΤϠϟ 90     400   
4 07/05/2003 
ΔϓήϏϦϴδΤΘϟΔϳήϴϴϐΗήϣ΍ϭ΃ΔϋϮϤΠϣ
ΕΎϴϠϤόϟ΍ 15     3500   
5 08/06/2003 
ΐϠϘϟ΍νήϣΔϓήϏΔϳέϭήοϒϴϴϜΗΕ΍ΪΣϭ
ΔϳΎϨόϟ΍ΕΎϴϠϤϋ 15 3 3000 9000   



















 Case 4      
Project name New building C in Nasser Hospital - Khan Younis + Rehabitation  
project # EGSD/156.GZ     
Duration 90 days     
Schedule start  01/10/2003     
Schedule finish  31/12/2003     
start date 01/10/2003     
finish date 06/01/2004     
Contract 
Value 629350     
final value 709400     
Owner Ministry of health      
Consultant Palestinian Economic Council     
contractor El Farra Bros Co.      
       
       





















1 17/05/2004 ΪϨΑϭωϮϧϡ΍ΪΨΘγ΍HamatϪϟΩΎόϳΎϣϭ΃ 53     960 
2   ΪϨΑΕΎττΨϤϟ΍ΐδΣϞϳΪόΗ 4     600 
3   ΪϨΑAϪϟ΍Ϯσ΃ΪϳΪΤΗ 4     480 
4   
ΪϨΑϰϟ΍ΪϳΪΤϟ΍ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ϡϮϴϧϮϤϟ΃ΔϴϋήϓβΑΎΤϣϊϣ
ΝέΎΨϤϠϟ 53     1800 
5   ΪϨΑϔΣΓΩΎϳίήϴγ΍ϮϤϟ΍ΔϛΎϤγΓΩΎϳίϡΩέϭή 1     805 
6   ΪϨΑϚϟάϛ 1     2520 
7   ΪϨΑ΢ϴΤμΗ 1     3570 
8   ϞϫΎϨϤϠϟΔϴτϏ΃ΔϓΎο΍ 8     1900 
9   ΪϨΑΩϮγϷ΍ϝΪΑϦϔϠΠϣΪϳΪΣϝΎϤόΘγ΍ 53     1700 
10   
ΪϨΑ˯Ύϐϟ·ΪϨΑϲϓΓΩϮΟϮϣΎϬϧ΃ΚϴΣϖϳήΤϟ΍ΕΎϧ΍Ϯτγ΍
 2     -1000 
11   ΪϨΑίΎϏϖϳήΣΕΎϧ΍Ϯτγ΍ϡ΍ΪΨΘγ΍ 48     2500 
12   ΪϨΑΓέΩϮΒϟ΍ϦϋίΎϐϟ΍ΕΎϧ΍Ϯτγ΍Ϟμϓ 48     150 
13   ΪϨΑΪϨΒϟ΍ϰϠϋϲϧϻϮΠϟ΍ζϴΑ΍ήΑϞϴϤΤΗ 8     600 
14   ΪϨΑϭΕΎϣ΍Ϯόϟ΍ϞϴλϮΗΕΎΨπϤϟ΍ϊϣΔϴΑήϬϜϟ΍ 100     800 
15   ΎΨπϤϠϟΔϳΎϤΣϕϭΪϨλΔϓΎο΍ϢϳήϓϊϣΕ«« 48     600 
16   ΩΪϨΑΔϳΪϳΪΤϟ΍ήϴγ΍ϮϤϟ΍ΔϛΎϤγΓΩΎϳί 1     350 
17   ϝ΍ΕΎϔλ΍ϮϣΓΩΎϳίdiffuserϒϴϴϜΘϟ΍ϲϓ 48     2400 
18   ΪϨΑϲϓΕΎϴϤϛΓΩΎϳίΪϘόϟ΍ϲϓΎϬΑϖϔΘϤϟ΍ΔΒδϨϟ΍ϦϣήΜϛ΃ 21     2000 
19   ϦϴΠδϛ΃ίΎϏΓΪΣϭΕϼϴλϮΗΔϓΎο΍ 8     1100 
20   ΪϨΑήϴγ΍ϮϣΔϓΎο΍ϢϠϣ 8     800 
21   ϥΎϫΩ 21 1097 2.5 2743 
22   ΐθΧΏ΍ϮΑ΍ϥΎϫΩ 21 11 35 385 
23   ϥ΍έΪΟϚϴϣ΍ήϴγ 21 158 11 1738 
24   βϴΟϥ΍έΪΟ 21 -36 15 -540 
25   white miniral false ceiling 32 -40 16 -640 
26   ϚϴΑΎΒηϡϮϴϧϮϤϟ΃Βϟ΍ϲϐϟ΃ΪϨ 32 -20 80 -1600 
27   ϞϴδϏν΍ϮΣ΃ 21 71 60 4260 
 
 
28   ϡΎϤΣϢϘσ 21 29 80 2320 
29   ρϼΧ 21 73 50 3650 
30   ΕΎϔϠΨϣΔϟ΍ί΍ϭϡΪϫ 21 991 4 3964 
31   ϚϠΑς΋΍ϮΣ 21 107 10 1070 
32   ς΋΍ϮΣ 21 103 8 824 
33   ήϤΣ΃Ϊϴϣήϗ 21 53 65 3445 
34   ΎϴϣωίϮϣϥϮϠΒσϩ 21 13 150 1950 
35   ϲϧϻϮΟΐϴΑΎϧ΃ 21 600 2.5 1500 
36   ϞΑΎϛ 21 250 5 1250 
37   ϞΑΎϛ 21 250 4 1000 
38   ϞΑΎϛ 21 50 7 350 
39   ΖϨγέϮϠϓέ΍Ϯϧ΃ 21 7 40 280 
40   jet proof 21 30 12 360 
41   ζΘϳϮγ 21 25 11 275 
42   ζΘϳϮγ 21 20 14 280 
43   socket 21 275 12 3300 
44   socket ˯Ύϐϟ·ϞϣΎϜΒϟΎΑΪϨΒϟ΍  32 -20 30 -600 
45   socket ˯Ύϐϟ·ϞϣΎϜΒϟΎΑΪϨΒϟ΍  32 -15 15 -225 
46   c b 3*16 ˯Ύϐϟ·ΪϨΒϟ΍  32 -20 25 -500 
47   e l c  21 5 65 325 
48   ci  21 30 5 150 
49   step relay (cancel) 32 -3 150 -450 
50   cb (cancel) 32 -6 30 -180 
51   pipes 21 -550 1.5 -825 
52   ΐϴΑΎϧ΍ήϔΣ 21 -500 1 -500 
53   ΐϴΑΎϧ΍ήϔΣ 21 -362 1 -362 
54   ΔϳΩΎϨΘγ΍ϥ΍έΪΟϥϮσΎΑ 48 58 110 6380 
55   ϒϘδϠϟύήϔϣΏϮσ 21 -300 8.5 -2550 
56   ΪϘόϟΎΑΓΩϮΟϮϣήϴϏΔϧΎϴλήϣ΍ϭ΃ΔϋϮϤΠϣ 47     19389 
       























Project name ϦϴϨΒϠϟΔϴ΋΍ΪΘΑϻ΍ΔϴϋΎΠθϟ΍ΔγέΪϣ      
project # EHRP GZE10 R2.GZ      
       
Duration 300 day       
Schedule start date 02/11/1996      
Schedule finish 
date 02/09/1997      
start date 02/11/1996      
finish date 15/09/1997      
Contract Value 869278 $      
final value        
Owner Ministry of Education      
Consultant 
consultant engineering group for 
modern architecture      
contractor Sadi for contracting & trading      
Contractor Strategy         
  Palestinian Economic Council      
































  24/12/1996 έΎπΣ΍ϡΪϋ ϢμΧϝϭΎϘϤϟ΍ϞΒϗϦϣΓέΎϴγ $)   220 -50 -11000   
    αΪϨϬϣΏΎϴϏ ϊϗϮϤϟ΍   264 -50 -13200   
1 02/11/1996 ϖΑΎτΗϡΪϋ ϊϗ΍Ϯϟ΍νέ΃ϊϣϡΎόϟ΍ϊϗϮϤϟ΍ςτΨϣ 27     0 10 
2   ϰΘΣωΎϔΗέϻ΍ ϡ΍ΰΣΎϴϧΪϟ΍ΏΎΘϋϷ΍ (s 96 /a 18) 1     2500   
3   
ϴΑΎΒηϊϗϮϣ΢ϴοϮΗϚϲϓΔϔϋΎπϣΔϴϤϜϟ΍ϭ
ΕΎϴϤϜϟ΍ϝϭΪΟ 4 54 100 5400   
4 10/12/1996 
ήϣϻ΍ϦϋΞΗΎϨϟ΍ήϴΧ΄Θϟ΍ξϳϮόΘϟϊϳήδΗήϣ΃
ϝϭϻ΍ 56     0 -3 
5 09/12/1996 ήϔΤϟ΍ΔϴϤϛΓΩΎϳί 49 
128
4 5 6420   
6 10/12/1996 ΪΠδϤϟ΍ΐϧΎΠΑνέϸϟέϮδϟ΍ΔϓΎο΍ 39     3400   
7 20/12/1996 Ωήϟ΍ΔϴϤϛΓΩΎϳίΖϐϠΑϡ 49 
154
7 3.3 5103.7   
8 01/03/1997 ϯήΧ΃ΔϴϋήϓΔΣϮϟϞϤϋ 1     500   
9 26/02/1997 
άϴϔϨΗimpulsrelay΢ϴΗΎϔϤϟ΍ϦϣΩΪϋϭ
ΔτϏΎπϟ΍ 8     150   
10 26/02/1997 
ϒλϞϜϟϲϔϠΨϠϟέ΍ΪΠϠϟϲϓΓϮϗΡΎΘϔϣϊοϭ
νήόϟ΍ΓΰϬΟϷ 90 104 10 1040   
11 26/02/1997 
ΪΨΘγ΍ϲϓΓΩήϔϤϟ΍ϦϣϻΪΑΔΟϭΩΰϣΕΎΒϤϟϡ΍
ϑϮϔμϟ΍ 53 219 45 9855   
12   ΓέϮΒδϟ΍ϑΎθϜϟβϛΎϋΔϓΎο΍ 53 52 40 2080   
13   
ΩΪϋΐϴϛήΗϭΪϳέϮΗϢϳΩϮλΕΎϓΎθϛ
Ε΍ϭ 31 6 200 1200   
14 26/02/1997 ήϴϔϴϠΒϣ΍ίΎϬΟΔϓΎο΍ 8 1 350 350   
15 18/03/1997 ς΋΍ϮΣ˯ΎϨΑ ΝέΪϟ΍ΔϘτϨϤΑ 8     3000   
16 18/03/1997 ϢγήΑ΄τΧ ϦϴϤϴϟ΍ϦϣΝέΪϟ΍Δϳ΍ΪΑΚϴΣΔϬΟ΍Ϯϟ΍ 1 0 0 0   
17 18/03/1997 ϒϘδϠϟΩΪϤΗϞλ΍ϮϓϞϤϋ˯ΎϣΏήδΗϊϧΎϣ 8 139 10 1387.3   
 
 
18 19/05/1997 ϝϮτΑϲΤλϑήλςΧήτϗϡζϧ΍ 39     10500   
19 26/05/1997 ήΘϧ΍ΏΖϠϔγϻ΍Ε΍ήϤϣϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍Ϛϟ 53 970 16 15520   
20 08/06/1997 ΔγέΪϨϤϟ΍ΏΎΑϞϘϧ 90     500   
21 29/03/1997 ΩΪϤΘϟ΍Ϟλ΍ϮϓΪϨϋήΧ΃έ΍ΪΟ˯ΎϨΑ 8 80 36 2880   
22   ΔϳϮδΗϝΎϤϋ΍ 49 
145
3 6.7 9735.1   
23   Ε΍έϭΪϟϱΪϳΪΣΏΎΑΐϴϛήΗ 48 1 150 150   
24 03/06/1997 ΝέΪϠϟϞϴϧΎΑΔϓΎο΍ 8 158 3.3 522.72   
25 03/06/1997 Ε΍ήϤϣϮϜϳ΍ίΎϣ 8 284 14 3981.6   
26 03/06/1997 Ε΍έϮΒγ 8 30 70 2100   
27 04/08/1997 
νέϷ΍ΔότϗϭΔγέΪϤϟ΍ϦϴΑΪϧΎδϟ΍έ΍ΪΠϟ΍ϞϳΪόΗ
ΓέϭΎΠϤϟ΍ 39     2660   
28 06/09/1997 
ϩΎϴϤϟ΍ςΧϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍Γέ΍Ω΍ΦΒτϣϦϴΘϨϛΦΒτϣ
αέΎΧΦΒτϣ 8     2600   
29 10/09/1997 ΔϴϣΎΧέϝΎϤϋ΍ 35 17 40 680   






































Case 6  
Project name sheikh Radwan school      
project # EHRP GZE05 R2.GZ     
      
Duration 300 day      
Schedule start date 02/11/1996     
Schedule finish 
date 02/09/1997     
start date 02/11/1996     
finish date 02/09/1997     
Contract Value 869278 $     
final value       
Owner Ministry of Education     
Consultant 
consultant engineering group for modern 
architecture     
contractor Shehab for contracting & trading     
Contractor Strategy        
  Palestinian Economic Council     


























  21/11/1996 έΎπΣ΍ϡΪϋ ϢμΧϝϭΎϘϤϟ΍ϞΒϗϦϣΓέΎϴγ $)   19 -50 -950 
1 18/03/1997 ς΋΍ϮΣ˯ΎϨΑ ΝέΪϟ΍ΔϘτϨϤΑ 8     3000 
2 18/03/1997 ϢγήΑ΄τΧ ϦϴϤϴϟ΍ϦϣΝέΪϟ΍Δϳ΍ΪΑΚϴΣΔϬΟ΍Ϯϟ΍ 1     150 
3 18/03/1997 Ώϼτϟ΍ΔϣϼδϟΔϴΟέΎΨϟ΍ΔϬΠϟ΍ϦϣΝέΪϟ΍˯ΎϨΑ 48     1200 
4 18/03/1997 ϤϋϒϘδϠϟΩΪϤΗϞλ΍ϮϓϞ˯ΎϣΏήδΗϊϧΎϣ 8 139 10 1387.3 
5 01/03/1997 ϯήΧ΃ΔϴϋήϓΔΣϮϟϞϤϋ 1     500 
6 26/02/1997 άϴϔϨΗimpulsrelayΔτϏΎπϟ΍΢ϴΗΎϔϤϟ΍ϦϣΩΪϋϭ 8     150 
7 26/02/1997 ϒλϞϜϟϲϔϠΨϠϟέ΍ΪΠϠϟϲϓΓϮϗΡΎΘϔϣϊοϭ 90 104 10 1040 
8 26/02/1997 Ϥϟϡ΍ΪΨΘγ΍ϑϮϔμϟ΍ϲϓΓΩήϔϤϟ΍ϦϣϻΪΑΔΟϭΩΰϣΕΎΒ 53 219 45 9855 
9   ΓέϮΒδϟ΍ϑΎθϜϟβϛΎϋΔϓΎο΍ 53 52 40 2080 
10   ΩΪϋΐϴϛήΗϭΪϳέϮΗϢϳΩϮλΕΎϓΎθϛΕ΍ϭ 31 6 200 1200 
11 26/02/1997 ήϴϔϴϠΒϣ΍ίΎϬΟΔϓΎο΍ 8 1 350 350 
12 03/06/1997 ΝέΪϠϟϞϴϧΎΑΔϓΎο΍ 8 158 3.3 522.72 
13 03/06/1997 Ε΍ήϤϣϮϜϳ΍ίΎϣ 8 284 14 3981.6 
14 03/06/1997 Ε΍έϮΒγ 8 30 70 2100 
15 26/05/1997 ϚϟήΘϧ΍ΏΖϠϔγϻ΍Ε΍ήϤϣϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ 53 1455 16 23280 












Case 7     
Project name ϣήϜϟ΍ΔγέΪϣΔόγϮΗϞ    
project #      
     
Duration 6 month    
Schedule start 
date 24/11/2002    
Schedule finish 
date 24/05/2003    
start date 24/11/2002    
finish date 21/08/2003    
Contract 
Value 209950    
final value 237190.52    
Owner Ministry of education    
Consultant Palestinian Economic Council    
contractor Alemran palestinian group co    














1   ϡϭέΪΑΔϓΎο΍ ΏϮδϨϣϕήϓΝϼόϟ  47 27321 45 
2 15/03/2003  ϱΩΎϨΘγ΍έϮγϝΎϤϋ΍ϚϠΑέϮγ  47 13760   
3   ϛήΗΔΑ΍ϮΑΐϴ  ΔϳΪϳΪΣ 48 400   
4   ϡϭέΪΒϠϟΔϴϣΎϣ΍ϚϴΑΎΒη 47 210   
5   ςϴϠΒΗΖϠϔγϻ΍ϦϣϻΪΑϙϮϟήΘϧΎΑ 53 7600   
6   ϱΩΎϨΘγϻ΍έϮδϠϟΔϘηήϟ΍ϊϣΓέΎμϗΏέΎθϣ 47 1700   
7   ΔΑήΗϝϼΣ΍ϞϤϋϭήϔΤϟ΍ΔϴϤϛϲϓΓΩΎϳί 49 3701.2   
8   
ΓΪϤϟ΍ΪϳΪϤΗήϣ΍ϑϭήψϟ΍ΐΒδΑϡϮϳϭΔϴϨϣϻ΍
ϕϼϏϻ΍ 44   45 



















Case 8  
Project 
name Khalid Bin Al Waleed School      
project # EHRP. GZE/13. R3. NS.      
ωϭήθϣήϳΪϣϭΪϳΪΟϊϗϮϣαΪϨϬϣ      
Duration 300      
Schedule start 
date 08/06/1997      
Schedule finish 
date 04/05/1998      
start date 08/07/1997      
finish date 11/05/1998      
Contract 
Value 716573 $      
final value        
Owner Ministry of Education      
Consultant Palestinian Economic Council      
contractor Al Hallaq Co.      
Contractor 
Strategy         





























98 ϲϓήϴϴϐΗ ΕΎττΨϤϟΎΑΎϤϋήΒΘΨϤϟ΍βϴγ΄ΗϝΎϤϋ΃ 87     1000   
2 
28/07/19
97 ϖΑΎτΗϡΪϋ ϑήϐϟ΍ϭΓΪϤϋϷ΍έϭΎΤϣϦϴΑΩΎόΑϷ΍ 4     150   
3 
09/08/19
97 ϞϤόϟ΍ϒϗϮΗ ΖϨϤγϻ΍ήϓϮΗϡΪϋϭϕϼϏϻ΍ΐΒδΑ 44       10 
4 
06/11/19
97 ΔϠψϤϟ΍ΔΣΎδϣΓΩΎΑί 53     3400   
5 
09/09/19
97 ϩήϴΒϜΗϭΐόϠϤϟ΍ϥΎϜϣήϴϴϐΗ 53     5780   
6 
10/09/19





βϠϣϻ΍ϪΟϮϟ΍ 53     400   
8 
14/09/19
97 ΐ΋Ύδϟ΍ϝΪΑβϴϜϣΖϨϤγΎΑΔϣΰΣϻ΍ΐλ 43 62 5 310   
9 
27/10/19
97 Ϥϟ΍ςϴϠΒΗϚϟήΘϧϻΎΑΔϨΑϷ΍ϦϴΑΔΣΎδϢγ 53 2960 13.6 40256   
10 
21/09/19
97 ϚϟήΘϧϻΎΑήϤϤϠϟϚϟήΘϧ΍ρϼΑϢγ 53 860 13 11180   
11 
29/09/19
97 ϱΩΎϨΘγ΍έ΍ΪΟϞϤϋ 49     43360   
12 
30/09/19
97 ϙ΍ήΘϧϻΔϧΎγήΧϦϣΔϠψϤϟ΍Δϴοέ΍ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ 53     1400   
13 
17/12/19
97 ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ΔϘϟΰϨϤΑΔϳΩΎόϟ΍ΔϳΪϳΪΤϟ΍ΕΎΑ΍ϮΒϟ΍ϝ 53 2 150 300   
14 
20/12/19





ΐϠτΘϳΎϣάϴϔϨΗ 96     700   
 
 
16   ΔϳΎϤΤϟ΍ϚϴΑΎΒθϟ˯΍ήπΧΔϳϮΑϥΎϫΩ 8     1532.5   
17   
ΔϓήϏϭϥΰΨϤϟ΍ϭϒμϘϤϟ΍ρϼΑϞϔγ΃έΎϛήϛεήϓ
αέϮϜδϴΒϟ΍ϝΪΑαέΎΤϟ΍ 32 88 -2 264   
18   αέϮϜδϴΒϟ΍ϝΪΑΔϠδϟ΍ΓήϛΐόϠϤϟέΎϛήϛεήϓ 32 580 -2 -1160   
19   
ϦϣϻΪΑήΒϔϟ΍ϦϣΔϠδϟ΍ΓήϛΝήΑΐϴϛήΘϟήόγϕήϓ
ΐθΨϟ΍ 53 2 250 500   
20   ΪϳΓήϛϰϣήϣΐϴϛήΗ 8     466   
21   αέϮϜδϴΑεήϓΕ΍έΎϴγϖϳήτϟϢγ 8 516 3 2580   
22   ΔϠψϤϠϟϦϔϠΠϣϩΎϴϛΏ΍έΰϣϞϤϋ 8 1 500 500   
23   ήϔΤϟ΍ΕΎΒϤϛΓΩΎϳί 49 5554 2 11108   
24 
24/02/19
98 ϢϳήϜϠϟϲϨϜδϟ΍ϦϣϥϮϠϟ΍ήϴϴϔΗήϣ΃ 90     413.3   
25   ϥΰΨϣϦϴϛΎΒηΐϴϛήΗ 1     400   
26   ήΗϦϔϠΠϣΪϳΪΣΞτγΏ΍ϮΑ΃ΐϴϛ 8 3 250 750   
27   ΕΎϴΑήθϤϠϟϥ΍ΰΧΐϴϛήΗ 96     250   
28   νήϋΔΑ΍ϮΑΐϴϛήΗϦϣϻΪΑήΘϣ 53     150   

































Project name Nusairat Girls Bisic School      
project # EHRP. GZE/07. R3. NS.      
       
Duration 300      
Schedule start 
date 08/01/1997      
Schedule finish 
date 04/11/1997      
start date 08/01/1997      
finish date 17/11/1997      
Contract 
Value 856439      
final value        
Owner Ministry of Education      
Consultant 
Palestinian Economic 
Council      
contractor Al Hallaq Co.      
Contractor 
Strategy         



















B18 8     6000   
2 
23/03/19
97 Ϟλ΍ϮϓϞϤϋ ΩΪϤΗ  8     1050   
3   ΔϓΎψϨϟ΍ΔϧΎγήΧϲϓκϘϧ 52 66 -105 -6930   
4   έϮδΠϟ΍ΔϧΎγήΧΓΩΎϳί 21 37.9 160 6064   





4 15 -755.1   
6   ύήϔϤϟ΍ήΠΤϟ΍ΔϴϤϛϲϓκϘϧ 21 -954 12 -11448   
7   ΔϴΟέΎΨϟ΍ΓέΎμϘϟ΍ϲϓΓΩΎϳί 21 1640 5 8200   
8   ΔϘηέϚϟάϛ 21 648 3 2124   
9   ϥΎϫΩ 21 1381 3 4143   
10   Ώ΍ϮΑϷ΍Ϟϔγ΃ϮϜϳ΍ΰϣ 21 27 9 243   
11   ϥ΍έΪΟϚϴϣ΍ήϴγ 21 36.5 20 730   
12   ϲΤλϑήλΔϜΒη 47     5900   
13   ΖϠϔγ΍ΔϴϤϛΓΩΎϳί 21     8127   
14 
25/10/19
97 ϚϟήΘϧΎΑΖϠϔγ΍ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ήϣ΃ 53 1445 14 20225   
15   Ε΍έϮΒγΐϴϛήΗ 8 30 105 3150   
16   Ε΍ήϤϤϠϟϮϜϳ΍ΰϣΐϴϛήΗήϣ΃ 8 276 14 3863.7   
17   ϕϼϏ΍ 44       8 
18   ϞϤϋϒϗϮΗ 42       4 
19   ΐϴϛήΗϦϳΰΑ΍έΩϡϭΰϟϮϜϳ΍ίΎϣ 8 
85.9
6 10 859.6   
20   ήΠϳΎΗΖϴϧ΍ήΟΐϴϛήΗ 53 11.9 150 1785   
21   ϲϠΤϣϡΎΧέ 53 20.8 40 832   
22   ϲϠΤϣϢϠΧέ 53 7.4 10 74   




24   αέΎΣΔϓήϏϞϤϋ 87     5296   
25   ϞΑΎϛΐϴϛήΗϲϠϳέϊϣΔΣϮϟϊϣ 98     1010   
26   Ε΍έϮΒδϠϟέ΍Ϯϧ΃ΐϴϛήΗ 53 52 45 2340   
27   ϡΎϤΤϟ΍Ώ΍ϮΑϷϱΪϳ΃ 8 28 3 84   





ϑϮθϜϤϟ΍ 49 500 100 50000   
30   ΝέΪϠϟϞϴϧΎΑϞϤϋ 53 95 4 380   
31   ϚϴϴΑΎΒηϢΠΣϲϓήϴϴϐΗΕ΍έϭΪϟ΍ 96     200   
32   Ε΍ήϤϤϟΎΑιΎΧϦϳΰΑέΩΐϴϛήΗ 48 33 32 1056   





53 400 2 400   
35   
ΔϓήϏϭϦϴΘϨϜϟ΍ϭΓέ΍ΩϼϟϪϴϔΑϞϤϋ
αέΎΤϟ΍ 90     900   





































Case 10       
Project name Qezan Alnajar Kan Younis School      
project # EHRP. GZE/09. R4-KY      
       
Duration 300      
Schedule start date 25/01/1997      
Schedule finish date 21/11/1997      
start date 25/01/1997      
finish date 10/12/1997      
Contract Value 735280.5      
final value        
Owner Ministry of Education      
Consultant Palestinian Economic Council      
contractor Al-Farra Co.      
Contractor Strategy         














1 22/02/1997 ΪϳΪΤϟ΍ϞϳΪόϧ ϭΪϋ΍ϮϘϟ΍ϲϓΓΪϤϋϷ΍  1     150   
2   νέϻ΍ΐϴγΎϨϣϭΔϴϜΒθϟΎΑ΄τΧ 1     900   
3 28/03/1997 Ε΍έϮΒγΐϴϛήΗήϣ΃ 8     5085   
4   αέΎΣΔϓήϏ 87     5735   
5   ϕϼϏ΍ 44       8 
6   ϮΠϟ΍˯ϮγΐΒδΑϒϗϮΗ 42       4 
7   ΩΪϤΘϟ΍Ϟλ΍ϮϓϞϤϋ 8   105 1050   
8   ΝέΪϠϟϞϴϧΎΑϞϤϋ 53 95 5     
9   Ε΍έϭΪϟ΍ϚϴϴΑΎΒηϢΠΣϲϓήϴϴϐΗ 96     200   
10 03/06/1997 
ϞϴϠϛϦϣϢϴϨϣϮϟϷ΍ϝΎϤϋ΃ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ϝ
 18     1200   
11   ϦϔϠΠϤΑΔϳΎϤΤϟ΍ΪϳΪΣϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ 53     16745   
12   Ε΍ήϤϤϠϟϦϳΰΑ΍έΩΐϴϛήΗ 48 30 75 2250   
13   ήΗΕΎϧϮϜϠΒϠϟϮϜϳ΍ΰϣΐϴϛ 8 200 14 2800   
14 25/10/1997 ϚϟήΘϧ΍ΐϴϛήΗ 53 1367 13 17771   


















Case 11       
Project name 
Constructing Housing Building  Engineering institute - 
Rafah   
project # 2/2005      
Duration 12 month      
Schedule start 
date 22/04/2006      
Schedule finish 
date 21/04/2007      
start date 22/04/2006      
finish date 14/06/2005      
Contract 
Value 706965.49      
final value 744174.2      
Owner Palestinian Housing council       
Consultant Al-Manama       
contractor Salah Al-Deen Co.      
Contractor 
Strategy         




















1 31/05/2006 ϰϨΒϤϟ΍ήϴϴϐΗ ϒϘγϷ΍Γ΍Ϊϳί 27     
2566
5   
2 31/05/2006 ΓΩΎϳί έΎϛήϜϟ΍  4 122 3 366   
3 31/05/2006 ϪΤϴϠδΗΓΩΎϳίϭΪόμϤϟ΍ς΋ΎΣϚϤγϞϴϠϘΗ 83     123.8   
4   ϦϣρϼΒϟ΍Ϟϔγ΃ήϴγ΍ϮϜϟ΍ήτϗήϴϴϐΗϝζϧ΍ 52     -4000   
5   ϚϠΑϞϳΪΒΗΏγϥϭΩΔϳέΎϤόϣϲϋ΍ϭΪϟήό 4     0   
6   
ϭϝΎϤΣ΃ϊϳίϮΗϥΎϤπϟΓΪϤϋϷ΍ϦϴΑΕ΍ήϤϜϟ΍ϞϳΪόΗ
ϡ΍ΰΣΔϓΎο΍ 1     100   
7   Ώ΍ϮΑ΃ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ΏΕΎϧϮϜϠΒϠϟϲϓ 32 34 -100 -3400   
8 08/07/2006 ϕϼϏ΍ 44     0 58 
9   ϰϨΒϤϟ΍ϝϮΣϙϮϟήΘϧ΍ρϼΑϞϤϋ 53 300 14 4200   
10 09/12/2006 ϖϠΣϞϳΪΒΗϝΪΑΏΎΒϟ΍Ώ 5 60 10 600   
11 04/12/2006 ˯ΎΑήϬϜϟ΍ϕϭΪϨλϞϘϧ 48 2 325 650   
12   ϡϮϴϨϣϮϟ΍ϭϝΰόΑΩΪϤΘϟ΍Ϟλ΍Ϯϓ˯Ϟϣ 8 43 12.5 537.5   
13   ϚΒθϟ΍ϦϣϻΪΑΪϟϮϤϠϟΔϓήϏ˯ΎϨΑ 53     3500   
14 24/06/2007 ωϭήθϤϠϟέϮγΔϓΎο΍ 48     
1000
0   
15   ΘϔΗΐϠϋΐϴϛήΗϦϴϛϼΒϠϟζϴ 8 34 14 476   
16   ΔϟΎδϏϒϳήμΗϭΔϳάϐΗρϮτΧ 8     1908   
17   ΔϳΪϳΪΤϟ΍ΐϴδϟ΍ΓΩΎϳί 48     3177   
18   ΪϋΎμϤϠϟϚϴΑΎΒη 90     195   
19   ϱΪϳΪΣΝέΩΏΎΑ 8 2 200 400   
20   ϦϴϛϼΑϡΎΧέ 8 155 8 1240   
21   change over 100 2 537.5 1075   
22   ΗΪϟϮϤϠϟϲϟ΍Ϟϴϐθ 100     1208   
23   ϩΎϴϤϟ΍ΕΎϣϮόϠϟϲϟ΍ϞϴϐθΗ 100     600   
24   ήϴγ΍Ϯϣ˯ΎΑήϬϜϠϟζϧ΍ 8     
1419.
5   
 
 
25   ήϴγ΍ϮϣϞϫΎϨϣϭΕΎϧϮϔϠΘϠϟ 8     405   
    ϒϘγϻ΍ΔϧΎγήΧήϴϴϐΗ 32     -2400   
    ˯Ύϐϟ·ϖϳήΣΕΎϧ΍ΰΧ 32     -600   
    ΎϨϣΏ΍ϮΑ΍˯ΎΑήϬϛέϭ 8 51 70 3570   
    ϡΎΧέήδϛϑ΍ϮΣϮϜϳ΍ΰϣΕΎΟέΩ 8 10.3 13 133.9   
    ΪϳΪΣΏΎΑΐϴϛήΗ 8 5 300 1500   














































Case 12       
Project name 
Constructing Housing Building  Al-Rakaba 
instetute     
project # 3/2002      
       
Duration 12 month      
Schedule start 
date 23/04/2003      
Schedule finish 
date 22/04/2004      
start date 23/04/2003      
finish date        
Contract 
Value 477334      
final value 473069.1      
Owner Palestinian Housing council       
Consultant Jenena      
contractor Al- Shehabia      
Contractor 
Strategy         

















1 24/04/2003 ϝϼΣ΍ϞϤϋ ΔΑήΘϠϟ 49     4679 10 
2 27/05/2003 ϞΒϗϦϣϒϴϗϮΗ κϴΧήΗΩϮΟϭϡΪϋϯϮϋΪΑΔϳΪϠΒϟ΍ 91       1 
3 31/05/2003 ΏΎϗήϟ΍ϭΪϋ΍ϮϘϠϟϝΰϋάϴϔϨΗ 8     400   
4 13/08/2003 ΔϴϓΎο΍Δϴϗήθϟ΍ϖϘθϠϟάϓ΍ϮϧϞϤϋ 90 14 100 1400   
5 04/10/2003 ϑϼΧΪόΑϲϠΧ΍ΩϊϴτϘΗήϣ΃ 71 850 17.5 14875   




18000   
7   ϝϮϴϤϟ΍ϭήϴΧϷ΍ϒϘδϠϟϝΰϋϝΎϤϋ΃ 8     6743   
8   ϰϨΒϤϟ΍ϭΔϠψϤϟ΍ϦϴΑΏΎΑϞϤϋ 90     300   
9   ΐθΧϦϣϻΪΑϚϟϲΘϠϣϖϘθϟ΍ξόΑΏ΍ϮΑ΍ΐϴϛήΗ 90 5 500 2500   
10   ϞΧΪϤϠϟϖϠόϣήϤϣάϴϔϨΗ 53     3455.2   
11   ϲΟέΎΨϟ΍ήϤϤϠϟϚϟήΘϧ΍ςϴϠΒΗϞϤϋ 90 50 16 800   
12   ΝέΪϠϟέΎϨϛΔϓΎο΍ 8     486   
13   βϜΗήΒϤΘΑΝέΪϠϟΖϳΰϟ΍ϥΎϫΩϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ 53     300   
14   ϕϼϏ΍ 44       24 
15   ϞϳήϛήΑϮδϟ΍ϦϣϻΪΑΖϳΰϟΎΑΔϠψϤϟ΍ϥΎϫΩ 53     254   
16   ϣ΍ήΒϟϞϣ΍ϮΣΐϴϛήΗϩΎϴϤϟ΍Ϟϴ 53 8 210 1680   
17   ΝήΒϠϟέΪΤϨϣ˯Ύθϧ΍ 48     2185   
18   ήϤϤϠϟϦϳΰΑέΩΐϴϛήΗ 8     736   
19   ϮϜϳ΍ΰϣ 8     253.5   
20   ΪϟϮϤϠϟΓΪϋΎϗϞϤϋ 48     81 1 








Case 13       
Project name Constructing Housing Building  Rafah     
project # 1/2002      
       
Duration 8 month      
Schedule start date 05/07/2002      
Schedule finish date 04/03/2003      
start date 05/07/2002      
finish date 04/03/2003      
Contract Value 276879.5      
final value 281174.5      
Owner Palestinian Housing council       
Consultant Door      
contractor Salah Al-Deen Co.      
Contractor Strategy         














1   ϝΎϤϋ΃ΓΩΎϋ· ϥΎϫΩϭΓέΎμϗΝΎΟίϭ  41     3835   































Case 14       
Project name Constructing Housing Building  Tal Alhow     
project # 1/2003      
Duration 8 month      
Schedule start date 14/12/2003      
Schedule finish date 14/12/2003      
start date 13/08/2004      
finish date 19/05/2005      
Contract Value 587528      
final value 604561      
Owner Palestinian Housing council       
Consultant Yafa      
contractor Bonian      
Contractor Strategy  Claimer      
        





1 23/03/2004 ιΎΧϢϴϋΪΗ ήϔΤϠϟϲϗήθϟ΍ΪΤϠϟ 49 7365 4 
2 07/09/2004 έΪΤϨϣ˯Ύθϧ΍ 48 2185   
3 27/09/2004 ΞϠΜϤΑΝΎΟΰϟ΍ϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ 96 1300   
4 27/09/2004 ΝήΒϟ΍ϥϮϟήϴϴϐΗ 90 1200   
5 27/09/2004 ΔϴδϤθϟ΍ΕΎϣΎϤΤϠϟΕ΍ΪϳΪϤΗϞϤϋ 90 1500   
6 14/10/2004 ψϤϟ΍ϭήϤϤϟ΍ϦϴΑϱΪϳΪΣΏΎΑ΢ΘϓΔϠ 8 580   
7 23/11/2004 ΔϣΰΣ΍ϊϐϣΪόμϣϒϘγϞϤϋ 8 1082   
8 25/11/2004 ρΎϔηΔΤΘϔϟΕΎδϴγ΄ΗϞϤϋ 8 1200   
9   ΓΪϧΎγς΋΍ϮΣϞϤϋ 4 147   
10 15/01/2005 έΪϨϠθϟϲϧϮϛϦϣΪϋΎμϤϟ΍ωϮϧήϴϴϐΗ 54 -18000   
11 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 47.6   
12 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 297   
13 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 117   
14 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 325   
15 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 245   
16 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 47.6   
17 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 297   
18 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 89   
19 01/02/2005 ϖϘθϟΎΑΔϴϠΧ΍ΩΕ΍ήϴϴϐΗ 90 108.5   
20 15/01/2005 ϲ΋ΰΟϕϼϏ΍ 44   11 
21 06/02/2005 ϲϠϛϕϼϏ΍ 44   11 
22 27/02/2005 ϩΎϴϣϞϴϣ΍ήΑϊΑέ΃ΔϓΎο΍ 95 2200   
23   ϩΎϴϣΩϮγ΍ΔϜΒηΐϴϛήΗ 95 9000   
24   ϖϘθϟΎΑϞϣέϊοϭ 95 2800   
25   ˯ΎΑήϬϜϟ΍ΔϓήϐϟΐθΧΏΎΑ 8 170   
26   ΔϴΟέΎΧΓέΎμϗ 21 1952   
27   ϲΟέΎΧϥΎϫΩ 21 97.6   
28   ΝέΩϦϳΰΑέΩ 21 169   
29   
ϦϣϡΪΨΘδϤϟ΍ϡΎΧήϟ΍ΔσϼΑνήϋΓΩΎϳίϝ
 53 100   
30   ΪϟϮϤϠϟϲΑήϬϛρΎϔηΐϴϛήΗ 21 334   




Case 15       
Project name Constructing Housing Building  Dewan Almothafeen    
project # 1/2005      
       
Duration 8 month      
Schedule start date 20/04/2005      
Schedule finish 
date 19/12/2005      
start date 20/04/2005      
finish date 10/01/2006      
Contract Value 564475      
final value 593254      
Owner Palestinian Housing council       
Consultant Dar Al-Handasa      
contractor Hatawee Co.      
Contractor Strategy         















1 25/04/2005 ΐϴγΎϨϣϞϳΪόΗ ΔϠψϤϟ΍ϭϞΧΪϤϟ΍  1     1100   
2   ΝέΩϞΧΪϣϞϤϋ ϡϭέΪΒϠϟήΧ΃ 90     3000   
3   ϡϭέΪΒϟ΍ωΎϔΗέ΍ΔϴϠόΗ 90     900   
    έΪϨϠθϟϲϧϮϛϦϣΪόμϤϟ΍ωϮϧϞϳΪΒΗ 54     -18000   
4 31/05/2005 ϡϭέΪΒϟ΍ρ˯΍ϮΣϝΰϋ 8     1060   
5 23/07/2005 ΏΎΤγΪϳΪΣΏΎΑϞϤϋϡϭέΪΒϟ΍ϞΧΪϤϟ 48     660   
6 03/09/2005 
ΔϟΎλΎϬϠϳϮΤΗϭϯήΧ΃ΔϬΠϟΔϠψϤϟ΍ϚϠΑϝΎϤϋ΃ϞϘϧ
ϡΎΧέϚϴΑΎΒη 90     600   
7 12/10/2005 ΢΋΍ήηΪϳΪΣϚϴΑΎΒηϞϤϋ 48     360   
8 01/12/2005 ΔϠψϤϟ΍ϡϭΰϟϮϜϳ΍ΰϣΕΎδΒΣ 90     440   
9   ˯ΎϨΒϟ΍ϝΎϤϋϷΓέΎμϘϟ΍ΔϓΎο΍ 95 14400 2.7 38880   
10 26/12/2005 έΎΠϟ΍ϊϣΔϴϗήθϟ΍ΔϘτϨϤϟ΍ΔϳΎϤΣ 48     1400   
11   ΔϴΒθΧΏ΍ϮΑ΃ϕϮϠΣΐϴϛήΗϭΪϳέϮΗ 95 33 224 7392   
12   αΩΎδϟ΍έϭΪϟ΍ϒϘγβϴγ΄Η 90     340   
13   ΐϴϛήΘϟ΍ΔϘϳήσϭΎϬγΎϘϣήϴϴϐΗϭΔϳϮϠϋΕΎϧ΍ΰΧΐϴϛήΗ 95     700   
14 02/01/2006 ΔΤμϟ΍ΕΎδϴγ΄ΗΔϘϳήσήϴϴϐΗ 53     200   
















case T       
Project name  Kan Younis School      
project # EHRP. GZE/09. R5-KY      
       
Duration 300      
Schedule start date 25/01/1997      
Schedule finish date 21/11/1997      
start date 25/01/1997      
finish date 24/12/1997      
Contract Value 735310.5      
final value        
Owner Ministry of Education      
Consultant Palestinian Economic Council      
contractor Al-Salama Co.      
Contractor Strategy         















1 22/02/1997 ΪϳΪΤϟ΍ϞϳΪόϧ ϭΪϋ΍ϮϘϟ΍ϲϓΓΪϤϋϷ΍  1     160   
2 28/03/1997 Ε΍έϮΒγΐϴϛήΗήϣ΃ 8     5100   
    ϱέΎΠϤϟ΍ςΧΔϟ΍ί΍ 47     50000 30 
3   αέΎΣΔϓήϏ 87     5800   
4   ϕϼϏ΍ 44       8 
5   ϮΠϟ΍˯ϮγΐΒδΑϒϗϮΗ 42       4 
6   ΩΪϤΘϟ΍Ϟλ΍ϮϓϞϤϋ 8   105 1050   
7   ΝέΪϠϟϞϴϧΎΑϞϤϋ 53 95 5 475   
8   Ε΍έϭΪϟ΍ϚϴϴΑΎΒηϢΠΣϲϓήϴϴϐΗ 96     200   
9   ϦϔϠΠϤΑΔϳΎϤΤϟ΍ΪϳΪΣϝ΍ΪΒΘγ΍ 53     16745   
10   Ε΍ήϤϤϠϟϦϳΰΑ΍έΩΐϴϛήΗ 48 30 75 2250   
11   ΕΎϧϮϜϠΒϠϟϮϜϳ΍ΰϣΐϴϛήΗ 8 200 14 2800   
12 25/10/1997 ϚϟήΘϧ΍ΐϴϛήΗ 53 1367 13 17771   

































Case 1: Deir El-Balah Hospital 
 This project was a community health center in Deir El-Balah, but because the 
occurrence of El-Aqsa Intifada the community center changed to a hospital. 
 The owner of this project was the Ministry of Health and the contract type of 
this project was a unit price contract and the strategy of the contractor was a 
partnering strategy. The duration of this project was 18 months and the schedule 
starting date was 25/07/1999 and the actual starting data was 15/08/1999. The delay in 
project was 19 causable days with finishing date on 14/02/2001. The contract value 
was 1470821$, but the contract close up cost was 1972933.5$. The relationship 
between the contractor, consultant, and owner was a good one. 
 Percentage of time that the project manager spent on the project was not less 
than 95% and percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 56% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 1 summarizes the results of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 



























Review of the project by the 
proper governmental agency 500 25 425 
3 27 Plan errors 1500 7 1245 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 6030 0 380 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 1500 0 94.5 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 5550 0 1748.5 
1 8 Inadequate Design 21600 0 13608 
1 8 Inadequate Design 300 0 36 
1 8 Inadequate Design 157 0 20 
1 8 Inadequate Design 3000 0 189 
7 56 Delays in the Project 40000 0 0 
8 69 
Consultants lack of judgment 
and experience 0 8 0 
9 87 A prevalent practice on this  140000 0 4725 
 
 
project and/or district 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 









Contractors lack of judgment 
and experience 1200 
0 
0 
1 5 Impossibilities 20100 0 633 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this 




Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 600 
0 
196.8 
6 54 Value Engineering 70830 2 17849 
3 29 
Change of plans or scope by 
owner 169700 5 42764 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions -8010 0 2018 
10 98 
Mechanical and electrical 
provision 150  94.5 
8 71 
Honest wrong beliefs of 
consultant 2656 0 83.6 
9 90 User needs 9534 0 1201 
5 48 Safety considerations 800 0 400 
4 43 Material non- availability 5995 0 700 
10 100 Technology changes 2429.5 0 1200 
1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 




463571.5 47 90513.3 
 
Case 2: Al-Zaitoon Health Clinic. 
 This project was a health clinic in Al-Zaitoon in Gaza . The owner of this 
project was the Ministry of Health. The contract type of this project was a unit price 
and the duration of this project was 215 days with schedule starting date 
 
 
on15/10/1996 but the actual starting on 23/10/1996. The delay of this project was 14 
causable days with the finishing date on 15/07/1997. The contract value was 
281007.06 $, but the contract close up cost was 278571.7 $. The relationship between 
the contractor, consultant, and owner wasn't a good one. 
 Percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was not less than 
95% and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 10.2% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 2 Summarizes the result of change 
orders and their impact on performance. 
 


























6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 4538  286 
1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 3350  111 
1 8 Inadequate Design 140  15 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this project 
and/or district 3523.1  230 
1 8 Inadequate Design 140  10 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 5373.7  1650 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -8710   
1 8 Inadequate Design 100  10 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1400  10 
1 8 Inadequate Design 866  400 
1 8 Inadequate Design 400  20 
1 8 Inadequate Design 200  22 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities 
of work 6334.8  2000 
1 6 Change in design request 8116.5  1700 
1 6 Change in design request -9647   





Owner desire to improve his 
financial -225   
1 8 Inadequate Design 8585.8  2704 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -3840   
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities 
of work 1469.1  466.6 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities 
of work 2535  1267 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -2040.57   
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -2632.39   
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -1307   
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -2940   
1 1 Design Errors 411.7  259.3 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -1450   
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -14220   
Total 29 
-1294.26 0 11160 
 
Case 3: Community Health Center in Deir El-Balah 
 This project was a community health center in Deir El-Balah and it consisted 
of adding a new storey and some rehabilitation. The owner of this project was the 
Ministry of Health and the contract type of this project was a unit price and the 
duration of this project was 120 days with schedule starting date on 27/01/2003 and a 
actual starting on 30/01/2003. The delay of this project was 52 days, but only 21 days 
were causable with finishing date on 22/07/2003. The main reason for the delay was a 
not enough of contractor crews to perform. The contract value was 185885.99 $ and 
 
 
the relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner wasn't a good one and 
there were some disputes among them. 
 Percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was not less than 
95% and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 2.3% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 3 Summaries the result of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 


























4 43 Material non- availability 2100 7 0 
4 44 Israeli closure  14 0 
9 90 User needs 400  10 
1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 3500  300 
1 15 
Noncompliance of design with 
owners requirements 9000  20 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities 
of work 1739.5  4025 
Total 6 
14639.5 0 4355 
 
Case 4: Nasser Hospital - Khan Younis 
This project was a community health center in Deir El-Balah and included 
adding a new building C in Nasser hospital - Khan Younis and doing some 
rehabilitation. The owner of this project was the Ministry of Health and the contract 
type of this project was a unit price and the duration of this project was 90 days with 
schedule starting date on 01/10/2003 and actual starting on 01/10/2003 the delay of 
this project was 6 non-causable days with finishing date on 06/01/2004. The main 
reason for the delay was the intensity of change orders. The contract value was 
629350 $ and the relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner was a 
good one.  
 
 
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was not less 
than 95% and percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 3.6% without 
any productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 4 Summaries the result of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 


























6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 960 0 30 
1 4 Inconsistencies 600 0 37.9 
1 4 Inconsistencies 480 0 150 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 1800 0 56.4 
1 1 Design Errors 805 0 50.7 
1 1 Design Errors 2520 0 238 
1 1 Design Errors 3570 0 112.4 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1900 0 30 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 1700 0 10 
1 2 Omissions -1000 0 0 
5 48 Safety considerations 2500 0 60 
5 48 Safety considerations 150 0 50 
1 8 Inadequate Design 600 0 0 
10 100 Technology changes 800 0 126 
5 48 Safety considerations 600 0 9 
1 1 Design Errors. 350 0 5 
5 48 Safety considerations 2400 0 0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 2000 0 200 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1100 0 320 
1 8 Inadequate Design 800 0 100 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 2743 0 259 





Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 1738 0 218 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work -540 0 0 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions -640 0 0 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions -1600 0 0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 4260 0 68 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 2320 0 37 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 3650 0 115 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 3964 0 2000 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 1070 0 101 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 824 0 78 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 3445 0 217 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 1950 0 245 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 1500 0 200 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 1250 0 40 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 1000 0 30 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 




Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 280 0 20 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 360 0 20 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 275 0 10 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 280 0 10 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 3300 0 50 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions -600 0 0 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions -225 0 0 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions -500 0 0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 325 0 5 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 150 0 5 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions -450 0 0 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his financial 
conditions -180 0 0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work -825 0 0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work -500 0 0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work -362 0 0 
3 48 Safety considerations 6380 0 100 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work -2550 0 0 
 
 
5 47 Differing Site Conditions 19389 0 2443 
Total 
56 76851 0 7900.4 
 
Case 5: Al-Shejaa'ea Elementary School for Males 
This project was Al-Shejaa'ea Elementary School for Males. The project was a 
new construction school in Gaza city. The owner of this project was Ministry of 
Education. The contract type of this project was a unit price and its duration was 300 
days with schedule starting date on 02/11/1996 and actual starting on 02/11/1996. The 
delay of this project was 13 days, only 10 of which were causable, and the finishing 
date was on 15/09/1997. The main reason for the delay was the plan error but the 
cause of the non-causable delay was the productivity loss. The contract value was 
869278 $ and the relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner wasn't a 
good one.  
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was only 40% 
and percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 32.8% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 5 Summarizes the result of change 
orders and their impact on performance. 
 


























3 27 Plan errors 100 10 100 
1 4 Design Inconsistencies 2500  472 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities 
of work 5400  85 
7 56 Delays in the Project 0  0 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 6420  202 
4 39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 3400  428.2 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 5104  80.4 
1 1 Errors 500  30 
1 8 Inadequate Design 150  15 
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9 90 User needs. 1040  32.7 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 9855  62 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 2080  13 
3 31 Change in the owner's requirements 1200  75 
1 8 Inadequate Design 350  5 
1 8 Inadequate Design 3000  378 
1 1 Errors 50  50 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1387.3  174.7 
4 39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 10500  1984 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 15520  1466.6 
9 90 User needs 500  315 
1 8 Inadequate Design 2880  362.8 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 9735.1  613 
5 48 Safety considerations 150  9 
1 8 Inadequate Design 522.7  6.6 
1 8 Inadequate Design 3981.6  501 
1 8 Inadequate Design 2100  132 
4 39 
Uncovering disclosed existing 
conditions 2660  335.2 
1 8 Inadequate Design 2600  327 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 680  10.7 
9 90 User needs 100  7 
Total 
30 94465.7 10 8272.9 
 
Case 6: Sheikh Radwan School  
This project was a new construction for Sheikh Radwan School in the City of 
Gaza. The project owner was the Ministry of Education. The contract type of this 
project was a unit price and the duration of this project was 300 days with schedule 
starting date on 02/11/1996 and actual starting on 02/11/1996 and there was no delay 
on this project so the finish date was on15/09/1997. The contract value was 869278 $ 
and the relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner fluctuated between 
good and bad.  
 
 
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project not less than 
95% and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 71.5% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 6 summarizes the result of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 


























1 8 Inadequate Design 3000  600 
1 1 Errors 150  150 
5 48 Safety considerations 1200  240 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1387.3  174.7 
1 1 Errors 500  30 
1 8 Inadequate Design 150  15 
9 90 User needs 1040  239.2 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 9855  62 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 2080  13 
3 31 Change in the owner's requirements 1200  75 
1 8 Inadequate Design 350  5 
1 8 Inadequate Design 522.72  39.6 
1 8 Inadequate Design 3981.6  426.6 
1 8 Inadequate Design 2100  60 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 23280  3638 
9 90 User needs 100  7 
Total 
16 50896.62 0 5775.1 
 
Case 7: Al-Karmel Secondary School 
This project was comprised adding a new classroom with rehabilitation in Al-
Karmel Secondary School in the City of Gaza. The owner of this project was the 
Ministry of Education. The project contract type was a unit price and its duration was 
6 months with schedule starting date on 24/11/2002 and actual starting on 24/11/2002. 
The delay of this project was 87 days, but the causable delay was 90 days. The finish 
 
 
date was on 21/08/2003; the main reason for the delay was differing site conditions 
and Israeli closures. The contract value was $209950 and the relationship between the 
contractor, consultant, and owner was a good one.  
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was not less 
than 95% and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 13.7% with 
75% productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 7 summarizes the result of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 


























5 47 Differing Site Conditions 27321.2 45 5163.7 
5 47 Differing Site Conditions 13760  2167.2 
5 48 Safety considerations 400  52 
5 47 Differing Site Conditions 210  15 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 7600  957.6 
5 47 Differing Site Conditions 1700  214.2 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 3701.2  116.5 
4 44 Israeli closure  45 0 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions -746.88  0 
Total 9 
53945.52 90 8686.2 
 
Case 8: Khalid Bin Al Waleed School  
This was a new construction for Khalid Bin Al Waleed School in Al-Nusirat 
Camp. The owner of this project was the Ministry of Education and the contract type 
was a unit price with duration of 300 days. The schedule starting date was on 
08/06/1997 and actual starting on 08/07/1997. The delay on this project was 7 days 
with 10 days of causable delay. The finishing date was 11/05/1998 and the main 
reason for the delay was Israeli closures. The contract value was $ 716573 and the 
relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner wasn't a good one.  
 
 
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was not less 
than 70% and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 49.8% with 
75% productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 8 summarizes the result of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 



























A prevalent practice on this project 
and/or district 1000  63 
1 4 Design Inconsistencies 150  94.5 
4 44 Israeli closure 0 10 0 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 3400  428.5 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 5780   
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 4250  2677 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 400  910.3 
4 43 Material non- availability 310  0 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 40256  7400 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 11180  2150 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 43360  6829 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 1400  262.5 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 300  14 
1 5 Design Impossibilities 550  20 
9 96 96Socio-cultural factors 700  50 
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1 8 Inadequate Design 1532.5  482.7 
1 8 Inadequate Design -264  0 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial -1160  0 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 500  0 
1 8 Inadequate Design 466  10 
1 8 Inadequate Design 2580  325 
1 8 Inadequate Design 500  20 
5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 11108  699.8 
9 90 User needs 413.3  13.2 
1 1 Design Errors 400  10 
1 8 Inadequate Design 750  21 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 250  40 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 150  5 
1 8 Inadequate Design 2790  87 
Total 
29 133051.8 10 22612.5 
 
Case 9: Nusairat Girls Basic School 
This project was a new construction of Nusairat Elementary Girl School in Al-
Nusairat camp. The owner of this project was the Ministry of Education. This project 
contract type was a unit price and the duration of this project was 300 days with 
schedule starting date 08/01/1997 and actual starting 08/01/1997 and the delay of this 
project was 13 days with 12 days causable delay. The finishing date was the 
17/11/1997 and the main reason for the delay was Israeli closure and the extreme 
whether condition. The contract value was $856439 and the relationship between the 
contractor, consultant, and owner was rather a good one.  
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was not less 
than 85% and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 24.9% with 
75% productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 9 summarizes the result of change 






























1 8 Inadequate Design 6000  94.5 
1 8 Inadequate Design. 1050  66.1 
6 52 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
economical construction -6930  0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 6064  1213 
6 52 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
economical construction -755.1  0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work -11448  0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 8200  2460 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 2124  486 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 4143  1726 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 243  67.5 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 730  110 
5 47 Differing Site Conditions 5900  929.2 
3 21 
Significant changes in the 
quantities of work 8127  1024 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 20225  4334 
1 8 Inadequate Design 3150  300 
1 8 Inadequate Design 3863.7  414 
4 44 Israeli closure 0 8 0 
4 42 Extreme whether condition 0 4 0 
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1 8 Inadequate Design 859.6  215 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 1785  112.5 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 832  52.4 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 74  5 
1 8 Inadequate Design 471.2  157 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this project 
and/or district 5296  834.1 
10 98 Mechanical and electrical provision 1010  63 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 2340  230 
1 8 Inadequate Design 84  6 
1 8 Inadequate Design 150  5 
5 48 Safety considerations 50000  7875 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 380  23.8 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 200  12.5 
5 48 Safety considerations 1056  66.5 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 16745  0 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 400  12 
9 90 User needs 900  141.7 
6 52 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
economical construction -2400  0 
Total 
36 130869.4 12 23035.8 
 
Case 10: Al-Qezan School 
This project was a new construction of Al-Qezan School in Khan Younis. The 
owner of this project was the Ministry of Education and contract type was a unit price 
with 300 days' duration. Schedule starting date was the 25/01/1997 and actual starting 
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the 25/01/1997. The delay on this project was 19 days with 12 days causable delay so 
the finishing date was the 10/12/1997. The main reason for the delay was Israeli 
closures and the extreme weather conditions and the non-causable delay was because 
the contractor did not use enough labor. The contract value was $735280.5 and the 
relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner was a rather good one.  
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was not less 
than 90% and percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 24.9% with 
75% productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 4.10 summarizes the result of 
change orders and their impact on performance. 
  


























1 1 Design Errors 150  2 
1 1 Design Errors 900  14.1 
1 8 Inadequate Design 5085  320 
9 87 
A prevalent practice on this project 
and/or district 5735  903.2 
4 44 Israeli closure 0 8 0 
4 42 Extreme whether condition 0 4 0 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1050  66 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 475  47.5 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 200  5 
2 18 Specified item became unavailable 1200  0 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 16745  0 
5 48 Safety considerations 2250  450 
1 8 Inadequate Design 2800  400 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 17771  4101 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 2340  156 
Total 





Case 11: Constructing Housing Building  Building 2/2005 - Rafah 
This project comprised constructing a new residential building for the 
Engineering Institute in Rafah City. The owner of this project was the Ministry of 
Public Works and Housing. The contract type of this project was a unit price and the 
duration of this project was 12 months with schedule starting date the 22/04/2006 and 
actual starting date the 22/04/2006. The delay of this project was 53 days with 60 days 
causable delay and the finishing date was the 14/06/2007. The main reason for the 
delay was the Israeli closures. The contract value was $706965.49 and the relationship 
between the contractor, consultant, and owner was a good one.  
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was only 95% 
and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 23.6% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 4.11 summarizes the results of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 


























3 27 plan error 25665  4042 
1 4 Design Inconsistencies 366 1 122 
9 83 Utility Companies 123.8  0 
6 52 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
economical construction -4000  0 
1 4 Design Inconsistencies 0  0 
1 1 Design Errors 100  6 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions -3400  0 
4 44 Israeli closure 0 58 0 
6 53 
Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 4200  900 
1 5 Design Impossibilities 600  0 
5 48 Safety considerations 650  300 




Suggestions to Initiate more 
Quality 3500  551.25 
5 48 Safety considerations 10000  1575 
1 8 Inadequate Design 476  102 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1908  360 
5 48 Safety considerations 3177  200 
9 90 User needs 195  12 
1 8 Inadequate Design 400  34 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1240  116.3 
10 100 Technology changes 1075  140 
10 100 Technology changes 1208  100 
10 100 Technology changes 600  38 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1419.5  250 
1 8 Inadequate Design 405  70 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions -2400  0 
3 32 
Owner desire to improve his 
financial conditions -600  0 
1 8 Inadequate Design 3570  255 
1 8 Inadequate Design 133.9  10.3 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1500  100 
1 8 Inadequate Design 600  10 
Total 
31 53249.7 59 9345.45 
 
Case 12: Constructing Housing Building  Building 3/2002 - Gaza 
This project comprised constructing a new residential building for the 
Palestinian Control and Investigation Board in Gaza City. The owner of this project 
was the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The contract type of this project was 
a unit price and its duration was 12 months with schedule starting date the 23/04/2003 
and actual starting date 23/04/2003. The delay of this project was 50 days of causable 
delays and the main reason for the delay was Israeli closures and differing subsurface 
conditions. The contract value was 477334 $ and the relationship between the 
contractor, consultant, and owner was a good one.  
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 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was only 95% 
and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 14.4% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 4.12 summarizes the results of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 


























5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 4679 10 294.8 
9 91 
Review of the project by the proper 
governmental agency 0 1 0 
1 8 Inadequate Design 400 0 25 
9 90 User needs 1400 0 175 
8 71 Honest wrong beliefs of consultant 14875 0 1275 
6 54 Value Engineering -18000 0 0 
1 8 Inadequate Design 6743 0 1062 
9 90 User needs 300 0 20 
9 90 User needs 2500 0 5 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 3455.2 0 544 
9 90 User needs 800 0 150 
1 8 Inadequate Design 486 0 50 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 300 0 40 
4 44 Israeli closure 0 24 0 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 254 0 40 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 1680 0 112 
5 48 Safety considerations 2185 0 350 
1 8 Inadequate Design 736 0 63 
1 8 Inadequate Design 253.5 0 31 
5 48 Safety considerations 81 1 25 
5 48 Safety considerations 440 14 50 
Total 




Case 13: Constructing Housing Building  Building 1/2002 - Rafah
 This project entailed constructing a new residential building in Rafah city. The 
owner of this project was the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The contract 
type of this project was a unit price and its duration was 8 months with schedule 
starting date in 23/04/2003, actual starting date in 23/04/2003, and finishing date in 
04/03/2003. The contract value was 276879.5 $ and the relationship between the 
contractor, consultant, and owner was a good one.  
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was only 95% 
and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 0% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 4.17 summarizes the results of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
 
























4 41 Strikes 3835 0 966.4 
5 48 Safety considerations 292.4 0 18.4 
Total 2 
4127.4 0 984.8 
 
Case 14: Constructing Housing Building  Building 1/2003 - Gaza 
This project entailed constructing a new residential building for the Palestinian 
Control and Investigation Board in Gaza City. The owner of this project was the 
Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The projects' contract type was a unit price 
and its duration was 12 months with schedule starting date in 14/12/2003, actual 
starting in 13/08/2004, and the project's delay was 37 days, but the causable delay was 
only 26 days. The main reason for the delay was Israeli closures and differing 
subsurface conditions. The contract value was 587528 $ and the relationship between 
the contractor, consultant, and owner was a bad one as the contractor strategy was 
claimer.  
 The percentage of time the project manager spent on the project was only 95% 
and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 8% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 4.18 summarizes the results of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  
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5 49 Differing subsurface conditions 7365 4 928 
5 48 Safety considerations 2185  276 
9 96 Socio-cultural factors 1300  0 
9 90 User needs 1200  400 
9 90 User needs 1500  415 
1 8 Inadequate Design 580  15 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1082  137 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1200  250 
1 4 Design Inconsistencies 147  18.5 
6 54 Value Engineering -18000  0 
9 90 User needs 47.6  7.5 
9 90 User needs 297  46.8 
9 90 User needs 117  18.5 
9 90 User needs 325  51.2 
9 90 User needs 245  38.6 
9 90 User needs 47.6  7.5 
9 90 User needs 297  46.8 
9 90 User needs 89  14 
9 90 User needs 108.5  17.1 
4 44 Israeli closure  11 0 
4 44 Israeli closure  11 0 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 2200  75 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 9000  1984 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 2800  840 
1 8 Inadequate Design 170  20 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 1952  369 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 




Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 169  21.3 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 100  0 
3 21 
Significant changes in the quantities of 
work 334  10 
5 48 Safety considerations 78  10 
Total 
31 17033.3 26 6051.8 
 
Case 15: Constructing Housing Building  Building 1/2005 - Gaza 
This project comprised constructing a new residential building for Personnel 
Department of the Palestinian Authority (Diwan Almothafeen) in Gaza City. The 
owner of this project was the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The project's 
contract type was a unit price and its duration was 8 months with schedule starting 
date in 20/04/2005, actual starting in 20/04/2005, and the delay of this project was 22 
days and it was non-causable delay. The reason for the delay was that the contractor 
company was a novice one in the field without any experience. The contract value 
was 564475 $ and the relationship between the contractor, consultant, and owner was 
a bad one. 
 The percent of time the project manager spent on the project was only 95% 
and the percentage of change orders initiated by the owner was 92% with 75% 
productivity (Table 2.2) for the project. Table 15 summarizes the results of change 
orders and their impact on performance.  


























1 1 Design Errors 1100 0 207 
9 90 User needs 3000 0 0 
9 90 User needs 900 0 141 
6 54 Value Engineering. -18000 0 0 
1 8 Inadequate Design 1060 0 250 
5 48 Safety considerations 660 0 40 
9 90 User needs 600 0 75.6 
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5 48 Safety considerations 360 0 22.7 
9 90 User needs 440 0 55 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 38880 0 10800 
5 48 Safety considerations 1400 0 200 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 7392 0 1120 
9 90 User needs 340 0 45 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 700 0 100 
6 53 Suggestions to Initiate more Quality 200 0 50 
9 95 Change in economic conditions 3500 0 500 
Total 
16 42532 0 13606.3 
 
 
 
 
 
